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4Editors’ foreword
The phenomenon of continuing Belarusian social and economic stability has
fascinated domestic and foreign economists, sociologists and politicians for many
years. The Belarusian economic model survived dozens of gloomy forecasts about
its imminent collapse, whereas the population does not show any active signs of
discontent, despite substantial limitations on economic freedom and civil liberties.
Furthermore, despite the clear difference in living standards compared to the CEE
countries that successfully pursued market reforms, Belarusian society has been
distinctly cautious about any changes that might improve these standards. By the
mid%2000s, Belarus seemed to have reached a «counter%revolutionary phase», when
elites were able to cope with governing the state, while the masses have no appetite
for fundamental changes. Reforms were advocated by a tiny layer of experts and
activists of the political opposition only.
Numerous attempts have been made to explain the phenomenon of Belarusian
stability. Those explanations, apart from referring to the preemptive nature of
Alexander Lukashenko’s regime, focused on external sources of support for the
Belarusian model (primarily via Russian oil and natural gas subsidies). There have
also been references to the «traditional», parochial character of Belarusian society,
which by definition would not dare to pick a bone with the authorities, or discuss
alternatives and make up its mind about options. Such interpretations are not solid,
though. Countries with a much easier access to cheap and easy money have often
proved unable to keep the social compliance level high enough to avert political
and social shocks. If the Belarusian regime manages to respond to any challenge
and opposition, why should it bother about social support at all? Why did state
expenditures on social programs and wages «skyrocket» in pre%election years,
despite the seeming pointlessness of Belarusian elections? Why have efforts to
uphold the status quo redoubled in what seems to be the most progressively%minded
social groups? Why has the state, which is adequately «protected» by numerous
special services, been promoting new priorities and pursuing not only a policy
towards higher wages and salaries, but also a course aimed at infrastructure
development and modernization?
Deliberations about modern Belarus are too often limited to the analysis of
citizens’ attitude to the specific people in power, especially the President, whereas
analyses of in%depth factors of the relationship between society and the system as a
combination of functions rather than separate representatives have been almost
completely lacking. One possible instrument to shed light on the mystery of
Belarusian stability is the social contract theory – a modern interpretation of the
classic theory of social contracts suggested by prominent French thinkers of the
XVII century. The social contract is based on an explicit or tacit (non%verbal)
agreement between the authorities and society stipulating mutual obligations and
limitations pertaining to the mechanisms engaged to pursue their interests. It is
owing to this agreement that both parties (the authorities and citizens) enjoy certain
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guarantees – security for the former (on condition it meets the minimum package
of commitments to citizens); and well%being for the latter (as long as they play by
the rules formulated by the authorities either in cooperation with citizens or
independently).
An administrative system based on the framework of the social contract
provides for certain advantages enjoyed both by the authorities and society. The
state reduces the likelihood of being forcibly replaced by suppressing the
motivation of citizens for advocating change, even if this means devoting vast
resources to «buy loyalty» at the expense of rivaling power clans. By waiving
certain rights and claims, citizens receive guarantees of stability and security in
their everyday life. Even when the social contract is struck at a relatively low
level of social commitments, it could prove more advantageous for citizens to
abide by the terms than to strive for more, because the attempts to achieve «more»
may result in a serious deterioration of personal living conditions. Furthermore,
the results of protests are often uncertain, and benefits unclear. Rephrasing one
French revolutionary, few are ready to sacrifice their small personal happiness
for the sake of great happiness for all.
The existence of the social contract in any system is at odds with the view
that the system exclusively depends on fear and reprisals (they are not ruled
out, though, apparently being a part of tacit agreements). By analyzing the
social contract in Belarus we formulated the following general assertion:
Belarusian stability is based on public consent to the state of things in the country
determined by the authorities. The authorities provide the minimum package of
obligations promised to society. Obviously, this deal was not reached using
democratic procedures, but the social contract is not an exclusive feature of
democratic countries.
Historically, the social pact (contract) evolved differently in various countries,
marking the patterns of development of society. Countries with a stronger civil
society witnessed the formation of a horizontal social contract. Society adapted its
organization to its relationship with the authorities and relations of its businesses
with the regime. Weaker civil societies saw the state apply its hierarchical model in
its relations with the economy and society. Belarus is characterized by the vertical
social contract, where representatives of various social groups, being unable to reach
an agreement on mutual rights with each other, «cede» their rights to some
sovereign. The sovereign starts redistributing these rights without the consent of
the groups involved.
Vertical social contracts in most CIS member%states are rooted in their common
Soviet past. The standard formula of the social contract between the authorities
and society in the Soviet model looked like this [coined by satirist M. Zhvanetsky]:
«You make believe that you work, and we make believe that we pay you». This type of
contract is notable for the simplicity of stimulation/consent mechanisms and a
multitude of «sticks», that is, instruments to coerce groups into honoring the
contract. There used to be no mechanisms of voluntary withdrawal from the
contract, and any minor deviation was considered an attempt to escape, with all
ensuing punitive consequences.
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The history of the social contract in Belarus is quite long and is connected with
the traditions of the paternalist nation and «the best Soviet republic» conceived
under the charismatic leaders of the Soviet past – Kirill Mazurov and Petr Masherov.
Originally, president Lukashenko only maintained that tradition, which contributed
a lot to his popularity on the one hand and helped preserve the system, in which
the authorities exert control over society by using relatively economic «contractual»
instruments without large%scale application of force on the other. That contract
used to remain primitive for a very long time. «Anything for a life without war» –
this pattern of the social contract between the authorities and pensioners amply
outlines the minimum package that about a quarter of the population wants from
the government. The state is ready to deliver this package and even guarantee a
certain increase in wages and pensions apart from general public order and clean
and tidy streets.
However, in the early 20th century, the Belarusian authorities were faced with
completely new social requirements that were to a great extent a result of the state
wage pushing efforts. The state had set itself a «rating trap», when social
commitments got broader, but the government was not always capable of meeting
them. As a result, the state has to make steps towards economic liberalization, one
purpose being to maintain the contract with those whose expectations it could
barely satisfy. Also, the state started supporting, implicitly and explicitly, an «exit»
from the contractual framework into the private sector, or labor migration.
What can a study of the social contract bring on besides satisfying our
curiosity? An understanding of the nature of mutual obligations and assessment
of the level of their performance allows not only to explain the status quo, but to
provide political and civil actors with a set of positive messages that may be
perceived by society on the basis of its demands and expectations. We believe such
proposals are possible primarily in the areas where the contract is not carried out
in full measure, and commitments fail to correspond to expectations. In the segments
that maintain this balance, alternative actors should be extremely cautious in their
proposals, keeping in mind the balance of convenience, and refrain from
promoting revolutionary changes.
We need to emphasize that the social contract may be modified both from
«above» and from «below», and modifications may range from minor to very
significant. Sometimes it suffices to change the type of social contract (horizontal
vs. vertical), but most often only the form (formula) changes. The social contract is
altered from «above» in order to avert possible public discontent or as a delayed
reaction to certain manifestations of public discontent. Changes originating from
«below» come from negotiating sides, which can take various forms of dialogue
between society (separate groups) and the authorities. For negotiating sides to
work efficiently, certain conditions must be met: researchers note the importance
of the noncommercial sector (various NGOs, business unions, think%tanks and other
organizations), its unity, clearly worded demands (conditions), and maturity and
competitive nature of the political field). In Belarus, the NGO sector and non%
governmental expert community are weak (including business unions), both
economically and organizationally; politics are dominated by a single vision, and
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political parties are scattered and perform the role of dissidents and human rights
organizations. Whereas the horizontal contract is characterized by actors’
communicating with each other in search of a compromise, the vertical contract
only allows a dialogue with the authorities. The efficiency of this type of dialogue
in terms of changing the current situation remains low. People prefer adapting while
almost completely disregarding the «voice» option, that is, political protest. The
regime does not hesitate to use repressive mechanisms and promotes «managed
voice» alternatives – complaints to the state about the state (state%controlled
housing and utility agencies and courts, local authorities, etc.), government%
organized non%profit organizations (Belarusian Republican Youth Union, etc). At
the same time, the state closely follows the level of public consent/discontent, and
if negative developments accrue, the state is there to interfere (and introduce the
«one%stop» principle in the work of local authorities, cut red tape, and combat
corruption, roll back reforms in social benefits, and many more).
Now that social guarantees and benefits as well as real wages and pensions have
shrunk, the population finds it easiest to resort to the textbook adaptation strategy.
The authorities are actively reformatting contractual relations with the basic social
groups by slashing the «social package». The modifications of the social contract
in the «authorities%business» framework (liberalization of the business environment
commenced in late 2008 – early 2009 in the wake of the global crisis, which in
some degree affected Belarus) had been advanced almost exclusively from «above»,
under tight control of regulatory bodies; the authorities only allowed proposals of
the business community that fitted the bill.
The efficiency of reformatting and modifying the social contract parameters
from «below» is contingent upon the protest potential of Belarusian society, which
is completely insignificant. Not more than 4% of Belarusians are ready to personally
take part in any protest actions (this holds for all social groups). A necessary
precondition for establishing the horizontal social contract is the restoration of the
institutes of public discussion and real democracy. This may take decades. Therefore,
in the next few years Belarus will have to live with the broken or modified old
contract and rudimentary new one.
The editors and authors would like to express their appreciation for Pavel
Daneiko, who was the first one to identify and discuss the phenomenon of the
«Belarusian miracle» in terms of the social contract. The staff of the IPM Research
Center took an active part in conducting the research, discussing its findings and
writing this book. NOVAK axiometric laboratory helped collect factual evidence in
the framework of the study. The editors and authors also appreciate the invaluable
contribution of Mikhail Zalesski and Yury Chavusau, who analyzed legal information
and political documents. The Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies and authors
are grateful to Eurasia Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and Stefan Batory





SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Kiryl Haiduk
1. INTRODUCTION
What makes the Belarusian socio%political system stable? Many analysts and
observers have considered Belarus – a non%market economy with no open political
competition – as a country that should eventually embark on the path of systemic
reforms, following the path of the vast majority of former socialist countries. Many
representatives of alternative political forces were expecting economic problems
to be too grave for the wheels of state to overcome, so a new development scheme
would inevitably be chosen. The reality proved quite different, though. On the one
hand, there are no crisis tendencies in the economy, despite the global economic
downturn. On the other hand, some analysts have noted the weakness of alternative
political forces, which do not seem to enjoy the public support they are supposed
to have.
Some researchers point at the change in the scheme of legitimization of the
political authority, which enables it to preserve social support. It is maintained
that back in the mid%1990s the support for President Lukashenko was a charismatic
one, whereas by the 2001 elections it had been replaced by a «rationality%based»
backing.1 Belarusian philosopher Valentin Akudovich highlights the problem of
incomplete national formation in Belarus on the debris of the collapse of the USSR:
population simply wanted to swap the chaos and uncertainty of the early 1990s for
stability and confidence (Akudovich, 2007). The buildup of the nation%state began
with the return to the symbols of the «great past time» (i. e. pre%Soviet), but for
most Belarusians the symbols were too abstract vis%а%vis the promises to stop the
«slide into the abyss».
Indeed, the authorities managed to reach an economic expansion (Haiduk et al.,
2004), which was essential for forming a rational electoral support. However, this
rational support called for a continuous growth of incomes, which at the initial
stage led to a reduction in the poverty level (Haiduk, Chubrik, 2007), and then
ignited the improvements in the consumption standards. However, improved
standards of living also imply qualitative changes in social behavior that could set
a «motivation» (o «rating») trap2: prosperity growth entails an upgrade in social
1 See: «Political Situation in Belarus in 2007: In Search of a New Vision», the Russian version:
http://www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/political%20situation%20in_
blr_paper_ru.pdf and the English version: http://www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/
documents/political%20situation%20in%20br_paper_eng.pdf.
2 See http://www.nmnby.org/pub/0709/27d.html.
9demands, which cannot be satisfied within the framework of the existing economic
system so further changes become very likely (Kruk, 2008).
An important economic and political factor of social stability was the political
business cycle (see the discussion in Haiduk et al., 2004, Haiduk, Pelipas, Chubrik,
2007), within which the standard of well%being «on average in the economy» was
increased prior to crucial political events. The cycle was primarily based on the
increases of the average wage in the economy due to the maintenance of controls
over the wage setting in Belarus. The costs of such policies were slowdown in real
incomes in the post%electoral periods, but it would bring wage and income standards
to a whole new level. Enterprises had no other option, but to pay higher wages. In
order to follow this policy, the state supported economic entities with preferential
loans. The cyclic nature of income flows contingent on the political events is
observed throughout the entire period under review (see, for example, Kruk, Pelipas,
Chubrik, 2006).
The occurrence of the cycle all along the entire decade may seem unexpected:
rational expectations theory claims that political business cycles cannot be sustained
since voters can be «cheated» by politicians only once. Over time, citizens are better
capable of predicting the economic policies so it becomes harder to run the cycle
(Cukierman, 1992; Lucas, Rapping 1972).
However, the use of political business cycle has been uninterrupted in Belarus.
This indicates either the «irrationality» of Belarusian voters (which is unlikely),
or the fact that the relations between the state and society are based on some stable –
in a way contractual – principles, that is, an exchange of loyalty for certain benefits.
This prompts us to use the term «social contract».3
The social contract hereby stands for an implicit agreement between the state
and the main social groups, in which parties are more or less aware of the costs and
benefits of their behavior. We also need to take into account the regularity and
intensity of the contract, which is a result of collective actions. Whereas the costs of
the protest are clearly perceived by one party (the punishment for a «default» on
contract), the benefits of protests against the terms of the contract are not always
clearly identified, while non%participation options are more appealing and even
sanctioned by the authorities.
This book dwells on the issue of the social contract in an effort to shed light on
the reasons behind the sociopolitical stability in Belarus. The social contract is not
a written, but as an «as if», agreement. Its existence is premised upon the assertion
that the era of charismatic support of political authority is over, while the use of
coercive mechanisms is limited due to the costs it entail Moreover, coercive methods
cannot be applied to many spheres of social life: in the framework of the relations
between the state and the basic social groups there is a place for rationality that we
3 This term had been introduced previously: it was noted at the BISS «Towards a New Vision of
Belarus» conference of September 10–12, 2007, that the social contract included not only
material aspects (preset by the functioning of the political business cycle), but also «moral»,
ethical political aspects, such as the idea of the role of the state in society, the notions of social
justice, solidarity, etc. The conference report is available at http://www.belinstitute.eu/images/
stories/documents/reportrus.pdf.
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try to define and analyze .This rationality cannot be reduced to a mere mentality,
historical or cultural factors. It is embedded into the processes of social interaction
and may be described in terms of costs and benefits, and the choice of behavioral
strategies in various repeated situations. There are theories exist for a better
understanding of these processes.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section discusses approaches
to socioeconomic stability, which is necessary to understand the social contracting.
This theoretical discussion provides us with the clues on how to conduct the
research. The third section describes the principles of empirical analysis and provides
data characteristics.
2. SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THEORIES OF SOCIAL ORDER AND
STABILITY
The origins of social theories that use the notion of the «social contract» can be
traced to the works of Thomas Hobbes. According to him, the social contract is the
social order secured by the state. Beyond this order a human life is «solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short» (Hobbes, 1964 [1588]), which is why, according to Hobbes,
people rationally pursue a «hypothetical» social contract, under which they
voluntarily submit to their sovereign. Other citizens behave in exactly the same
way, and no one is motivated to breach the contract. The state grants its citizens
with certain rights, freedoms and benefits, whereas citizens show loyalty to the
state.
However, the state, with its coercion leverage, is capable of doing whatever it
wants with its citizens. In essence, this makes the social contract asymmetrical.
According to this logic, man does not reach an agreement with the state, but accepts
the conditions the state imposes from «above». On the other hand, the general
provisions of the contract are implicit, and are to a large extent created in the process
of the interaction between the state and the citizen. Can we recognize this «act of
violence» as a contract?
Hobbes notes that people voluntarily comply with the terms of social contract
for a simple rational reason: it is better to live in security rather than choose the
«bellum omnium contra omnes» option and linger in constant fear. At the same
time, there should be a third party, a monarch and arbiter capable of using violence
in case citizens seek to exit the contract or breach its provisions. The contract is
therefore built on the power of rational judgments and the possibility of enforcement
measures in case rational assumptions are distorted.
It follows that the stable monopoly of power allows the creation of enclaves of
peaceful and secure life, where citizens can be beneficially engaged in economic
and other activities. Citizens are not distracted in making investments and ensured
in the safety of assets and gradually get accustomed to the dreadful «Leviathan»,
and trust it more and more.
Turning to economic theory, the contract is defined as a private institute
(agreement), which envisages a certain mechanism of support for regular
transactions between the parties to the contract. Contracts can reduce transaction
Kiryl Haiduk
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costs and encourage exchange (Novgorodtsev, 2006). However, in economic life,
contracts are often well specified and set the framework of relationships in various
recurrent situations. In contrast, the social contract is peculiar for its implicit nature,
complexities related to social relations and «bounded rationalities» (Weiland, 2008)
of the parties. Constant interactions between the parties are required in order to
adapt to dynamic transaction terms, because the social contract does not stipulate
specific conditions from the outset. In its turn, adaptation is a result of «exchange
of signals» between the parties (Posen, 1995).
The process signaling may be illustrated by looking at the strategic interactions
among central banks, firms, and workers (Iversen, 2000). The latter reduce the
«inflationary markup» when bargaining over their wages and tend to coordinate
their wage demands if the central bank «signals» its intention to adopt non%
accommodating monetary policies. In case wage demands are inflation%adjusted,
monetary non%accommodation leads to unemployment growth, and wage workers
will be punished for their uncompromising attitude. In turn, central banks may opt
for less tough policies, provided that firms and employed workers «signal» their
intention to constrain wage demands (and actually do so) leading to lower costs
for firms. As a result, unemployment level remains unchanged at best. These strategic
interactions were observed in a number of Western European countries in 1950s –
1970s (see Iversen, Eichengreen, 1999).
Exchange of signals is observed in the spheres other than economic domain.
The channel is mass media. The texts broadcast or published by the media define
the range of socially%acceptable, «normal» behavior along with the unwanted
behavior patterns. By transmitting the acceptable models of interaction between
the authorities and social groups the media indicate how each text should be
interpreted and how the addressee should act (Yefimova, 2009). Socially acceptable
behavior patterns may be allocated among three distinct patterns: «loyalty»
(approval), «exit» (refusal, understatement), and «voice» (active denial, protest)
strategies.
The social contracting scheme thus comprises economic, political and
ideological aspects. Provision of material benefits is combined with the use of force,
or repression (formal, legally established procedures) that builds up loyalty, and
ideological settings describing the behavior models recommended by the state.
The theory of sociopolitical order developed by Antonio Gramsci is often
referred to by researchers that work in political economy, as it provides a coherent
framework integrating political, economic and social aspects. According to Gramsci
(1991), sociopolitical stability in any state is based on combinations of coercion
and consent, compulsion and persuasion, legal and moral relations, controls and
self%controls. The ruling elite uses a number of tools to perform the «control
function» in «political society», which is regulated by formal legal provisions, and
the «leadership function» in «civil society», where there are no formal hierarchic
mechanisms, but civil society members accept the existing structure. Stability in
any state is maintained not only by the coercive machine; rather, social and political
stability is based on the «concentration of consent» and production of common
ideological and cultural formulae (Gramsci, 1991).
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Gramscian theory characterizes authoritarian societies as having weak civil
societies. In democratic western countries there is a system of well%ordered relations
between the state and society, or, to simplify, «political» and «civil» society; whereas
in «oriental» societies the state was «everything», not «just a forward trench, with
a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements» of civil society behind it
(Gramsci, 1991). Apparently, the situation in Belarus is somewhere in between
these two margins. Gramsci mentions a «transitional stage» between the
dictatorship of political society (totalitarian state) and «traditional hegemony»
(democratic state), «characteristic of certain situations in which the exercise of
hegemonic function becomes difficult, while the use of force would involve too
many dangers» (Gramsci, 1991).
Theories of political economy reveal the ways sociopolitical and economic
institutions are «strategically» interrelated. The central message of French
Regulation School is that economic growth, development and changes in political%
economic systems are not propelled by economic factors alone (especially
«accumulation of capital»), but also by the so%called «mode of regulation» (Dunford,
1990). The term «rйgulation» [which could be translated as «regularization» or
«normalization»] differs from «regulation», as it describes the concurrent operation
of mechanisms that reproduce and modify the system, as well as transform it in the
long run. The term emphasizes the combination of regulation and self%regulation
processes.
According to the regulation theory, a stable interaction of political and economic
factors fits into the framework of three interrelated concepts. The «accumulation
regime» denotes stable relations between production (including factor productivity,
comparative importance of industries and sectors, etc.) and consumption (structure
of demand) through distribution of GDP among investment, consumption and
profit. The «accumulation regime» functions due to a set of supporting institutions
that forms the «mode of (social) regulation». The latter is defined as an array of
institutional forms that provide the context for socioeconomic relations and
practices. For example, the distribution of profits between investment and
consumption depends on the existing system of collective bargaining (or, more
precisely, the degrees of its centralization), and social safety net (welfare state).
The «mode of regulation» therefore allows stabilizing the contradictory and
uncooperative behavior of individuals and groups with a view to adapting it to the
operation of the capital accumulation system and securing sustainable economic
growth. Furthermore, mode of regulation also comprises the «societalization mode»,
or processes of social cohesion and public integration. These processes to a great
extent weave the fabric of the social contract.
In other words, the trajectory of social and economic development is heavily
influenced by social factors, including social relations and political actions. The
mode of regulation determines the type of relations between employers and wage
earners, the nature of competition among companies, and monetary and credit
mechanisms, relations between the national and global economies, and the form of
state interference in the economy. One of the central processes is the relationship
between capital and labor, especially the organization of work and pay systems
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(the distribution of the output among consumption, in the form of wages and salaries,
profit, and accumulation in the form of investments).
The proponents of regulation theory have applied their theory to various
economic systems, including the Soviet and post%Soviet ones (Boyer, 1997). The
starting point was the declaration that various socioeconomic systems are
characterized by certain instruments to coordinate economic relations and manage
them. According to Aglietta (1979), the market economy is based on wage relations
and resolution of the macroeconomic conflict: consumption versus investment (as
in the «accumulation regime»). In the Soviet system, the main pillar was the
resolution of the conflict within the production%accumulation%distribution triad.
The key role in the Soviet system was played by the state (Altvater, 1993), and
regulation almost fully prevailed over self%regulation. Nevertheless, Sapir (2002)
notes regular cyclical fluctuations of production, investment, factor productivity
and even employment (among major sectors) in the Soviet system of regulation.
He also points at some features common with market economies; however, in the
Soviet system prices played almost no role in product distribution.
The Soviet economy must have tried to repeat the success of western «Fordism»,
but it failed to match the development of the consumer goods sector while constantly
improving the quality of consumption. First of all, the Soviet system apparently
lacked a distinct stimulus to produce consumption goods (Smith, Swain, 1998, p.
275). Recessionary trends were perceptible as early as the 1970s and had been
caused, among other, by a gap between the real macroeconomic behavior and formal
institutions and rules. The period was marked with the appearance of strategies for
«exit», participation in informal activities and establishment of connections, etc.
In due course, a parallel, or shadow, sector emerged, as formal institutions appeared
to be lacking in flexibility to respond to challenges to the system and address all
crisis contradictions (Altvater, 1993, p. 23). The crisis of the USSR was therefore
can be interpreted as a crisis of the Soviet «regulation system», which proved
incapable of efficiently coordinating the activities of its elements.
At the same time, the stability of social relations in the USSR was based on the
exchange of certain benefits offered to the working class (as the largest social group)
for its political loyalty. Some researchers have discovered that there used to be a
sort of social contract in the USSR, and it showed the first signs of decay in the late
1980s, including for economic reasons. According to Cook (1993), the Soviet social
contract consisted in the following: «… the regime provided broad guarantees of
full and secure employment, state%controlled and heavily subsidized prices for
essential goods … and egalitarian wage policies. In exchange for [these benefits
and] such comprehensive state provision of economic and social security, Soviet
workers consented to the party’s extensive and monopolistic power, accepted state
domination of the economy, and complied with authoritarian political norms»
(Cook, 1993, p. 2).
Perestroika questioned the fundamental provisions of the Soviet social contract.
The Gorbachev leadership’s agenda included an increase in wage differentials, price
reforms, and facilitated the appearance of private businesses, which brought about
social stratification. The disintegration of the Soviet social contract was
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accompanied by mass protests, including rallies (Borisov, 2000), but protests
subsided later on.
According to Haggard and Kaufman (Haggard, Kaufman, 1995), economic
problems in authoritarian societies often result from the tendency for authoritarian
leaders to hold power for too long, at least longer that required from the point of
view of sustainable socioeconomic development. These leaders break accountability
mechanisms and start to rely on certain clients, delivering coercion for many social
groups. However, Haggard and Kaufman admit that authoritarian rule may be useful
when the previous order has collapsed, and a new one has not been created yet.
During the initial period a concentration of political power delivers solutions to
collective action problems: for instance, investors are not eager to spend money
amid political chaos. Uncertainty of any kind, including the vagueness connected
with repartition of power, prompts many players to choose short%term, short%sighted
strategies, or straddle the fence. This is why authoritarian governments, which
guarantee order and irremovability of power at least for some time, help address
the problem of collective actions in the economic sphere.
However, Haggard and Kaufman note that problems arise when authoritarian
governments stay in power for too long while allowing no change when it is needed.
In their economic management efforts they start relying on the clientele, which
leads to economic inefficiencies. The thing is that authoritarian rulers as a rule
tend to form closed political structures despite the fact that they originally were
supported by wide public. In the course of time the social group that determines
who stays in power narrows, because economic competition is stifled, corruption
thrives, and private initiative is strangled. Only the team of confidants, who aspire
to additional economic influence through the use of political leverage, have their
property rights properly protected. Whereas in democratic countries the social
group that determines the ones in power is formed by the majority of ordinary
voters, in authoritarian countries this group is much smaller and comprises
bureaucrats, the leadership of the ruling power, the military, etc.
Political leaders are rational and strive to remain in power. They are aware
that their political survival depends on how long they will be able to provide their
supporters with certain benefits. Also, they should prevent crises. The efficiency of
policies «takes backseat», while the ability to choose the groups that can ensure
the most significant support is brought to the forefront. The difference between
democracy and autocracy lies in stimuli determining the institutionalized behavior
of leaders.
This logic is formalized in The Logic of Political Survival by Bueno de Mesquita
(De Mesquita et al., 2003), who indicates three basic parameters that influence the
incentives of politicians. These are the size of the so%called «selectorate», the
«winning coalition», and the balance between them. The «selectorate» denotes
everyone who takes part in electing a leader (for example, in democratic countries
it is represented by the electorate, voting citizens, while in totalitarian countries
selectorate only includes party leaders). The «winning coalition» is defined as a
subset of the selectorate that receives «private benefits» from the leader in exchange
for loyalty and support during political campaigns (in democratic countries it is
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formed by members of the party in office, and in totalitarian regimes it is a small
faction that holds the levers of power). In turn, «private benefits» range from
ministerial portfolios in democratic societies to key roles in corruption transactions
in nondemocratic regimes. Public benefits are meant for all other citizens.
In this way, de Mesquita et al. maintain authoritarian leaders are aware that to
preserve their power they need to conduct what they believe to be a rational policy
in a given politico%institutional context. In authoritarian regimes, the winning
coalition is small compared to the size of the selectorate, and leaders have to focus
on providing relevant benefits for its members in such a way that the others will
tend to lose. It happens this way because small coalitions cannot efficiently respond
to wide demands of masses, which is why economic policies are built on the provision
of private benefits to the clientele. Therefore, a «suboptimal» economic policy (also
mentioned by Haggard and Kaufman as emerging due to the fact that the
authoritarian model lingers after it plays its positive role) may be politically rational,
but not viable in the long run.
In democratic regimes the size of the coalition that supports the leader (through
the election mechanism) is larger than the selectorate; for that reason the likelihood
that the members of the group (in fact, the majority of voters) will win does not
depend on who is in power: in democracies, leaders require about half of the
selectorate’s votes, therefore the most efficient way to retain power is to provide
public rather than private benefits, for example, education, infrastructure, health
service, etc. In this way, democracies distribute the fruit of economic growth among
the majority, the entire selectorate, and not the narrow group of the «winning
coalition».
It is crucial for authoritarian regimes to keep the members of the coalition certain
that the flows of private benefits will remain uninterrupted in the foreseeable future.
Problems may appear because a «bad» economic policy has its limits, and sooner or
later the economy will encounter difficulties. Masses see public benefits dwindle
as the flows of private benefits peter out. De Mesquita et al. (2003) speak of the
role of international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which provided support for authoritarian leaders helping them to retain
power by holding back reforms.
However, not all authoritarian regimes are doomed to failure. The successes of
authoritarian regimes, according to Besley and Kudamatsu (Besley, Kudamatsu,
2005), depend on the availability of mechanisms of selection of successors and
accountability. Their empirical study shows that leadership change is positively
associated with higher rates of economic growth. For instance, In Mexico, Partido
Revolucionario Institucional stayed in power for a long time because of the internal
competition mechanisms allowing leadership turnover. Interestingly, the party
resorted to the political business cycle instruments: votes were «bought» before
elections  by way of increasing budget expenditures and pushing wages, etc.
(Magaloni, 2006).
What happens in Belarus ? It would be interesting to test the concept by Bueno
de Mesquita, but it is a research of its own. For instance, one of the difficulties is to
look at how the structure of the «winning coalition» changes, and determine its
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composition. From the point of view of the social contract with various social groups,
its very existence proves that the size of the selectorate may be larger than in a
simple dictatorship. This may be proved by the fact that the benefits of economic
growth have been distributed in favor of the lower%income households, and social
expenditures have remained at quite a high level for a transition economy.
As we see, theories to one extent or another indicate the methods political
leaders use to maintain the loyalty of citizens. This may be achieved through the
creation of a «winning coalition» (De Mesquita et al., 2003), or labor market
institutions that settle labor and wage conflicts (Boyer, 1997). Political leaders
that head entire states may manage them as organizations that offer their members
(citizens) certain benefits. If the state offers insufficient or low%quality benefits,
citizens%clients cease to consume these benefits or make signals about the necessity
to improve their quality by staging a public protest.
Hirschman (1970) uses the terms «exit», «voice» and «loyalty» as the axes
that political leaders rely on to reduce the risk of a coup d’Etat or mass protest. In
the scope of this «triad of strategies», «exit» (non%participation in social or political
life, withdrawal to shadow economy, etc.) is crucial, as it allows reducing the level
of coercion and «monitor» potentially active adversaries of the political system.
Hirschman’s concept, originally developed for organizations and their employees,
or firms and consumers of their products may as well be applied to political systems
(Hirschman, 1978).
However, the value of the concept for our analysis is not its parsimony. For
instance, if product quality declines, the consumer would switch preferences (in
conditions of a competitive market) in favor of another product («exit») or make a
complaint in one form or another («voice»), whereas if it is impossible to buy exactly
the same product or the consumer has a fondness for this brand, he or she will
continue buying it («loyalty»). In fact, «voice» and «exit» are found in many
everyday situations.
Hirschman’s theory is valuable to our study, as it allows analyzing the range of
strategies available to the parties to the social contract. Whereas the concepts of
De Mesquita and Haggard and Kaufman focus on how political leaders build their
relations with social groups, Hirschman’s concept allows analyzing the behavior of
social groups, understand their motivation and forecast possible responses to
changes in the situation. Besides, it is a useful instrument to interpret the
mechanisms of collective actions.
3. HIRSCHMAN’S CONCEPT
Hirschman seeks to understand how organizations, whether firms or nation states,
can improve their efficiency. He analyzes the set of strategies available to citizens%
customers. The first one is «exit». For example, a product quality decline leads to a
reduction in sales revenues, because customers switch to a substitute, thus alerting
the firm to the necessity to improve quality. As a rule, this strategy is chosen by
«alert» customers, whereas inert ones continue as buyers, showing loyalty to the
product. Another mechanism to detect and eliminate «repairable lapse» is «voice»,
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acting as a complement to «exit» or as a «substitute» for it (Hirschman, 1970,
p. 33).
Hirschman defines «voice» as «any attempt at all to change rather than to escape
from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective
petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority
or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to
mobilize public opinion» (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30). In a political system, voice has
the «articulation%of%interests» function of this or that group.
«Exit» and «voice» jointly form a framework, in which the expression of voice
depends on exit opportunities and «elasticity of demand» for goods. All other
conditions being equal, the role of voice increases as the opportunities for exit
decline. The absence of exit opportunities would eventually give voice the role of
the only «reaction function», otherwise exit becomes the main reaction to
deterioration (Hirschman, 1970, p. 35).
Exit is originally preferred to voice because in comparison to the exit option,
voice is costly. The choice between exit and voice often depends on how the
«effectiveness of voice» is (subjectively) evaluated. According to Hirschman, «if
customers are sufficiently convinced that voice will be effective, then they may
well postpone exit», which is chosen at an early stage of disagreement about the
deterioration (Hirschman, 1970, p. 37). It appears that voice can be a substitute for
exit as well as a complement to it.
On the one hand, the use of voice is always costly. For instance, a protest may
result in a loss of job. On the other hand, when comparing protest costs and
benefits, citizens customers take into account collective action factors. A reference
to Mancur Olson (1971) is appropriate here. According to his collective action
theory, people will not express their protest unless they are aware of its benefits
and are certain that a «critical mass» of protesters supporting a change in the
current situation will be reached. The voice costs and collective action factor can
therefore enfeeble the development of voice as a behavioral strategy (Hirschman,
1970, p. 43). Reprisal may weaken voice by raising its costs and making the exit
option more appealing.
The coexistence of voice and exit (as complementary or mutually exclusive
options) is possible because there is the third option – «loyalty», – which, in its
turn, makes exit less likely (Hirschman, 1970, p. 77). At the level of nations, loyalty
may be attained through offering material benefits, as well as non%material,
ideological factors. Loyalty, according to Hirschman, «far from being irrational,
can serve the socially useful purpose of preventing deterioration from becoming
cumulative, as it so often does» (Hirschman, 1970, p. 79). In other words, loyalty
may constitute a barrier to exit and a «residual» strategy if voice proves too costly.
It may be propelled by the sense of affiliation with a social group, organization or
state, but unlike faith and trust, loyalist behavior retains reasoned calculation.
High entry costs or serious punishment for the use of exit may increase the
attractiveness of loyalty. At the same time, as soon as more and more participants
notice that the organization is doomed to failure, loyalty disappears, giving way
to voice or exit.
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One should note that «voice» is mostly efficient when it is a collective response
based on horizontal ties. A study made by Levada%Center shows that Russian
society has no horizontal solidarity of this kind, which makes people rely on the
«close circle» of social ties. Furthermore, voice costs are too high (because
democracy is rather weak), so exit becomes a more attractive option, provided
there is a chance, which, in turn, increases the appeal of loyalty for the rest of the
population.
Hirschman illustrates the interaction of voice, loyalty and exit using the example
of school education. A decline in quality of public (free) schools encourages better%
off parents to send their children to private schools (thus choosing the exit option),
characterized by a better%quality education. Exit is preferred to voice here, despite
their equal availability, because the latter is more «cumbersome» compared to exit,
as it requires the calculation of consequences under uncertainty. Besides that, the
lack of coordination among the participants enfeebles voice. Voice is only chosen if
the participants are certain it will be efficient (that is, if voice is «heard» or accounted
for). Alternatively, exit consists in searching for a meaningful alternative. As soon
as it is found, welfare improvements occur. Competition, therefore, weakens voice
and is responsible for the inclination to choose exit.
The withdrawal of children of richer parents from public schools results in
further deterioration of the quality of education, but schools are incapable of
noticing this decline it in the short run. This happens because pupils from well%to%
do families constitute a small part of students; at the same time, private schools,
where well off parents send they children, offer no exit option at all, and parents
tend to resort to voice to improve education quality in the instance of «last resort»
(for instance, they demand new teachers, improvements in the physical
infrastructure, etc.). Some parents prefer staying «loyal», though, and keep their
children in public schools, as they are certain the situation will improve in the long
run.
In economics, entrepreneurs and investors may also «vote with feet» looking
for the best possible «business climate» (Hirschman, 1978, p. 100). Hirschman notes
that «capital flight … was perceived as a salutary restraint on an arbitrary
government both by Montesquieu and [Sir James Steuart] Mill» (Hirschman, 1978,
p. 99), and is a factor helping to improve the efficiency of state administration.
Smaller economies are especially sensitive to capital outflows, because their internal
investment resources are limited.
More broadly, the exit%voice%loyalty triad, according to Hirschman, may be
used in the «analysis of state» and «political behavior» (Hirschman, 1978). One of
the aspects of this analysis is the political effects of «institutionalized [channels of]
exit». An important result of the presence of these channels is the fact that as soon
as they become available (as an instrument to settle the conflict), the exit practices
become «self%reinforcing», so that the power of voice, which is the essence of political
process, becomes restrained (Hirschman, 1978, p. 95). With exit available as an
«outlet for the disaffected», the voice option became less appealing: «the ships
carrying the migrants contained many actual or potential anarchists or socialists,
reformers and revolutionaries» (Hirschman, 1978, p. 102). For instance, mass
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migration thus reduced social protest in the European%American state systems as a
whole and not only in the sending countries (Hirschman, 1978, p. 102).
Hirschman’s theory may thus be applied to studies of social behavior strategies.
The theories of sociopolitical stability briefly discussed above show that politicians
build their relations with society by balancing consent with coercion. Because the
latter envisages costs and has efficiency limits, it is preferable to elaborate effective
mechanisms of achieving consent. These mechanisms cannot be imposed from above,
but are formed as a result of interaction with the behavioral strategies that tend to
be selected by the parties to the social contract.
One of the objectives of this book is to reveal these strategies as reactions of
citizens%customers to the framework set by the state. At the same time, the strategies
are not universally applicable for all, but differentiated, which is why we consider
the social contract with various social groups.
4. THE GROUPS OF SOCIAL CONTRACT IN BELARUS
We identify social groups depending on their social mobility possibilities, which
differ according to the levels of accumulated human capital. Human capital to a
great extent determines the social chances of an individual. Economic changes
call for new skills, which must be provided by either an efficient retraining system,
or enterprises themselves. On the other hand, the state may interfere in the
economy and restrain reform and thus creating no demand for new skills. However,
such intervention might prevent inequality from rising, but may adversely affect
the external competitiveness of the country. In market economies the welfare
state has played an important role in the protection of certain skills, but in a way
compatible with maintaining competitiveness of domestic firms on foreign markets
(Iversen, 2002). The state saw «demand» from various population groups, and
politicians who came to power would reach coalition decisions that satisfied the
majority.
It is logical to stipulate that various population groups have various demands
for public benefits, and – based on what has been said above – these demands differ
depending on how people evaluate their capabilities, the level of accumulated
«human capital» and possibilities of its utilization in this or that sector of the
economy, which is expressed in the position on the labor market that the individual
takes.
Besides the considerations related to human capital and its protection by the
state, we have heavily leaned on the experiences with opinion polls conducted by
NOVAK sociometric laboratory and Independent Institute of Socio%Economic and
Political Studies (IISEPS). In particular, the following social groups have been
identified: young workers and students, wage workers, entrepreneurs, pensioners
and civil servants4. In order to be able to categorize respondents, we used the
4 Besides, depth interviews with civil servants were conducted. Their results are studied in a
separate research.
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question about the occupation of the respondent with possible answers below
(Table 1).
Table 1
Occupations of employed respondents
The group of wage workers (the employed, to be more precise), includes
the following categories: (1) workers of enterprises/organizations (answers 4
and 5), (2) state%paid workers [public sector employees] (answer 8), (3) civil
servants (answer 6), servicemen, etc. (answer 7) and those who make products
for further sale in households or choose the answer «other» (that is, typically
the self%employed). The group of wage workers appeared to be the largest one;
the remaining groups will be addressed separately. The affiliation criteria are as
follows: these people are not owners of businesses and are in employment at a
private or state entity. Their economic status is greatly determined by the
employer, and the same is true for their career prospects. As for the self%
employed, they are, as a rule, small producers or suppliers of services. They
accept market conditions shaped by the state policies and behavior of large
companies.
The study used the data collected based on focus groups (three groups were
conducted with budget%paid workers, three with wage workers and two with young
workers) and during a nationwide poll5  (representative sampling, 1,577 people aged
18 to 75, including 833 employed persons). The subgroups that we will use for
comparison are the following:
• state%paid workers (public sector employees, civil servants and servicemen) –
20.5% of the group; and non%budget sector workers (employees of enterprises
and organizations, and those working in households) – 79.3%;
• private sector employees (20.7%) and public sector employees (79.2%).
The main characteristics of the «employed» group at large and two subgroups
are presented in table 2.
Occupation % 
1. Owner (co-owner) of an organization, business (employer)  0.8 
2. Top executive (senior manager), director (except in schools)   0.5 
3. Middle manager, deputy director (except in schools) 3.5 
4. Qualified specialist, manager 15.6 
5. Worker, vendor, etc. 24.9 
6. Civil servant 1.8 
7. Serviceman, law-enforcer, etc. 0.8 
8. Budget-paid employee (teacher, medic, librarian, maintenance and utilities worker, etc.) 8.3 
9. Individual entrepreneur, farmer 1.1 
10. Household worker making products for sale  0.3 
11. Pensioner 26.7 
12. Student 7.5 
13. Homemaker 2.8 
14. Unemployed 4.4 
15. Other 1.2 
 




Some characteristics of «the employed» group
Source: calculations are based on Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) research
 The 
employed 
Non-budget Budget Private Public 
The employed 100.0 79.3 20.5 20.7 79.2 
Place of residence      
Brest region 12.8 11.8 17.0 10.4 13.5 
Vitebsk region 12.7 12.5 12.9 12.1 12.9 
Gomel region 15.4 14.8 18.1 12.1 16.3 
Grodno region 13.5 13.7 12.3 9.8 14.4 
Minsk region 12.7 12.4 14.0 9.2 13.6 
Minsk 20.8 23.7 9.9 39.9 15.9 
Mogilev region 12.0 11.0 15.8 6.4 13.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Settlement size      
Over 1 million (Minsk) 20.9 23.7 9.9 40.1 15.9 
100,000–500,000 32.7 30.5 40.7 31.4 33.0 
50,000–100,000 5.5 5.4 5.8 2.3 6.4 
10,000–50,000 16.6 15.6 20.3 12.8 17.5 
5,000–10,000 2.5 3.0 1.2 0.6 3.0 
Fewer than 5,000 21.8 21.8 22.1 12.8 24.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Gender      
Females  47.8 41.2 73.3 34.3 51.3 
Males  52.2 58.8 26.7 65.7 48.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Age      
18–24 10.4 10.7 9.9 17.9 8.6 
25–34 26.1 26.0 26.2 31.8 24.5 
35–44 26.2 26.5 24.4 30.1 25.1 
45–54 30.3 29.8 32.0 16.8 33.7 
55–64 6.8 6.7 7.6 3.5 7.7 
65 + 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Internet use      
Daily  8.5 9.2 5.8 21.4 5.3 
A few times a week 12.1 10.1 19.9 17.3 10.7 
A few times a month 8.9 7.1 15.2 9.2 8.8 
Once a month or less frequently  6.1 5.4 8.8 5.8 6.2 
Do not use  61.8 65.2 49.1 45.7 66.0 
Do not know what Internet is 2.5 2.9 1.2 0.6 3.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Education      
Primary and lower 0.7 0.9 0.0 3.5 0.0 
Junior secondary 1.2 1.1 1.7 0.0 1.5 
Secondary 18.1 20.7 8.1 20.9 17.4 
Specialized secondary (technical school, college) 32.4 33.3 29.1 32.0 32.5 
Vocational training (training school) 24.7 27.2 14.5 21.5 25.6 
Higher 22.9 16.8 46.5 22.1 23.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Monthly income      
Sufficient, can put money aside monthly 7.1 7.6 5.2 10.4 6.4 
Can put month aside, but not regularly  47.9 47.0 51.2 49.1 47.5 
Can make both ends meet 35.5 35.8 34.3 27.7 37.4 
Not sufficient at all, deny themselves every necessary 5.3 4.8 7.0 4.0 5.7 
No answer/Undecided 4.2 4.8 2.3 8.7 3.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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5. CONCLUSION: SOCIAL CONTRACT IN CONTEMPORARY
BELARUS
Our study is based on the premise that the political system of any state cannot be
based on repression and coercion, as the elements of public consent are vital for its
survival over the long run. However, in non%democratic societies it is the state, and
not civil society, that sets the framework of the consensus by offering material and
non%material benefits in exchange for citizens’ loyalty. Because the state plays the
dominant role in the political and economic life, whereas civil society remains
relatively weak, their interrelationships are asymmetric.
This asymmetry does not rule out the presence of bilateral relations, though.
Although the parties to the social contract are not in equal conditions, there are
instruments to express protest, or at least signal problems. Therefore, the state has
to somehow account for them. These signals are perceived by the state, which aims
at seeking consent. Furthermore, there are possibilities of «exit», or alternatives
located beyond the space controlled by the state. Moreover, the applications of
coercive mechanisms have their efficiency limits. In fact, any authority is interested
in having its actions meet the expectations of the majority, if it is to remain in
power over the medium to the long runs.
Following Hirschman, we consider the state as an organization that offers its
citizens%customers certain benefits. If the level/quality of benefits is insufficient,
customers may either cease consuming them, thus choosing the strategy of non%
participation, or demand improvements. According to Hirschman, citizens%
customers have two options, namely, «exit» (strategy of non%participation in public
or political life) and «voice» (to signal problems or protest). The choice of either
way indicates that the third option – «loyalty», or adaptation to the existing
situation, – is not selected. If costs of voice are high, loyalty may be preferred. The
latter may also be chosen because of ideological settings, that is, subjective sense of
attachment, non%material factors.
In brief, here is the logic design our study is based on, but we use it not because
it is simple and applicable to a broad range of social situations. Firstly, it is in line
with some of the releveant theories of social order and stability, which suit well to
understand the situation in Belarus. Secondly, these are «macrosocial» theories,
whereas we are trying to understand the «microsocial» motives. Thirdly, proceeding
from the definition of the social contract we gave above, the suggested logical scheme
corresponds with many of its aspects, for instance, it enables us to detect and analyze
which social strategies each party to the social contract tends to choose in order to
reduce uncertainty.
From the perspective of social groups, we consider the «demand» for state services
in terms of social security, especially at the level of protection of the accumulated
human capital. This is one of the axes of the empirical part of our study, which in
many aspects correlates with the poll%based experience accumulated by Novak
laboratory and the IISEPS, as they frequently indicate the similarity of opinions
within the social groups we identify. We have also accounted for other important
aspects of social contracting, including non%material and ideological factors.
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When it comes to non%materials aspects, the system of values configured by
media messages is of particular interest. The value settings may enhance loyalty
thereby weakening the attractiveness of voice. One should remember that in our
study we proceed from the subjective estimates of social group members and make
use of available statistical data, but only for the sake of illustration or an additional
source of information.
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Chapter 2
SOCIAL CONTRACT: WAGED WORKERS
Alexander Chubrik, Kiryl Haiduk
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter investigates the structure and content of the social contract with
waged workers in contemporary Belarus. The structure of this chapter is as follows:
the first section addresses the roots of the social contract in order to give a clear
picture of the existing situation. The second section analyzes some specific
mechanisms of its work, namely, labor market regulation (including employment
and wage controls). Specifically, we emphasize the instruments to punish for
«disloyalty», ways to «pay for loyalty» and the use of sanctions. The third session
considers the available possibilities of «exit» as a means to stabilize the
implementation of the social contract in a way that waged workers always have a
chance to choose an alternative, which weakens the power of their «voice». In
the fifth section, we consider the recent challenges to the Belarusian economy.
We believe they may be serious enough to entail a revision of existing agreements
related to implicit social contracting. The extent of the possible «revision» of the
social contract depends on the anticipated and real impact of the global financial
crisis on the Belarusian economy. At the same time, there is an addition room
opens for a dialogue, production of positive messages, including those for
alternative political forces.
2. THE SOURCES AND ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
WITH WORKERS
2.1. Sources of the social contract with workers
The idea of the social contract broadly lies in the fact that stable relations are
built and maintained between the state and social groups. The parties of the
contract offer each other certain benefits – not necessarily material goods –
including symbolic ones (among them are indications as to mutually acceptable
behaviors).
The Belarusian economy in many aspects lags behind other former socialist
economies by the extent of reform (take the share of the private sector in GDP,
which remains between 20% and 25%, one of the lowest levels for countries in
transition, see EBRD (2009)). The state still preserves controls over prices, wages
and important labor market institutions. Furthermore, the government imposes
growth targets on industrial manufacturers and sees that all the targets are met.
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The prevalence of political and social motives over purely economic factors against
the background of socio%political stability all suggests that Belarus may have a
peculiar kind of tacit «as if» agreement between the authorities and major social
groups. We classified in our preliminary study the groups based on the degree of
their dependence on the state and economic situation, which is to some extent
controlled by the authorities. This investigation looks into the relations with waged
workers as a significant social group in Belarus.
Before embarking on our study we should note that the group of waged workers
is not homogeneous. There is no «representative» member in the group; however,
the case of workers may be used to display the functioning of the social contract,
from direct participation in the contract to the stabilizing component, located
beyond the contract, namely, the possibility of «exit».
When describing the preferences of the parties to the social contract, we will
focus on the following points. One of the key considerations  for the authorities is
certainly the absence of any public protest. Representatives of the currently ruling
political class currently in power must remember well the protests of the early
1990s. The doubling in prices in April 1991 resulted in mass protests of workers at
large Minsk%based factories (Minsk Electrical Works, Automated Lines Works,
Gear Works and some departments of Minsk Tractor Plant). The protesters mostly
wanted their wages adjusted proportionally to inflation. Prior to that, in 1989,
miners of Soligorsk came out on strike in solidarity with the miners of Donetsk
and polar regions. «Gomselmash» workers were also on strike in 1990 to seek higher
«Chernobyl» allowances.
The protests clearly came as a surprise both to the authorities and the
representatives of alternative political forces (see Sovetskaya Belorussia of April
24, 1991). At least 40 Minsk%based enterprises and two trolleybus stations were on
strike on April 24, 1991, and in Orsha protesters threatened to disrupt train services.
The government was forced to make concessions, and the wave of strikes subsided.
The strike committee of Minsk Automobile Plant decided to discontinue the protest
as early as April 25. The June 1991 program of economic reforms was based on the
necessity to preserve a «socially%oriented» market economy as a «strategic
orientation». This basic principle has remained unchanged thus far and is safely
embedded in the current economic policy of the state.
The strikes became a clear indication to the Belarusian authorities that society
is not passive. Firstly, they proved that a spontaneous strike was not impossible;
secondly, they showed that the main reason behind the protests was the uncertainty
of workers and their fear of losing their jobs, which could mean an increase in poverty
in conditions of an underdeveloped private sector. Besides, the workers used to
have «specific assets» (Williamson, 1996) highly valued in the Soviet economy.
They could not be easily transferred between various fields of activity in a new
situation. Many workers had no experience in entrepreneurial activities, whereas
foreign companies were not eager to come to Belarus.
An essential economic goal the authorities were to fulfill was to secure jobs at
large enterprises while increasing incomes on a regular basis (to catch up with the
constant rise in consumer prices, an effect of the devaluation of the national
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currency) in order to stave off poverty among the employed population. The
maintenance of full employment therefore became a cornerstone material component
of the social contract, which was reckoned with when correlated with the other
constituents of the contract and factors that ensure its stable performance. At the
same time, it would be more appropriate here to speak about the regulation of the
labor market as a whole, including wage controls.
In addition, the stability of relations governed by the social contract is built on
the possibility of «exit», which in the given case may be represented by private
sector opportunities, work in the informal labor market, or labor migration. Even
the Belarusian government admits that the share of the shadow economy stands
between 10 and 15% of GDP, and takes it for granted rather than perceives it as a
serious problem. According to Gurr (1970), the number of alternatives for the
protest%oriented social classes is in inverse proportion to the likelihood of a collective
social protest. Olson (1963) juxtaposes modernizing societies and modern industrial
societies and notes that the former were characterized by political instability because
of the absence of a mechanism to compensate to those who were «losing» as a result
of the modernization process. In turn, such institutes as the welfare state and social
security programs rendered industrially developed economies more efficient (see
also Boyer, 1997).
It has been noted that there was a sort of social contract back in the Soviet
Union, its main component being the industrial class (Cook, 1993). The essential
commitments under that contract were to ensure full employment and provide
a broad range of social benefits, namely, housing, health service and education.
Adam (1991) suggests the following elements of the Soviet social contract: (1)
right to employment; (2) entitlement programs; (3) stable low prices for staple
goods; (4) even distribution of incomes; (5) accessibility of education, including
higher education. In this study we are more interested in elements (1) to (3)
than in the rest of them. In the 1990s, the Soviet social contract started changing
dramatically, especially as far as universal full employment was concerned
(Chapman, 1991). Belarus also saw the Soviet social contract modified, but the
authorities attempted to preserve control of the labor market in order to
maintain full employment.
2.2. Labor market control as an element of the social contract
The share of the manufacturing sector in the occupational structure decreased in
the period 1991 through 2006, while the share of the service sector expanded (one
reason was the appearance of a small%sized private sector). Nevertheless, the
potential of the private sector in creation of jobs remains insignificant. Officially,
the share of the «private sector» in the national economy stands at 45%, but this
figure covers the workers employed by joint%stock companies (which in fact may
be regarded as former state enterprises) to a greater or lesser degree controlled by
the state via stock ownership. At the same time, waged workers traditionally have
education – more than half have graduated from some education establishment,
including training colleges and vocational schools.
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The policy to maintain a high employment rate (including through the use of
budget subsidies) is the material benchmark of the social contract. The Belarusian
social safety net barely covers the unemployed: a jobless person cannot have a decent
unemployment benefit (which hardly exceeds a quarter of the minimum wage),
moreover, to receive it he or she must agree to be engaged in public works and take
on some other commitments.
A more important advantage is the relatively low, but stable income. Based on
the political business cycle, all wages are increased prior to the important political
events (Haiduk et al., 2006). The single%tier pension system completely controlled
by the state makes a withdrawal from official employment bringing forth a lower
pension in the long run. Private pension schemes are almost non%existent.Finally,
some social benefits used to be distributed through enterprises (although the scale
of benefits and distribution schemes decreased subsequently). For example, larger
manufacturers offered their employees kindergarten and polyclinic services, as well
as holiday recreation centers. Trade union organizations at large enterprises also
could provide additional support by paying bonuses for seniority or material aid to
the needy. According to focus group participants, the «official trade unions» are
always on the side of the «administration», but you can sometimes (at least once a
year) reap a benefit, say, a discounted hotel voucher or lower children’s summer
camp fees. This makes vacations partially «guaranteed», that is, workers are spared
the necessity to set money aside the whole year just to pay for the summer break.
The state has always been keen on retaining its monopoly on relations with
workers, and the domain of independent trade unions has been progressively
narrowed. They had to appeal to the International Labor Organization, but the
situation with the rights of independent trade unions – according to their
representatives – has changed for the better only slightly (see various materials on
the website «Trade union movement in Belarus» at http://www.praca%by.info/).
Another failure of Belarusian independent trade unions was their inability to
overcome the «contractual employment» system, that is, a transfer from permanent
labor agreements to fixed%term contracts (one to five years), despite an organized
nationwide campaign.
Fixed%term labor agreements, or «contracts», superseded, in spite of a chilly
welcome from employees, all other employment schemes. Nearly all participants of
focus groups noted that contracts restrained their rights, but nothing could be done
about it. The dependence on the state or authorities got even stronger, while the
«contractual system» has become an integral part of the social contract. Fixed%
term contracts is an instrument of sanctions, a punishment for protests, or a reminder
about the potential sanctions for disloyalty. According to representatives of
independent trade unions, fixed%term contracts were also used to get rid of activists
of independent trade unions: they simply did not have their contracts prolonged. A
loss of work, especially in Belarusian regions, where the number of jobs is limited,
was particularly painful. It appears that any actions that fail to fit in the acceptable
framework of relations between the authorities and a citizen may result in a loss of
work for waged workers. This is an immediate sanction for disloyalty and a guarantee
that the punishment is inevitable.
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Besides sanctions, the authorities have preserved the mechanism of enouraging
loyalty by way of establishing tight wage control in order to prevent wage
differentiation. Since 1998, the state has campaigned for reducing the differences
in labor compensations. Those emerged in 1994%1998, when enterprises were
allowed to set their own wage rates, and naturally resulted in wage differentiation
both inside industries and between them. The government decided to respond and
narrow the wage gaps. However, some enterprises are still capable to pay higher
wages due to special agreements with the state.
At the same time, wage control was used within the framework of political
business cycles (Haiduk et al., 2006) to raise incomes before important political
events. This has serious repercussions for the economy, since increases in real wages
periodically exceeded the growth of labor productivity. Maintenance of employment
and wage increases proved to be costly so the state resorted to bank loans, which
were not always provided for purely economic reasons. Moreover, the resources
that could otherwise have been invested were spent to buy «loyalty» of waged
workers.
Whereas waged workers were offered a gradual reduction in wage differences,
managers were provided economic incentives if they were successful. There were
attempts to raise salaries of executives and peg them to performance indicators. In
the first half of 2008, the government passed a number of legislative acts to increase
salaries of managers at state enterprises through higher bonus payments.
Furthermore, some scales and tariffs were adjusted.
The social contract with waged workers was reshaped in that period as far as
employment and wages were concerned. While employment support remained one
of the material pillars of social contract (even though the efficiency of producers
was affected), tight wage controls were successfully used to reduce wage
differentiation levels. Furthermore, wage rises were regular, albeit cyclical. Yet,
remuneration rates are lower than those in the neighboring countries; payments
for labor are not sufficient to ask for loans to pay for housing or take part in private
retirement pension schemes. The contractual employment system has made the
threat of sanctions for disloyalty appreciable and immediate. However, workers
have always had an option to «exit», connected with the work of the private sector,
informal labor market and temporary labor migration.
3. STRUCTURE OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT: A STUDY
3.1. Formulation of the hypotheses
Workers are the major group engaged in the interaction with the state, given the
fact that about 80% of the Belarusian workforce is involved in the public sector.
This explains the higher degree of reflection on the influence of the state upon
the life of this social group, compared to all other groups, – nearly 90% of workers
once in a while ponder on how the state shapes their lives. In other groups, the
share of those who are «being aware of» is about 10 percentage points lower, see
Figure 1.
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Source: BISS
Figure 1. Answers to the question: «How often do you think about how the state
influences your life and the life of your family?»
In fact, there are two social subgroups – persons of the preretirement age and
youth (younger than 25) – that are better aware of the «active role» of the state in
their lives than people in the other clusters. These two subgroups are quite
concerned over the state’s influence (the former are getting ready to retire, while
the latter are preoccupied with their future careers). At the same time, the «youth»
group shows the higher proportion of those who never think about the influence of
the state on their lives, with over 18%, compared to the average of 12.4% in other
age groups. The frequency reflection on the relations with the state suggests that
these groups are better aware of the «contract» with the state and its features. The
ratio we propose here is as follows: the higher the subjective assessment of the
quality of human capital, the lower the observed degree of reflection on the relations
with the state. Young people seem to have insufficient capital because of their age,
whereas preretirement persons «acquired» their capital back in the Soviet times.
The following hypotheses are formulated:
1. The higher the degree of subjective dependence on the state, the stronger
the demand for public social benefits.
2. The degree of conformity of the offered benefits to the expectations
defines the proneness to using the possibility of «exit».
3. The higher the subjective liquidity of human capital, the lower the
subjective dependence on the state. The higher the mobility of human
capital, the stronger the inclination to «exit» and disposition to «voice».
3.2. Conformity of state actions to expectations
The level of expectations from the state is calculated based on the following
methodology.
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Respondents were asked to choose whether it is important that the state should
be responsible for the 16 activities below:
• make it possible to earn money;
• provide preferences, benefits;
• provide pensions;
• pay educational allowances;
• provide free secondary education;
• provide free higher education;
• provide quality health services;
• protect from crime;
• extend 100% guarantee of bank deposits;
• guarantee employment;
• provide free health services;
• secure political stability;
• guarantee due course of law, so that I could settle disputes in courts;
• see that employers meet their obligations to employees;
• make it possible to be engaged in business activities;
• assist in housing acquisition, provide concessional loans.
Possible answers included «very important» (code «2»), «rather important»
(code «1»), «rather not important» (code «–1») and «not important at all» (code
«–2»). The weighted average was calculated according to the following formula:
1 2 3 4(2 1 1 2 ) /( ),x x x x N NA⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ −
where x1,….4 is the number of respondents that chose one of the suggested answers
(from «very important» to «not important at all»), NA is the number of respondents
that were undecided. The final result may vary from 2 (x1 = N – NA) to –2 (x4 =
N – NA), that is, from «very important» to «not important at all».
In order to evaluate the conformity of the state actions in the 16 given areas to
expectations, a question was asked to indicate what the state really does in each
domain. The results were calculated using the same formula. The negative sign
may be interpreted as default of obligations, whereas the positive sign may be
perceived as a failure to meet obligations fully.
Finally, the percentage of conformity of the state actions to expectations was
calculated (the quotient of the second and first indicators multiplied by 100). The
results are presented in Table 1.
From workers’ point of view, the key functions of the state (in the decreasing
order) are provision of quality health services, protection from crime, making it
possible to earn, protection of workers’ rights, independent judicial service/rule of
law. Only three key functions of the state from the workers’ list got into the top%
five rankings of other social groups (in which pensioners constitute more than half
of the total number), namely, quality health services, protection from crime and
independent courts (other groups added pension provision and political stability
to the list of staples). A conclusion we can draw here is that workers generate high
demand for the services that they find very hard to pay for using only their incomes,
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but these services are irreplaceable if really required. In other words, workers show a
strong demand for the social benefits that enable them to exist in the system with state
wage controls and restrained private sector.
Table 1
Level of expectations from the state and conformity
of the real situation to expectations
Source: estimates based on BISS data
When it comes to the conformity of the state to workers’ expectations, they
believe the state’s chief achievements are free medical services and education (both
secondary and higher), as well as assistance in acquisition of housing and protection
from crime. Workers almost fully agree with the rest of the social groups here –
except for housing, which is replaced by political stability in other groups’ top%five
list.
On the whole, the level of workers’ expectations from the state is higher than that
of other social groups (by 23%). However, compared to other social groups, the
state conforms to the expectations of workers to a much lesser degree (by 45.2%).
Only 11.5% of all workers are satisfied with the policy of the state, compared to
25.8% in other groups. Two more questions were asked to additionally check the
conformity of the state policy to the expectations of respondents: (1) does the state
take a good care of some social groups (most of which can be considered the most
vulnerable)? and (2) which state expenditures should be reduced, which
expenditures should be increased, and which should be left without changes (the
classification of expenditures matched the list of social groups from the first
question). The answers are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
In terms of the «care» of the state for specific social groups, four privileged
groups were identified – civil servants, militia and other law%enforcement agencies,
athletes and servicemen – with the average exceeding 1 for each group (that is,
Level of expectations Conformity to 
expectations 
Conformity to 
expectations, per cent 
Areas of state activity: 
Workers Others Workers Others Workers Others 
100% guarantee of bank deposits 1.48 1.19 0.03 0.11 2.2 9.2 
Free health services 1.46 1.32 0.71 0.83 49.0 63.1 
Possibilities to earn 1.65 1.02 –0.02 –0.07 –1.0 –6.7 
Possibilities of business activities 1.06 0.63 0.07 0.13 6.4 20.8 
Protection of workers’ rights 1.61 0.99 0.03 0.10 2.1 9.9 
Employment guarantees 1.55 0.89 –0.27 –0.20 –17.5 –22.7 
Protection from crime 1.67 1.61 0.40 0.59 24.0 36.4 
Quality free secondary education 1.32 0.79 0.66 0.76 50.3 96.4 
Quality higher education 1.12 0.70 0.55 0.64 49.4 92.4 
Quality health services 1.70 1.77 –0.24 0.12 –14.3 6.7 
Benefits 1.25 1.45 –0.19 –0.01 –15.3 –0.3 
Independent courts, compliance with law 1.60 1.53 0.19 0.44 11.6 28.4 
Decent pensions 1.42 1.54 –0.33 0.02 –23.4 1.3 
Political stability 1.50 1.60 0.33 0.56 22.0 35.3 
Assistance in housing construction, 
concessional loans 
1.46 0.93 0.41 0.42 28.3 44.5 
Educational allowances 1.03 0.64 0.29 0.36 28.2 56.6 
Average 1.43 1.16 0.16 0.30 11.5 25.8 
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corresponding to an answer that could be formulated as «rather [takes] very good
care»). As for other groups, which could be categorized as vulnerable and at the
same time deprived of the state care, according to workers, they include children
and large families (with around 0.5, that is, «rather not very good care»). One should
note that children and large families are the groups that are most susceptible to
poverty risks, and the perception of the state «care» for them may be rooted in the
myths propagated by the official media.
Note: The indicator is based on the distribution of answers to the question: «Does the state take a
good care of the following population groups in Belarus?» The answers «good care» («bad care»)
were coded «2» («–2), and «rather good care» («rather bad care») were coded «1» («–1»),
respectively. After that the average weighted index was provided, weights being the shares of
respondents choosing the suggested answers in the total number of respondents in a relevant group,
except for those undecided. The «average without four» is the arithmetic average for all groups,
save for four, which cannot be classified as «vulnerable»: civil servants, the police, servicemen and
athletes. The «average of four» is the average of these four groups.
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 2. State «care» for various social groups
The remaining eight groups may all be included in the «rather bad care» division.
The unemployed and rural population clearly stand out from the other because of
high poverty levels, which characterizes the perception of the social safety net by
workers as not very efficient.
The presence of the «privileged» groups (officials, law enforcers, athletes and
servicemen) is perceived negatively and interpreted as a redistribution of budget
funds from the «right» areas to the «wrong» ones – this is evident from the
alterations in the budget expenditure pattern proposed by workers. The number of
respondents advocating reductions in the four «privileged» expenditure items was
on average 30% and more above the number of proponents of increases in financing.
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The remaining ten items saw the number of respondents supporting a rise in
spending some 60% above the number of those wishing to have expenditures
«sequestered».
Note: The indicator is based on the distribution of answers to the question: «Which state expenditures
should be increased and which expenditures should be reduced?» and represents the difference
between the share of those who chose the option «to increase financing» and those who believe that
financing should be cut (the percentage was calculated as a ratio to the number of respondents who
provide a definite answer, that is, were not undecided). The «average of four» and «average without
four» are the same as for Figure 2.
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 3. Correspondence of the state expenditure pattern to
the pattern valued by the respondents
The most poorly financed expenditure items were, in workers’ opinion, (a)
public health service (the majority of respondents named its poor quality one of
five key problems in Belarus); (b) pensions, educational allowances and benefits
and (c) education and science. Simultaneously, the educational scheme was called
a serious achievement of the Belarusian state (see table 3), that is, workers believe
it is an area that can be perfected endlessly.
The ideological clichйs that promote the notion of the dominant role of the
state therefore work to boost demand for a greater state support in various
spheres. Apparently, unreasonable expectations create a situation when most
of the waged workers do not believe the state actions conform to their
expectations (see above).
When encountered with the failure of the government’s real actions to conform to
their expectations, people start relying primarily on themselves without reducing the
level of expectations from the state (which turn into a sort of stereotypes about what
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the state must do). Evidently, the reward for loyalty offered by the state has to a
great extent a «mythological» nature, and leaves ample room for «exit» (Haiduk,
Chubrik, 2009). At the same time, since all expectations are about future events,
there is always hope that they will ultimately be satisfied (assuming that in the
past living standards were improving). Because only a few expectations have been
fulfilled, namely, those regarding employment and pay increases, there is always
room for improvement. This hope contributes to the stability of the social contract;
it is part of the «rationality» of waged workers.
3.3. Waged workers and social contract groups
To identify social contract groups, a cluster analysis was performed based on the
following questions:




• your education and education of your children;
• your employment.
2. To what extent do you agree with the following:
• it is better to have a smaller wage and a guaranteed job;
• it is better to have average health services, but have then free of charge;
• it is better to assign jobs to graduates on a compulsory basis rather than leave
them unemployed;
• it is better to work at a state enterprise than for a private firm;
• it would be better if Belarusian enterprises generated not very high profits, but
were not ceded to foreigners.
3. To what extent do you agree with the following: «Our state secures civil peace
and political stability, and this justifies certain limitations of democracy and
freedom of speech?»
The first question enables us to look at the motives for the respondents’ choice
of any given strategy of behavior (for instance, exit or the use of state benefits).
The second question helps identify the values of the respondent (to some extent
this reflects the «mythological» component of the social contract). The first question
offers four possible answers: «[depends] only on me», «rather on me», «rather on
the state», «only on the state». The second question, too, proposes four answers:
«disagree», «rather disagree», «rather agree» and «agree». The answer «no answer/
undecided» is considered to be missed data.
Based on the cluster analysis (performed for the entire sample group), the
following social contract groups (clusters) were identified:
• dependent paternalists – those who indicate that their life (except for health)
depends on the state rather than on themselves. They tend to «agree» or «rather
agree» with the «paternalist» versions of the second question;
• independent paternalists – those who note that their life depends rather on
themselves, but agree with the idea expressed in the second question;
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• independent autonomists – those who do not depend on the state and disagree
with the second question;
• undecided – those whose position on the first and second questions is hard to
identify.
Cluster distribution (workers vs. other groups) is presented in Figure 4.
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 4. Difference in social contract types between the employed and other
groups (based on the cluster analysis)
The share of the «undecided» and «independent» among workers is much higher
than that in other groups, which means the employed use the possibilities of exit
more actively than other groups, or at least they are more mobile compared with
other social groups. Workers possess certain skills that they believe they can use
elsewhere as soon as they are faced with material problems (like some focus group
participants pointed out). This confirms the assumption that the degree of
dependence on the state, as well as the demand for social support, decreases in
inverse proportion to the growth in self%evaluation of the personal human capital.
Table 2 presents a number of cluster features that more or less identify their mobility,
as well as their social peculiarities and market values.
Gender. On the basis of gender, considerable differences were revealed between
the cluster of dependent paternalists (in which females dominate) and the remaining
clusters (with a higher share of males). These differences indirectly characterize
the mobility of clusters, as women prevail in lower%paid jobs, for example, in the
so%called «budget sphere» (teachers, medics, culture workers, etc.), light industry
and so on. The high dependence of these professions on the state explains why
there are so many women in the first cluster. This group is the least mobile one
while being the most vulnerable one.
Age. The youngest cluster is that of independent autonomists – the share of
respondents aged under 25 is twice if not thrice as large as those in other clusters.
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The largest share of preretirement persons is found in the cluster of dependent
paternalists. It appears that age differences also indirectly indicate the different
mobility rates of various clusters.
Education. On the basis of education, the differences between the clusters are
also quite serious. Independent autonomists show the highest share of respondents
with specialized secondary education and higher education. The cluster of
Table 2
Cluster characteristics (type of the social contract)
Source: estimates based on BISS data.




autonomists Undecided  The employed 
The employed, total 10.1 24.8 24.4 40.7 100.0 
Sex      
females 63.1 47.8 43.1 46.6 47.7 
males 36.9 52.2 56.9 53.4 52.3 
Age      
18–24 3.6 7.8 18.6 8.9 10.5 
25–34 10.7 24.8 35.3 25.4 26.2 
35–44 23.8 23.3 26.0 28.4 26.1 
45–54 53.6 34.5 17.2 29.6 30.2 
55+ 8.3 9.7 2.9 7.7 7.1 
Education      
Secondary and lower 31.3 24.8 17.7 15.6 20.0 
Specialized secondary (technical 
school, college) 28.9 29.6 34.5 33.9 32.5 
Vocational training (training 
school) 25.3 22.8 20.2 28.3 24.7 
Higher 14.5 22.8 27.6 22.1 22.9 
Ownership      
private 2.4 17.5 43.1 13.6 20.6 
state 97.6 82.5 56.9 86.4 79.4 
Income per family member, 
per month      
up to 250,000 rubles 18.3 11.0 7.8 9.7 10.5 
251,000 – 500,000 rubles 60.6 49.2 53.0 49.0 51.1 
501,000 – 1 million rubles 19.7 35.4 33.7 39.3 35.1 
over  1 million rubles 1.4 4.4 5.4 2.0 3.4 
Attitude to temporary labor 
contracts      
Positive 22.6 24.2 27.9 30.7 27.6 
Neutral 33.3 24.2 28.4 25.4 26.6 
Negative 38.1 48.8 38.7 36.9 40.4 
No answer/Undecided 6.0 2.9 4.9 7.1 5.4 
Which is better:      
to have a low but stable wage 75.0 42.5 21.6 48.1 42.9 
to take risks and get a greater 
reward 15.5 45.4 68.1 43.7 47.2 
No answer/Undecided 9.5 12.1 10.3 8.3 9.8 
Internet use      
Daily/A few times a week 7.1 19.0 37.9 15.0 20.8 
A few times a month and less 
frequently 10.6 10.7 14.3 18.5 14.8 
Never/Do not know what it is 82.4 70.2 47.8 66.5 64.5 
Wish to leave the country      
Rather yes 6.0 14.0 38.9 17.1 20.5 
Rather no 83.3 78.3 51.2 71.7 69.5 
No answer/Undecided 10.7 7.7 9.9 11.2 10.0 
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dependent paternalists is characterized by the prevalence of people with secondary
education (and lower), whereas the «undecided» cluster mostly includes people
with vocational%oriented education.
Property ownership. On this basis, the differences are evident: over 40% of
independent autonomists work in the private sector, while in the other clusters the
public sector has the dominant position. In the «independent paternalists» group,
17.5% of respondents are engaged in the private sector, compared to only 2.4% in
the «dependent paternalists» cluster. Apparently, those employed by privately%
owned businesses have already used the possibility of «exit» after failing to find
their place in the public sector, thus withdrawing from its direct «guardianship».
Income bracket is also important to identify the mobility of the «independent
autonomists» cluster, as well as of independent paternalists – the two groups have
the largest shares of respondents with monthly incomes exceeding 1 million
Belarusian rubles. Most of those undecided earn 500,000 rubles to 1 million rubles
a month. Nevertheless, the data presented in the study are to a great extent distorted,
especially in the private sector, as people tend to understate their incomes (especially
if their incomes are not always official).
Attitudes to fixedterm labor contracts are almost identical in all clusters, the
main exception being the cluster of independent paternalists. Nearly 50% of
respondents from this group have a negative attitude towards the contractual system
of labor relations (compared to 35–40% in other clusters), because most of
independent paternalists work in the state sector and regard fixed%term contracts
as an attempt to control them by the employer and the state (the key reason behind
the negative attitude is that «they deprive us of our rights in our relations with
employers», as some representative of the focus groups noted).
Choice between incomes and risks. Another mobility criterion is the life
philosophy on which is better – to have a stable but low wage or take risks and get
a greater reward. On this basis, the «polar» clusters are dependent paternalists and
independent autonomists, whereas independent paternalists and undecided
respondents have similar profiles.
Internet use as a mobility criterion also showed that independent autonomists
represent the most mobile cluster (which may pretty much be attributed to the age
of the cluster representatives): around 40% of respondents from this cluster are
active Internet users (at least once a week or more frequently). Independent
paternalists, who rank second, have only 19% of active Internet users, whereas the
«undecided» cluster leads by the number of occasional Internet users (a few times
a month or less frequently).
Since the cluster of independent autonomists proves to be the most mobile
one, it has the largest share of respondents that wish to leave the country (about
40%). The figure is as small as 6% in the «dependent paternalists» group.
The hierarchy of clusters by the degree of mobility looks as follows:
• independent autonomists – the most mobile group (by definition);
• independent paternalists – people who find exit beyond the framework of the
system, and are also capable to use loopholes within it; that is why they are less
mobile;
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• undecided – the largest group; most of its representatives work within the
system, but to a greater extent «go with the stream», compared to independent
paternalists (that is, they do not seek exit even within the system);
• dependent paternalists – the most vulnerable group with the lowest degree of
mobility. Preretirement%aged people make up more than 50% of this group –
their mobility is very much restricted (a loss of job would be equivalent to
permanent unemployment for many of them).
3.4. Subjective evaluation of the liquidity of human capital and structure of
the social contract
Another factor to measure the mobility of groups with various types of the social
contract is the liquidity of «human capital» (the notion «liquidity» was used by
some participants in focus groups with state budget%paid workers, who pointed at
the low «liquidity» of their skills, which obstructed their «exit» possibilities). The
study only presents subjective estimates of human capital liquidity. What is meant
here is how the respondents evaluate their skills as «specific assets» (Williamson,
1996), which require social protection by the state. A set of questions to gauge the
liquidity of human capital was provided in the questionnaire (see Table 3).
Table 3
«Liquidity» of human capital among cluster representatives
Note: The option «agree» includes the answers «agree» and «rather agree» (the same goes for the
«disagree» option).
Source: estimates based on BISS data




autonomists Undecided The employed 
I have an interesting job 
Agree  55.3 68.0 70.0 56.4 62.5 
Disagree 36.5 28.2 28.1 38.9 33.3 
No answer/Undecided 8.2 3.9 2.0 4.7 4.2 
With my qualification/education I will easily find a good job in Belarus  
Agree  41.7 47.6 50.0 43.5 45.9 
Disagree 50.0 48.1 43.1 50.3 48.0 
No answer/Undecided 8.3 4.4 6.9 6.2 6.1 
With my qualification/education I will easily find a good job abroad 
Agree  17.9 28.0 36.9 25.5 28.2 
Disagree 69.0 53.6 46.3 52.2 52.8 
No answer/Undecided 13.1 18.4 16.7 22.3 19.0 
My employer would find it very hard to replace such a qualified worker as I am  
Agree  29.8 32.0 34.5 31.8 32.3 
Disagree 63.1 59.2 54.2 57.1 57.5 
No answer/Undecided 7.1 8.7 11.3 11.0 10.1 
To a large extent I work because no one else wants to do my job  
Agree  28.6 23.2 20.7 18.1 21.1 
Disagree 67.9 72.9 72.9 76.0 73.6 
No answer/Undecided 3.6 3.9 6.4 5.9 5.3 
If it were not for my connections, my employer would have fired me long ago 
Agree  15.3 6.3 6.9 8.3 8.2 
Disagree 80.0 88.5 87.2 86.4 86.5 
No answer/Undecided 4.7 5.3 5.9 5.3 5.4 
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The answers to almost each one of these questions showed that independent
autonomists believe they possess the most liquid assets. For example, one of the
manifestations of a high liquidity of human capital for them is the ability to find an
interesting job. In the two «independent» clusters, the share of respondents with
interesting jobs amounted to around 70%, and in the clusters of dependent
paternalists and those «undecided» the share of interesting jobs stands a bit above
50%. The reverse side of the liquidity of human capital is the return on this production
factor. In our questionnaire it was measured using the degree of satisfaction with
wages on the one hand and various bonuses and positive working conditions on the
other hand. The results are presented in table 4.
Table 4
Subjective evaluation of the returns on human capital
Note: The option «like» includes the answers «like» and «rather like» (the same goes for the «dislike»
option.
Source: estimates based on BISS data
The obtained results prove that the only difference between independent
autonomists and the remaining clusters is a higher degree of satisfaction with their
compensations. Working conditions (including the job schedule, working







autonomists Undecided The employed 
Wage level 
Like 29.4 36.7 40.4 30.6 34.4 
Dislike 69.4 62.3 57.6 68.2 64.3 
No answer/Undecided 1.2 1.0 2.0 1.2 1.3 
Possibilities for career development 
Like 50.6 40.6 42.9 43.5 43.3 
Dislike 42.4 52.7 51.7 50.0 50.3 
No answer/Undecided 7.1 6.8 5.4 6.5 6.4 
Possibilities for advanced training 
Like 56.0 57.0 56.4 56.8 56.7 
Dislike 36.9 37.7 38.7 38.2 38.1 
No answer/Undecided 7.1 5.3 4.9 5.0 5.3 
Work schedule 
Like 90.5 82.1 74.8 73.9 77.8 
Dislike 9.5 15.5 21.8 24.6 20.1 
No answer/Undecided 0.0 2.4 3.5 1.5 2.0 
«Social package» (social guarantees) 
Like 66.3 55.3 55.2 55.6 56.5 
Dislike 25.3 35.9 38.4 37.6 36.1 
No answer/Undecided 8.4 8.7 6.4 6.8 7.3 
Relationship with staff 
Like 94.1 88.5 86.3 87.2 88.0 
Dislike 5.9 9.1 10.3 11.0 9.8 
No answer/Undecided 0.0 2.4 3.4 1.8 2.2 
Wage increase prospects 
Like 42.4 30.6 36.6 29.7 32.9 
Dislike 50.6 62.1 55.4 64.4 60.2 
No answer/Undecided 7.1 7.3 7.9 5.9 6.9 
Employer’s attitude to the employee 
Like 75.3 68.0 69.8 63.3 67.3 
Dislike 24.7 29.6 24.3 31.7 28.6 
No answer/Undecided 0.0 2.4 5.9 5.0 4.1 
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environment, and attitude of the administration, etc.) in the organizations, which
mostly employ independent autonomists, are more stringent than in the
organizations that employ representatives of other clusters. The cluster that proved
to be the most satisfied of all with working conditions is «dependent paternalists»
(the same cluster is the least satisfied with its wages). Therefore, the least mobile
groups with the least liquid human capital believe that the «care» of the state is crucial,
however hard it is to measure this «care» in monetary terms.
We are thus encountered with the protection of «specific», relatively less mobile
work skills with the help of employment. This is a sort of substitution for the
«welfare state», which in a number of West European countries played an important
role in the protection of specific skills, at least prior to the 1970s. But this role had
resulted from political struggle and popular vote for the parties that offered social
protection in their programs (see Iversen, 2008). At the same time, it may turn out
that this «care» is partially a myth created by official propaganda, and partially an
attempt of the respondents to excuse themselves for having such little wages (in
their own words).
3.5. «Voice» opportunities and perceptions of protest
According to Hirschman, «voice» is an important signal for an organization – it is
an indication that it loses efficiency and has to change to keep working. Hirschman
applies similar conclusions to nations (Hirschman, 1978). In democratic nations,
voice is manifested during elections, after which governments may change their
compositions if voters decide differently compared to the previous elections. At
the level of a business, one can have an open conflict with the employer, ask trade
unions for protection, take the case to court or «vote with feet», in other words, to
quit and find another job. The last option is characteristic of independent
autonomists rather than other groups. In case of conflict, they would rather change
their jobs than come into a conflict with the employer, thus choosing «voice». They
believe conflict costs are higher than the losses they will incur while looking for a
new job.
At the same time, this group counts on the protection of state authorities even
more than those who work for the authorities, for instance, dependent paternalists.
Almost half of them would prefer adapting to what they think is a deteriorating
situation to having an open conflict. This group considers conflict%caused losses
higher than the costs they would incur when choosing to openly protect their
relatively «illiquid» skills (see Table 5). Those «undecided», on the other hand,
have the share of respondents unwilling to express their discontent half as large,
which is very close to the average mean for the entire group of jobholders. In all the
clusters taken together, the share of the respondents that opt for «exit» is more
than a third, although more than half of the respondents tend to use various
instruments to «signal» their problems (by appealing to the authorities, trade
unions, court, tax inspection – any agency that represents the state), except for the
cluster of dependent paternalists, where the adaptation strategy outweighs the
strategy of voicing (47.2 vs 42.7%). Some 52% of the employed choose to «voice»,
Alexander Chubrik, Kiryl Haiduk
43
which means people either rely – possibly hypothetically – on the state’s performing
the «justice function» and/or consider the expenses of a protest to be too high.
Table 5
Answers to the question: «How would you act in case of a dispute with the
employer?» – depending on the type of the social contract
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Still more interesting from the sociopolitical point of view are the possible
reactions of people to state policies (see Table 6). Both independent paternalists
and autonomists would prefer showing no reaction at all to seeking confrontation.
However, more than 20% regard a complaint – in one form or another – as an
acceptable strategy. It is interesting that the trust in elections as a mechanism of
expressing «voice» or addressing an elected representative is considered to be a
less efficient strategy by all groups compared to a simple adaptation and complaint,
with less than 20% of respondents, except for dependent paternalists, with almost
25%. At the same time, dependent paternalists and the «undecided» cluster agree
to bear the expenses of legal recourse, meaning their personal problems that they
believe state authorities could tackle.
Representatives of political forces and civil society have always been interested
in protest moods and the potential of open protests, on which high hopes were
once pinned. It was deemed that Belarus could once again get back to the year
1991 – economic policies would prove inefficient, a new economic crisis would
erupt, bringing about hikes in prices and/or reductions in incomes, and people’s
patience would wear out. It was also believed that a crisis would lead to social
desperation, when people finally understand that there was no chance to earn, there
were no savings to rely on, and the future was vague – the only way out would be
to take to the streets and make a declaration.
One should be aware of the difference between the current situation and the
year 1991: people lost all their savings then, it was not clear what would be built on
the ruins of the Soviet Union, and no one could answer how people could make
their living. Almost twenty years have passed, and in the past decade both incomes







autonomists Undecided The employed 
Would quit my job 26.9 30.1 38.4 36.0 34.2 
Would agree to offered 
conditions, would not conflict  47.2 29.9 19.4 21.2 25.6 
Would appeal to state authorities 
that protect workers’ rights  16.1 26.0 22.4 22.7 22.8 
Would appeal to trade unions  13.6 17.6 5.9 15.8 13.6 
Would file a lawsuit against the 
employer 9.6 6.3 15.0 17.9 13.5 
Would appeal to the tax 
inspection (or a similar agency)  3.4 3.9 6.7 2.4 3.9 
Other 2.0 1.2 1.9 1.4 1.5 
No answer/Undecided 1.6 6.1 7.5 7.5 6.6 
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and a private sector emerged (even though it does not play a significant role in the
economy). There are new possibilities for «exit» both for temporary and permanent
labor migration, and both for blue and white collars.
Indeed, an appreciable share of able%bodied Belarusians is officially not
employed, and the share of economically active population decreased to 46.7% (of
the total population) in 2007 from 49.3% in 1991. On the other hand, Belstat’s
household polls show that the real employment rate exceeds the official data. In
2007, 71.9% of all respondents aged 17 to 64 said they were employed, up from
68.9% in 1995. The figures are above the official statistics on the number of
jobholders.
The gap between the able%bodied population and economically active
population shows that some people work in the «shadow economy». The
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in early 2008 reported
that labor migrants from Belarus had netted at least U.S. $2.3 billion in incomes in
2006, which made up 6.3% of that year’s GDP.1 The official estimate of the National
Bank of Belarus is at least ten times as low. The IFAD data were based on the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) statistics, which were almost the
same as estimates of independent experts, namely, between 400,000 and 700,000
labor migrants from Belarus annually.
Finally, Belarus developed a system of economic relations with certain logics
and definite operating principles, which encompasses the public sector, enterprises,
labor market, etc. In its turn, the government aims at stabilizing this system and
undertakes reforms only as the need arises, mostly to respond to external shocks.
The current economic crisis is indeed a serious shock capable of reformatting the
social contract, but it will hardly «break» the system the way the crisis of 1991 did,
or have similar consequences. Furthermore, large%scale protests took place too long
ago, and rally turnout has been decreasing. The data we present below give some
reasons why protests have become progressively weaker.
Table 6
Answers to the question: «If you are to some extent not satisfied with what the
state does for you, how is it possible for you to change the situation?» – depending
on the type of the social contract
Source: estimates based on BISS data







autonomists Undecided The employed 
Adapt, not change anything 45.6 56.0 55.6 51.1 52.9 
Complain to the state 28.3 22.0 23.2 23.9 23.7 
Appeal to the media, public 
organizations  11.7 17.3 14.3 24.7 19.0 
Vote in elections, appeal to 
elected representative  24.5 17.2 15.0 19.3 18.3 
Take legal action 17.7 8.6 7.1 16.5 12.4 
Other, No answer/Undecided 11.5 11.1 11.8 6.6 9.5 
Take part in mass protest actions 2.2 1.6 4.7 4.6 3.6 
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Table 7
Attitude to protest actions and their participants depending on the type of the
social contract
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Although about 56% of all waged workers admit that protest actions are not
unacceptable, the share of dependent paternalists who do not mind protests is lower
by almost 20 percentage points, and about half of such respondents consider protest
actions inefficient. Almost 65% said protesters are either irrational, or take part in
rallies for mercenary motives (i. e. for money). The highest share of respondents
who believe protests are reasonable and have a positive attitude towards participants
in protest actions, over 44%, is observed in the cluster of independent autonomists.
The undecided are somewhere in the middle, closer to independent paternalists
than to independent autonomists or dependent paternalists. It ought to be noted
that the attitude to protests (either approval or disapproval) does not guarantee
that the respondent will act in accordance with his or her opinion. Besides, the
share of respondents who remained undecided on this issue is considerable, between
13% and 20% depending on the cluster.
In all groups combined, we observe the same tendency as observed from the
table above: the degree of loyalty decreases as we move from dependent paternalists
(whose distinctive feature is the possession of «specific assets» or «non8liquid» human
capital) to independent autonomists (who possess more «liquid» skills). The attitude
to protests is ambiguous, and there is proof that people would rather voice their
problems by taking them to state authorities. The state is trying to combat protest
moods to some extend by promoting the possibility to «legitimate voice» including
the «one stop shop» rules, decree on cutting red tape, campaigns against corruption,
etc. These instruments are to show people that they can turn to official authorities








On protest actions:     
Participation in rallies should be punishable: 
criminal and administrative measures must be 
applied  
10.7 6.3 4.4 2.9 4.9 
As a citizen, you must obey the rules, not rebel 
against them by having rallies and protests 
35.7 18.8 15.8 19.8 20.2 
Rallies and protest actions are normal: people 
must be given a chance to speak out 
20.2 34.3 35.0 31.9 32.1 
Rallies and protest actions are acceptable, as 
they express people’s will  
13.1 26.1 27.1 23.6 24.0 
Other 1.2 1.4 1.5 2.4 1.8 
No answer/Undecided 19.0 13.0 16.3 19.5 17.0 
On participants in protest actions:      
I believe demonstrators get paid for rallies 31.8 28.5 17.2 12.6 19.6 
I believe demonstrators act foolishly, as they 
will not reap anything except for punishment 
32.9 21.3 18.2 32.9 26.5 
I believe demonstrators are brave people who 
adhere to their principles, are ready to assert 
their interests, despite reprisal 
17.6 33.8 44.3 33.8 34.7 
Other 0.0 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.1 
No answer/Undecided 17.6 15.5 18.7 19.4 18.1 
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when they «hunt» the truth and persuade them that relations based on conflict are
inefficient. However, these mechanisms and rules used to work during the relatively
favorable economic period. The crisis is capable of modifying these instruments,
though.
3.6. Impact of the financial crisis: possible modification of the
social contract
The economic crisis has brought about major adjustments to Belarus’ economic
policies and the fulfillment of the social contract. This is especially true for waged
workers, because the crisis proved ruinous for a large number of enterprises,
including the core ones responsible for the country’s gross industrial output. We
should remind that back in April 1991 the workers of flagship producers were among
the most active strikers.
The global downturn leads to an increase in the cost of fulfilling the social
contract provisions for enterprises and waged workers, whereas the sources to
finance the implementation of the social contract or maintain it as it used to be are
dwindling. This is caused, on the one hand, by a reduction is exports and general
growth in foreign debt, which is required to keep the national currency stable (and
it is getting harder to raise USD%denominated wages); whereas, on the other hand,
enterprises see the demand for their outputs fall, which will sooner or later make
them release labor. One of the cornerstone principles of the social contract – full
employment and protection of the relatively lower%quality «human capital» – is
thus at risk.
The influence of the crisis therefore challenges the very economic structure of
the social contract. A modification, or reformatting, depends on the expectations
regarding the duration and depth of the financial crisis, as well as the gravity of its
adverse effects on Belarus. The government thus far has been looking ahead with
cautious optimism, and a moderate package of measures has been prepared to address
any possible deteriorations. If we assume that the crisis will not be long%lasting,
the current social contract will be preserved, but increases in compensations and
incomes will not be significant. The workers will be left with a single option, namely,
to adapt to new conditions, especially if «exit» opportunities shrink (for instance,
because of the economic contraction in Russia, which affects the demand for
workforce, including labor migrants from Belarus).
But the costs of maintaining full employment may increase should the crisis
and the resulting diminution in demand on foreign and domestic markets continue
for long. In this case one of the fundamental provisions of the social contract, namely,
full employment, will have to be revised. In turn, this will bring about changes in
social protection schemes. Proposals have been made to increase (quadruple) the
average unemployment benefit to the subsistence wage. Furthermore, new
opportunities will have to be promoted in the private sector in order to create new
jobs and «absorb» the released workforce. In this case we will see a very serious
revision of the social contract as we have known it for the past decade. It may be
succeeded by a «revamped», or modified social contract.
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Currently, the authorities regard the preservation of the social contract as it is
now as their chief priority not only for sociopolitical, but also for economic motives.
Some enterprises cannot be allowed to reduce ouput now, because when the growth
period starts, it will be hard to get skilled workers back (this holds for chemical
and petrochemical enterprises). This is why the contract will be revised only when
the real need or unavoidable chanllenge arises, although certain reductions in social
commitments of the government seem to be inevitable in the future. In this context
the crisis gives the state additional room for maneuver, whereas workers may get
intimidated by the uncertainty of their future and choose to adapt to a new
environment.
On the other hand, a reformatted social contract with waged workers offers
them additional possibilities for self%organization. The growing social vulnerability,
looming threat of unemployment and narrowing «exit» possibilities encourage
workers to join independent trade union organizations. Even informal participation
(in the framework of trade union groups) may become the first step towards a more
serious organization.
4. CONCLUSION
The analysis we have conducted shows that the degree of subjective dependability
on the state and aspiration to participation in the social contact (as well as demands
for the benefits offered by the state) is contingent on the subjective evaluation of
human capital. The higher the confidence that the accumulated human capital will
be sufficient to reap the expected reward upon the skills, the weaker the paternalist
commitments of the social group and the higher the likelihood to choose the «exit»
strategy.
At the same time, the members of this social group are sensitive to economic
problems, such as consumer price increases and higher utility fees; however, very
few (11.4%) believe improvements in living standards hinge on market reforms.
One cannot claim that the idea of reforms is not supported by this social group. If
the advocates of economic reforms are added to those who believe that although
the state should interfere in the economy, it should not uphold loss%making
enterprises (that is, supporters of restructuring), and those who call for restructuring
plus a labor market reform, the number of «partisans of the reform» will go up to
almost half the entire group of waged workers. Keeping in mind that the share of
obvious opponents of reforms is much smaller – less than 20% – a properly presented
program of market reforms could meet with support of waged workers. Furthermore,
one positive effect of market reforms would be an enhancement of exit and the job
opportunities in the private sector
A key «lapse» of the state (according to workers) is its failure to create new
opportunities for making money, which calls for exit enhancement. The idea to
create new jobs, especially in the private sector, would obviously enjoy a positive
response from waged workers.
Nevertheless, this social contract group is sensitive to the social support from
the state. Workers tend to make demands that not always fit into the declared
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«socially oriented» framework of the state budget. They would welcome reductions
in expenses to maintain the state machine, security officials, construction of sports
facilities and the army and would rather spend released funds to support the
vulnerable (the unemployed, employees paid from the state budget, etc.).
Finally, waged workers would welcome labor market reforms if they abolished
fixed%term labor contracts. Over 40% of waged workers appear to have a negative
attitude to termed contracts, believing they strip workers of their rights in their
relations with employers. A transfer to permanent labor contracts is a crucial element
of the labor market reform, which could contribute to the appeal of the entire
package of market reforms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Pensioners constitute the second%largest social group after employed workers, but
this group is much more homogeneous than workers, as the latter look at the social
contract from the perspective of the subjective evaluation of their «human capital».
Pensioners are traditionally considered the core «electorate» of the authorities in
power, which suggests that this group is well aware of the «social contract», which
envisages a set of benefits in exchange for loyalty.
This chapter studies the key element of the social contract between the state
and pensioners in terms of «loyalty», «exit» and «voice». Its second part addresses
the social contract as an object of reflection of this group. Following are the analysis
of the social contract structure (especially the pensioners’ expectations from the
state and evaluation of the state’s success in meeting these expectations, the mobility
of this social group and other aspects). The third part studies the horizontal
connections within the group, and the fourth one addresses the economic status of
this social group and its economic settings. Conclusions complete the chapter.
2. STUDY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH PENSIONERS
2.1. Structure of the social contract with pensioners
The Belarusian pension system is managed by the state. Possibilities for private
pension funds are almost nonexistent despite pensioners’ desire to participate.1
Current legislation guarantees pension payment to all Belarusian citizens; moreover,
pensions are increased following wage increases. It ought to be noted that the
Belarusian pension scheme is to a great extent a «leveling» system – the average
pension paid after 30 years of continuous employment is only twice as high as the
minimum pension guaranteed to those who have no time in employment at all (about
2% of the total number of pensioners). Pensions of civil servants, former law%
enforcers and government officials are often much higher than the average (which
now stands at 30% of the average wage). «Higher» pensions are paid directly from
1 Baturchik, M., Chubrik, A. (2008) Vospriyatie naseleniem pensionnoy sistemy Belarusi:
rezultaty oprosa naseleniya [Population’s Attitude towards the Pension System of Belarus:
The Results of the National Opinion Poll]. In: Chubrik, A. (ed.) (2008) Pensionnaja sistema
Belarusi: otnoshenie naselenija i scenarii izmenenij [Pension System in Belarus: Public Attitudes
and Scenarios of Changes], Minsk, IPM Research Center.
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the state budget, not the Social Security Fund managed by the Labor and Social
Protection Ministry. As we see, the majority is offered basic guarantees, whereas
privileged categories get additional benefits.
Belarus does not have plans to reform its pension scheme. The Social Security
Fund has been posting a stable surplus, hence insufficient stimuli to modify the
pension scheme. In late 2008, representatives with the Ministry started public
discussions about raising the retirement age with a view to addressing the
demographic problems Belarus will be faced with in the future. The campaigners
failed to secure public support, though, mostly because of the life expectancy
statistics in Belarus. Given the high reliance of pensioners on the state in Belarus,
we put forward the following propositions:
1. Pensioners are more sensitive to social benefits offered by the state than
other groups and their demand for benefits is stronger;
2. The great dependence of this group on the state, susceptibility to
stereotypes and limited possibilities of «exit» enhance the loyalty of this
group.
Pensioners as a social group think about the role of the state almost as often as
the rest of the population (Figure 1). This indicates the medium level of the social
contract’s urgency for this group – we cannot say they perceive themselves as totally
dependent on the state.
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 1. Answers to the question: «How often do you think about how the state
influences your life and the life of your family?»
This distribution of answers evidently depends on the following aspects. Firstly,
the basic mechanism of pensioners’ reliance on the state is connected with pension
payment, which is regarded as the minimum required fulfillment of commitments
by the state. In other words, the risk of non%performance is considered insignificant:
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it is taken for granted that the state must pay pensions. Pension payment is perceived
not as an aspect of the social contract, but something that the state owes pensioners
irrespective of their fulfillment/non8fulfillment of their obligations to the state.2
Pension coverage is therefore not reason enough for loyalty. Secondly, pensioners’
expectations regarding the size of pensions are much more moderate than the
expectations of other social classes regarding their incomes. The social group of
pensioners regards retirement benefits as satisfactory.
On the whole, pensioners evaluate their material situation as below average,
which does correspond to reality; however, given the general satisfaction with the
degree of social support of the state and size of pensions it is not a factor that violates
the provisions of the social contract. Pensioners do not expect higher pensions
considering the existing pension level to be natural. The perception of Belarus as
the country where people like them live better than elsewhere, provides ample proof
of this (Figure 2).
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 2. Answers to the question: «How do you estimate your living standards?»
The structure of the social contract is reflected in the social groups’ expectations
from the state and perception of what the state expects from citizens. Pensioners’
expectations from the state are generally lower than the average for the entire
population. The average score of pensioners’ expectations (on a scale one to four3)
is 3.22 on aggregate, compared to 3.43 for the population at large.
1 Baturchik, M., Chubrik, A. (2008) Vospriyatie naseleniem pensionnoy sistemy Belarusi:
rezultaty oprosa naseleniya [Population’s Attitude towards the Pension System of Belarus:
The Results of the National Opinion Poll]. In: Chubrik, A. (ed.) (2008) Pensionnaja sistema
Belarusi: otnoshenie naselenija i scenarii izmenenij [Pension System in Belarus: Public Attitudes
and Scenarios of Changes], Minsk, IPM Research Center.
3 1 point – the state should not provide these benefits; 2 points – the state rather should not
provide these benefits; 3 points – the state rather should provide these benefits; and 4 points –
the state should provide these benefits.
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Like the population in general, pensioners prioritize free of charge high%quality
medical service and protection from crime. Specific expectations include provision
of benefits and pensions (Figure 3). The remaining categories do not seem to
matter to pensioners that much, especially those related to non%paternalistic
actions of the state: creation of possibilities to earn and opportunities for
entrepreneurship.
Note. At the axis, there is a difference between the average expectation score for pensioners and the
whole population.
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 3. Difference in the importance of state actions between pensioners and the
entire population (positive value = more important to pensioners, negative value =
less important to pensioners than for population at large)
Pensioners prioritize the stability factors, both political and financial (for example,
100% guarantee of bank deposits) (Figure 4), which stand out against other
indicators. Also important is law and order (efficiency of the court system).
Pensioners seem to value possibilities to earn and employment guarantees at
quite a low rate, but since expectations are low for these two entries, these issues
are not problematic for this group.
2.2. Loyalty factors
To evaluate the level of satisfaction with the implementation of the social contract,
it is necessary to draw a correlation between the evaluation of the real state of
affairs and expectations. From this perspective the most problematic issue is
pensions (Figure 5), which must be because of their size (58.7% believe it is not
sufficient). As for the payment itself and the regularity of payment, they are not
perceived as problems.
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Note. OX axis presents the difference between the average evaluation of the real actions of the state
and average rate of expectations.
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 5. Differences between contentment and significance of factors
Figure 4. Evaluation of importance and real state of certain aspects of social
assistance by (a) pensioners; (b) the population at large
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The group believes low pensions are due to the general economic situation in
the country and actions of state authorities (this was mentioned mostly by Minsk
dwellers – 63.4% of the total noted the responsibility of the state) (Figure 6).
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 6. Answers to the question: «If you believe your pension is not sufficient,
what is the reason behind low pensions in Belarus?»
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 7. Answers to the question: «Remember the last time you told yourself ’It is
good I live in Belarus!’» What was it connected with?
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The level of satisfaction with preferences and benefits, as well as medical services,
is also low. Pensioners are not satisfied with the level of protection from crime and
guarantee of bank deposits.
Ideological constructs constitute another essential element of the social
contract, alongside with material and non8material benefits. The categories
«strong state», «high administrative competence», «fair state» are the entities
that determine the positive perception by Belarusian society (Figure 7). Also
highly ideology%driven are the components connected with political stability,
construction and capital improvement and redevelopment of towns and villages.
For the social group of pensioners, the ideological component of state action is a
crucial loyalty factor.
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 8. Answers to the question: «What does your … depend the most?» by (a)
population at large; (b) pensioners
A peculiarity of pensioners as a social group is the quite high level of consent
with the provisions of the social contract in Belarus as a socially8oriented agreement.
On aggregate, 57.1% of all pensioners «agree» or «rather agree» that civil peace
and stability are worth certain democratic restraints. Pensioners constitute a
considerable part of those Belarusians who support such a contract (Figure 9).
Pensioners consider their material standing to be highly dependent on the state
(Figure 8). Over 60% of pensioners believe the state is to some extent responsible for
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their well8being, which testifies to the fact that the majority of this group has no
additional sources of income – savings, support of relatives, etc. Pensioners more
often depend on the state in health matters – the healthcare system is of primary
importance, but their requirements are not completely met.
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 9. Answers to the question: «Do you agree that our state secures civil peace
and political stability, and this justifies certain restrictions on democracy and the
freedom of speech?»
Most of Belarusian pensioners are paternalists, as 78.8% believe the conditions
of the social contract envisaging lower wages in exchange for stability are acceptable.
Similarly, 74.2% of the respondents agree to have medium%quality health services,
but free of charge; 75.7% would prefer Belarusian enterprises to be less profitable,
but remain state owned (Figure 10). The above indicators are higher than the
average for the Belarusian population, which proves the high level of loyalty of this
group.
Also, pensioners show a high level of satisfaction with the activity of the state
(Figure 11). Most of them (61.8%) believe the state takes a good or rather good
care of them. Moreover, the share of those who believe the state takes good care of
pensioners among the population%at%large is smaller than among pensioners
themselves. In other words, pensioners are more optimistic about their status than
other groups perceive it. This must be due to the understated expectations (which is
confirmed by other studies4).
4 Baturchik, M., Chubrik, A. (2008) Vospriyatie naseleniem pensionnoy sistemy Belarusi:
rezultaty oprosa naseleniya [Population’s Attitude towards the Pension System of Belarus:
The Results of the National Opinion Poll]. In: Chubrik, A. (ed.) (2008) Pensionnaja sistema
Belarusi: otnoshenie naselenija i scenarii izmenenij [Pension System in Belarus: Public Attitudes
and Scenarios of Changes], Minsk, IPM Research Center.
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Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 10. Answers to the question: «To what extent do you agree with the
statement?»
When analyzing the degree of satisfaction among pensions, we need to
differentiate among various aspects of the work of the pension system. Some of
them are more problematic (the size, same%pensions%to%all principle, and
adjustments to changing conditions) than others (regularity, etc.) (Figure 12).
In the context of the tendencies towards the formation of a two%tier pension
accruals scheme, it is important to estimate pensioners’ demand for non%
governmental retirement funds. As of today, the absence of institutions providing
additional sources of income for pensions (retirement funds, companies) is a
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problem for 36.5% of the respondents, which means the demand is being formed
now.
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 11. Answers to the question: «Does the state take good care of the following
social groups? Pensioners»
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 12. Answers to the question: «What in your opinion are the main problems
of the Belarusian pension system?»
Pensioners more often find it hard to assess the efficiency of state expenditures
than the rest of the population. On most criteria, this social group has the same
recommendations as the population at large – it is necessary to increase expenditures
on pension provision, educational allowances, benefits, health services; and cut the
expenditures on state authorities, the police and construction of sports facilities.
Pensioners tend to support increases in subsidies to agribusiness more than the
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entire population, whereas they are less eager to advise increases in financing of
high technologies (Figure 13).
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 13. Answers to the question: «Where should the state channel more money
into, and which expenditures should be cut?» ((a) pensioners,
(b) population at large)
Moreover, despite the abolition of benefits for this group, most pensioners believe
social support has not decreased. Only a third of them think the situation has
deteriorated, which is nevertheless more than for the population at large. However,
the share of those who believe social support for pensioners has increased
substantially is much higher among pensioners than among other groups, and stands
at 13.7% (Figure 14).
Pensioners appeared to be now very sensitive to changes in social support (both
positive and negative), although the majority (63.6%) believes the extent of social
support has changed (Figure 15). The abolition of benefits therefore did not become
a significant reason behind the growth in discontent about the provisions of the
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social contract. Important aspects of social support, according to pensioners, include,
inter alia, preferential medication prices (Figure 15, 16).
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 14. Answer to the question: «How has social support for people like you
changed over the past year or two?»
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 15. Answers to the question: «To what extent have changes in social support
influenced your life?»
2.3. Response to current policies
Pensioners largely rely on state support: the share of the respondents hoping for its
help in case of financial problems is higher than in other social groups, at 19.1%
(Figure 17). A contradiction should be emphasized, though: more than half of all
pensioners say their well%being depends on the state, but in case of need, 80% of
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pensioners will not rely on the state. This, again, must be due to low expectations:
this group does not believe the state is capable of giving more than the minimum stable
pension and there is no use hoping for additional assistance.
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 16. Answers to the question: «Which social support programs for people like
you are you aware of?»
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 17. Answers to the question: «Imagine you are faced with serious financial
problems. Who do you count on in such a situation?»
As was noted above, the level of discontent is not critical in this group,
whereas changes in the social contract provisions will lead to lower expectations
and conformism. If they are dissatisfied, 30.3% of pensioners will not change
anything (Figure 18), which may be explained by the absence of any liquid




Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 18. Answers to the question: «If you were to some extent dissatisfied with
what the state is doing for you, how would you change the situation?»
The best acceptable active strategy aimed at changing the parameters of the
social contract for pensioners is to appeal to local authorities with suggestions or
demands. This strategy aims at optimization of the existing pattern of relations and
search for additional possibilities for communication in the framework of the exiting
contract. In fact, this channel is used by the state as an instrument to differentiate
the conditions of the social contract for various social groups. This happens by way
of provision of benefits and bonuses for the least satisfied group or the group that
has no other means to satisfy their demands. Furthermore, these groups are ready
to spend time and effort on communication with bureaucrats/officials and deal
with formalities hoping for assistance. The bureaucratic procedure is a «screening»
machine, as groups having alternative possibilities as a rule do not use these channels
to seek additional benefits.
The likelihood of other strategies besides loyalty and modification of the social
contract by way of appealing to bureaucrats is low. An insignificant share of
pensioners leave room for voice and open protest: only 1.3% of them are ready to
participate in mass actions, 5.1% are capable of appealing to a public organization,
and 7.3% may take their cases to courts. All the above practices have a much lower
share of advocates among pensioners, compared to other groups (see Figure 18).
Pensioners tend to criticize protest actions more than other groups. This group
cannot be called «sympathizing», as it does not negate the right to protest, but
believes protests are irrational. On the contrary, participation in rallies is regarded
as a threat to stability, the status quo, which runs counter to pensioners’ values.
Furthermore, pensioners believe protesters are paid for taking part in rallies, which
corresponds to the messages of the state mass media (Table 1, Figure 19).
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Table 1
Pensioners’ and population’s attitude to protest actions and protesters, %
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Source: estimates based on BISS data
Figure 19. Answers to the question:
«Which of the following do you agree with?»
The possibility of the «exit» strategy in conditions of an unsatisfactory social
contract is very low for pensioners. This group does not want to leave the country,
although the share of potential migrants is high for the population at large, and
reaches 39.7% in the youth and non%workers groups (Figure 20).
Protests Protesters  
pensioners population at 
large 
pensioners population at large 
Absolutely positive  0.9 5.1 1.4 5.1 
Rather positive 10.3 25.3 12.1 30.0 
Rather negative 32.3 30.3 38.6 28.6 
Absolutely negative 28.0 16.4 17.8 10.9 
No answer/Undecided 28.5 23.0 30.1 25.4 




Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 20. Answers to the question: «Would you like to leave the country?»
Pensioners, on the one hand, are well aware of the illiquidity of their assets
(«human capital»). On the other hand, they believe this social group has a better
life in Belarus than elsewhere (Figure 21). This means the perception of the existing
social contract is positive and once again reminds about the significance of
ideological constructs for this group, especially those connected with the image of
Belarus as a country offering pensioners decent living standards.
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 21. Answers to the question: «Where do you think people like
you live better – in Belarus or abroad?»
Pensioners do not expect any changes in their material status (neither for the
better nor for the worse). The material standing of pensioners is more stable than
that of other groups (Figure 22). It must be the key vector of social expectations
for this group.
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Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 22. Answers to the question: «How has your material status changed over
the past 12 months?»
The material situation in this social group is connected with the actions of the
state (pensioners confirm this). However, when it comes to any deterioration,
pensioners, like other groups, tend to blame them on the financial crisis, that is,
external factors (Figure 23).
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 23. Answers to the question: «If your material situation
should deteriorate in the 12 months to come,
what do you think it might be caused by?»
If the state continues promoting this idea, any further possible deterioration in
the situation is likely to be interpreted as «force%majeure» rather than changes in




Horizontal ties as indicators of the potential to resist the contract terms imposed
by the state are weak. Firstly, the share of pensioners involved in the activity of
political parties and public organizations is much lower than in other groups – the
segment of activists is almost non%existent (Figure 24). This can be connected to
the absence of relevant settings for such activities among senior citizens on account
of the experience, practices and system of values generated during Soviet times.
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 24. Answers to the question: «Are you a member of a political party
or public organization?»
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 25. Answers to the question: «Is there anyone in the building where you live
performing the role of voluntary community activist responsible for complaints,
collection of signatures, contacts with the authorities?»
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Nevertheless, pensioners appear to be less active even in the social activities
that do not involve political aspects – they prove the least active participants in
local communities, especially if they are compared with the group of entrepreneurs/
executives. One should note that public activity is connected with general activity in
the economic area, as entrepreneurs/executives are the most active members of
parties/organizations, community leaders and providers of free aid. Pensioners, while
being economically passive, are not active in social interaction (Figure 25, 26). As a
result, pensioners have a low potential for resisting the terms of the social contract
imposed by the state.
Source: estimates based on BISS data.
Figure 26. Answers to the question: «How often do you communicate
with friends?»
4. CONCLUSION
As we see, pensioners constitute the most adaptable social group. Our propositions
regarding their acceptance of the existing social contract because of their reliance
on the state and susceptibility to stereotypes have been confirmed. Pensioners are
satisfied with the current pension scheme. Being guided to a great extent by
ideological constructs, pensioners believe the current situation in Belarus is stable.
Members of this group also believe it is better to live in Belarus than elsewhere.
This high degree of social satisfaction is rooted not in the sufficient size of
pension payments, but in low expectations combined with guarantees of receiving
a minimum social package. The social contract for pensioners, therefore, does not
manifest itself in material subsidies, but in some subjective, «socially constructed»
perception of stability and availability of the minimum social package. Pensioners
do not strive for more, but rule out the possibility of instability. At the same time,
pensioners prioritize stability and guarantees of bank deposits, which stand for the
minimum level of stability. Moreover, pensioners are interested in the very
possibility of making long%term deposits.
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Since there are no horizontal connections, pensioners often rely on the state.
The key peculiarity of the social contract with this group is the low degree of
demands made by the group in combination with the high degree of paternalism.
The likelihood of protest and «exit» in this group is minimal because of the
high level of conformism and illiquidity of human capital. This allows the state
additional room for maneuver when unilaterally changing the terms of the social
contract. One should bear in mind that given the ideological aspects of the contract,
further deterioration of the situation might be interpreted as effects of external
factors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The youth is frequently considered to be the most active and mobile social group.
Politicians pin high hopes on youth, for many analysts believe «generation change»
may lead to a change in the political regime (see, for example, a Stephan Batory
Foundation report1). Moreover, young people are believed to have a wide range of
opportunities and decisions regarding their future. They are not constrained by
accumulated social capital, hence additional possibility for social mobility. They
can therefore seek participation in the social contract voluntarily or select various
exit options (for instance, to leave the country).
At the same time, some members of this social group, while being economically
inactive (in particular, being unemployed), may be involved in the interaction between
the state and society to a lesser degree compared to other social groups, but still show
a strong demand for social programs, as they have no sources of income of their own.
Indeed, state programs target, inter alia, young families, young specialists, etc. Alongside
with other measures, these support programs could be regarded as instruments to
enhance the integration of this social group in the social contracting system.
In this study, we also address the behavior of nonworkers, as well as their
evaluation of the situation. Nonworkers, like the young, may tend to select the
paternalist policy, or, while being officially jobless, may have possibilities to earn in
the informal sector. The non%participation in the «vertical» social contract, in its
turn, may be compensated by «horizontal» connections.
The structure of this study is as follows: first, we formulate preliminary
propositions, consider the relevance of the social contract from the point of view of
this group, analyze the structure of the contract and presence of horizontal
connections; then study the motivation of this social group and factors that influence
the choice of some behavioral strategy (exit, voice, or loyalty); finally, we address the
evaluation of the economic situation by nonworkers; conclusions complete this study.
2. SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR YOUTH
2.1. Main propositions
Youth form one of the most dependent social groups. With insufficient accumulated
human capital, young people require the social support of the state more than other
1 The Stephan Batory Foundation (1991), http://www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/forum/
rap4eng.pdf.
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social groups (which is traditionally indicated in policy documents and declared
social programs, including support for young specialists, young families, etc.). This
determines the high dependence of this group and its integration into the social
contracting system. We therefore put forward the following proposition:
1. The young require state support programs aimed at improving their social
prospects (education, employment, housing, etc.)
On the other hand, youth do not always accept the current system of values
and available political rights and may opt for the strategy of non%participation in
the social contract or the «exit» option. Therefore, we can also suggest the following
proposition:
2. The young, as a group that has no specific human potential accumulated
in the past, may be more inclined to select the «exit» strategy or choose
not to participate in the social contract.
These propositions are not mutually exclusive, as it is considered that there may
exist ambivalent trends in the youth group. If this is so, the group is not homogeneous,
but segmented. The aim of the analysis is, therefore, to identify the subgroups that
choose one or another behavioral pattern.
As for the first hypothesis, the polls conducted for the study do not corroborate
it. State support does not appear to be a significant factor for young people, and
this group does not reflect much on the engagement in the social contract
(picture 1). On the other hand, the people that form the «nonworkers»2  group
think about the role of the state in their lives the least. A third of respondents
representing this group (31.5%) have never thought how the state influences their
lives, which is almost twice as much as the average for all respondents (Figure 1).
This means the group has the least people who regularly think about how their
lives depend on the state.
Figure 1. Answers to the question: «Do you often think how the state influences
your life and the life of your family?»
2 Hereinafter we refer to nonworkers as the economically inactive group including youth, the
unemployed and homemakers.
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This disregard for the state could be attributed to the fact that nonworkers
sense their dependence on the state indirectly rather than feel its immediate
influence. Students are mostly provided for by their parents, housewives and jobless
citizens live off their working relatives. They owe their social status and incomes
to their families, that is, specific people, not some abstract state.
Two conclusions may be drawn here: firstly, representatives of this social group
do not tend to reflect on the social contract; and, secondly, the social contract itself
must have dimensions other than «stability in exchange for freedom» for students,
housewives and the unemployed.
The results of the poll correlate with the results of the focus group tests. Students
perceive the state as an entity that is little included in their everyday life, as the
state is mostly represented by the directors of educational establishments. In other
respects, they interact with the state «through the agency» of their parents, who
are more integrated into the social contract. The situation is quite different for young
workers, though, as public welfare becomes more significant.
2.2. Social contract structure
The social contract may be defined as a model of the relationship between the state
and a social agent representing a complex of agent’s expectations from the benefits
offered by the state in exchange for loyalty. Loyalty is expressed in the support
and/or acceptance of state actions by the social agent. The degree of required
support is differentiated depending on social groups: it could be lower for some,
with the minimum level of engagement required, or very high for other groups,
envisaging more substantial bonuses offered in exchange.
The intensity of support could vary within the same group: the offered
contracts could provide for additional benefits (formal and informal) in exchange
for additional support (for instance, the Belarusian Republican Youth Union
for the young). Enhanced commitment implies the participation in
institutionalized forms of political engagement (parties, associations, patriotic
unions, etc.).
The Belarusian government constantly emphasizes the «socially%oriented»
nature of the Belarusian economy, which to a large extent determines the nature
of the social contract in Belarus (similarly to some other countries, including
Russia). The state declares that it ensures civil peace and stability, as well as
social guarantees, which are presented as justifications of freedom limitations.
Forty%five and a half per cent of Belarusians believe such an agreement is fair
(Figure 2). In the nonworkers group, this concept is supported only by 29.4%,
the lowest registered level among all groups. Meanwhile, the share of those
who disagree with this premise does not differ much from the mean value –
42.9% and 35.1%, respectively. This social contract type is mostly criticized by
entrepreneurs, not nonworkers. The latter have often failed to think about this
problem at all: polls show that more than a quarter of all respondents in the
group of nonworkers found difficulties in answering the question about their
attitude to this issue.
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Figure 2. Answers to the question: «Do you agree that our state
secures civil peace and political stability, and this justifies certain
restrictions on democracy and the freedom of speech?»
Despite the fact that nonworkers do not seem to think about the role of the state, it
would only be logical to assume that they must depend on the state more than other
social groups, except for pensioners. The share of people who associate their welfare
with the state, and not their own efforts, stands at 26% (Figure 3) in this group, which
is mostly formed by students, housewives and jobless people. It is naturally higher than
that in the groups of entrepreneurs and wage workers3. While it confirms the first
proposition about the «demand for the state [benefits]» from the young, the difference
between the personal evaluation of welfare dependence on the state between the groups
of wage workers and nonworkers is not really significant, given that formally students
live off educational allowances, and nonworkers’ only incomes are formed by
unemployment benefits. This on the one hand may indirectly prove that nonworkers
rely on their relatives; on the other hand, this must indicate the presence of self%
employment among students, housewives and formally unemployed.
The structure of the social contract may be determined by evaluating the
expectations of the social group and its perception of what the state expects from
its citizens. Expectations may be revealed in several aspects. Firstly, there are
material benefits (direct payments, conditions for earning); secondly, there are
additional welfare%related benefits, such as medical service, education and security;
finally, there are non%material benefits connected with the positive image of the
state from the perspective of citizens. These are ideological constructs based on the
ideas of patriotism, identification with a strong authority and various «social
myths». These elements of the social contract are broadcast mainly by the mass
media. Ideological constructs are tied with symbols, stereotypes and social myths.
The stability of the social contract lies in social groups’ accepting its key
elements. The satisfaction of social groups is achieved by meeting their expectations
from social benefits and positive evaluation of the actual performance of
commitments by the state.
3 This indicator stands below the average for the entire sample only because pensioners show an
extremely high level of reliance on the state.
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Figure 3. Difference in the importance of aspects of state actions between youth/
nonworkers and the entire population (positive value = more important to youth/
nonworkers, negative value = less important to youth/nonworkers than for the
population at large)
The young and nonworkers have higher expectations than the average for the
entire population, with average value standing at 3.47 for the young and 3.43 for
population at large. Young people and nonworkers tend to prioritize payments of
educational allowances, free secondary and higher education, compared to average
expectations (these benefits, vis%а%vis other factors, are of higher%than%average
significance). They are regarded as the basic social benefits that the state must
provide for young people (Figure 4).
Young people also believe a good environment for entrepreneurship and
possibility to earn to be more significant than the population at large. This shows
that the group under analysis needs the state to secure clear rules of the game and
ensure an entrepreneur%friendly environment, alongside with direct support.
Less significant aspects of state activities include, according to the young and
nonworkers, payment of pensions and guarantee of bank deposits, largely because
young people prefer current consumption to saving. The expectations of youth and
nonworkers are therefore connected not only with social support, but also with the
provision of possibilities to earn without direct interference of the state. The young
and nonworkers tend to disregard pensions and benefits, as they are matters of
«distant future» (Figure 5).
The largest gap between the expectations and real actions of the state, according
to youth and nonworkers, is observed in the possibilities to earn and employment
guarantees, as well as seeing that employers meet their obligations. It appears that
the key issues here are potential employment and support provided when a citizen
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enters the labor market. The low satisfaction with medical services is also
mentionable; however, this aspect seems to be of high priority in all social groups
in Belarus now.
Figure 4. Evaluation of importance and real state of certain aspects of social
assistance by (a) youth/nonworkers; (b) population at large
As was noted above, nonworkers sense their bond with the state and
participation in the social contract to a lesser extent compared to other groups. On
the other hand, they appear to rely on the state more than other groups when it
comes to employment: 32.3% of the respondents believe their employment depends
on the state (slightly above the 29.3% share on average for all Belarusians (Figure 6).
Indeed, about half of Belarusian students are educated on a free%of%charge basis
and «assigned» a job upon graduation. The share of students in the group of
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«nonworkers» is well over 50%, which explains the share of respondents in this
group that believe their employment depends on the state.
Figure 5. Differences between satisfaction
with the quality of the services performed by the state
and significance of factors for this social group
Figure 6. Answers to the question: «Which does your employment, wellMbeing,
health and education depend on the most?»
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Employment aspects are crucial for this social group, and the degree of
satisfaction determines the loyalty level. Students are rather vaguely aware of their
future employment. One%third of them (33.3%) do not see clear prospects of finding
a job according to their occupation, and 5.8% of all students believe being employed
in their specialization is unrealistic. Only 12.5% of students see good prospects of
finding a job according to their professional training, and the rest (46.7% of students)
believe they have a chance, but have their doubts.
Under the circumstances, the chief element of the social contract for students
is the mechanism of job assignment – some 40% of the young express loyalty towards
this component of the social contract. This means there is certain demand for the
«protective function» of the state, and the same applies to the passive economic
behavior model – the agreement to be paid smaller wages in exchange for guaranteed
employment – there share of those accepting this pattern is about 40% in the social
group of youth and nonworkers.
In this social group, the segment of those who are not ready to accept the social
contract terms exceeds the same for the entire population. This segment represents
the group that is potentially ready to choose the «exit» strategy.
Nonworkers on average have a negative attitude to the assignment procedure,
but the share of opponents of the assignment system, at 51.3%, is not really
dominating (the proportion of advocates of this procedure stands at 39.7%). Many
students consider compulsory assignment a possibility to find a job or gain
experience that will come in handy when they seek jobs later. They agree to work
for lower wages and salaries, because education does not guarantee that they possess
all the required skills.
Nationwide, figures look different: 52.5% of the respondents support the
assignment practice (because it is backed by pensioners; see Baturchik, Chubrik,
2009), and 35.1% are against it. More than a third of students (35.8%) believe only
the state needs student job assignment, but we cannot say the attitude to assignment
is universally negative: 37.5% of students say both the state and students benefit,
and 14.2% believe only students benefits from being assigned.
This element of the social contract is more important to groups that have a
smaller potential for self%fulfillment because of foreign factors and personal potential.
Job assignment is mostly supported by residents of smaller settlements; Minsk and
region centers have a much smaller share of supporters of obligatory assignment, as
there are more employment opportunities (Figure 7).
The share of proponents is much higher in the Vitebsk region, where household
incomes are the lowest in the county (Figure 8), while Minsk and the Brest region
have the largest shares of opponents mainly because of the possibility to have
incomes without state support.
There is no significant correlation between the attitude to mandatory post%
graduate assignment and current incomes – the young are guided by potential
perception of their prospects rather than the current situation. The dependence on
education is not considerable, either: the groups of advocates of assignment and its
opponents have almost equal shares of nonworkers with higher and specialized
secondary education (Figure 9). People with vocational technical training and
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junior secondary education prevail in the group of advocates of obligatory job
assignment.
Figure 7. Distribution of supporters and opponents of compulsory job assignment
depending on the settlement size
Figure 8. Regional distribution of supporters and opponents of job assignment
Figure 9. Distribution of supporters and opponents of job assignment
depending on their education
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The chief motive of the Belarusian social contract is the paternalist policy –
social security and guarantees amid low incomes. However, in the long view, the
young do not seem eager to accept the contractual terms and work for government
enterprises. If they were to choose, nonworkers would rather go for a job at a
privately owned company (47% of all respondents). In fact, private companies form
an environment, where the social contract is implemented indirectly («the state
influences the employer, not me»).
Only 37.8% of nonworkers would like to work for a state%owned enterprise,
which compares to 57.6% for the population at large. Work for a private company
is associated not only with additional opportunities, but also with more
responsibility and risk. Nonworkers would accept such conditions, as they are not
eager to sacrifice the size of their incomes for the sake of stability. Only 39.8% of
nonworkers would agree to earn less while being in guaranteed employment, less
than the average for the country (58.2%, Figure 10) by a third.
Figure 10. Answers to the question: «To what extent do you agree
with the following: it is better to have lower wages/salaries while having a
guaranteed job; mediumMquality medical services, but free of charge;
assign jobs to graduates, but not leave them unemployed; work for a state
enterprise instead of a private one; and is it better for Belarusian enterprises
to reap moderate profits than be sold to foreigners?»
It can be expected that people representing the nonworkers group are trying
to withdraw from state «custody». It is mostly due to the evaluation of the
quality of this «support». In the group of nonworkers, 32.5% believe the state
takes good care of young specialists, 31.5%, young families, and 42.2%, students
and postgraduates. These figures are lower than the average for the entire sample
(40.1, 37.3 and 42.4%, respectively), which means the state cares more about
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advertising its assistance than about providing the support itself. The group
that appears to be the most «deprived» of state support is the unemployed, as
only 19% of nonworkers (and 27.2% of all respondents) believe the state takes
care of jobless citizens. The best%protected population groups, according to
nonworkers, are civil servants, the police and special services, athletes and the
military (Figure 11).
Figure 11. Answers to the question: «Is the state taking good care
of the following population groups?»
Nonworkers’ evaluation of changes in the level of social support for their group
is the same as the average for the population at large. Most of the respondents,
62.3%, have seen no changes at all, despite the abolition of travel privileges. Twenty%
two and a half per cent felt deterioration, and only 5.2% said there were
improvements (4). Of those who said social support had dwindled, more than a
third called the deterioration «serious» – the share of such nonworkers stands at
8.4%, whereas the share of those who have seen considerable improvements has
reached 2.2%.
The degree of nonworkers’ awareness of social security programs in Belarus is
lower than the average for all respondents. Only 24.7% of them could recollect
some program (which compares to the average of 29.6%). Another 4.3% said all the
programs of state support they were aware of had been cancelled (Figure 12). The
best%known state programs of social support, according to nonworkers, are
concessional home loans and social allowances.
When the interviewer mentioned some specific program, it often appeared that
nonworkers knew about it. Some 58.4% of the respondents were aware of the
program of targeted support for lower%income and large families, 56.3% of them
knew about social privileges for the citizens that were affected by the Chernobyl
accident, 63.6% knew about preferential medication prices and 73.2% were aware
that concessional housing loans were provided in Belarus (Table 1). The figures
are below the average for all the respondents, but the knowledge about the programs
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and available social support in this group turned into tangible assistance more
frequently than in other social groups (save for lower prices for medications offered
to pensioners).
Figure 12. Answers to the question: «What social support programs
for such people as you are you aware of?»
Table 1
Awareness of social support programs
and use of these programs, %
Source: BISS.
The absence of significant support for nonworkers by the state and lack of
knowledge about social programs among the respondents result in the low level of
reliance on the state in case of need. Should their material situation deteriorate,
students, housewives and jobless citizens mostly rely on their relatives (78.9%),
but not on the state (5.6%). This group tends to rely on their own efforts less than
any other group (with the share of self%sufficient respondents in this group twice
as little as the average for all respondents), which emphasizes the lack of protection
and stresses the need for support (Figure 13).
Know about the program Use the program 
 
nonworkers population nonworkers population 
Targeted support for lower-income and large 
families 58.4 65.5 7.4 2.9 
Concessional housing loans 73.2 77.9 6.5 4.8 
Social benefits for the citizens that were affected 
by the Chernobyl accident 56.3 70.2 3.8 1.9 
Preferential medication prices 63.6 77.1 10.9 15.1 
Other 12.6 7.9 41.4 35.5 
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Figure 13. Answers to the question: «Who do you rely on in case
of serious material problems?» (nonworkers vs. population at large)
2.3. Social connections
The social contract presupposes interaction between members of the social groups
and the state, in which a separate individual does not possess adequate resources to
resist the conditionality of the latter. An individual participant in the social contract
may act only as a representative of a social group, although the potential of the
group is connected both with its resources and with the activity of separate members.
The activity of a social group is only possible if there are sufficient horizontal ties.
In this connection, a study of the involvement of an individual into horizontal ties
(which weakens the pressures of the «vertical» social contract) would be important.
Our empirical research shows that youth and nonworkers may be combined in
a group engaged in the social contract less than others due to their economic
inertness (Figures 14, 15).
Figure 14. Answers to the question: «Is there anyone in your house performing the
role of the voluntary community activist responsible for complaints, collection of
signatures, contacts with the authorities?»
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Figures 15. Answers to the question: «Have you ever offered
gratuitous help to a complete stranger, and have
you ever taken part in charitable activities?»
At the same time, we find out that the involvement of the group in horizontal
social relations is less intensive, too, because the young do not participate in public
or political activities much (Figure 16).
Figures 16. Answers to the question: «Are you a member
of a political party or public organization?»
However, informal social relations are very intensive in this group – the young
and nonworkers communicate a lot with their friends (Figure 17).
This shows that this group regarded as an entity resisting the social contract
terms imposed by the state has a low «protest potential». In this context, the
young also avoid interaction related to public interests. Their activity is
expressed mostly in the areas free from state influence, such as private life and
informal relations.
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Figure 17. Answers to the question: «How often do you communicate
with friends?»
3. FACTORS OF CHOICE BETWEEN EXIT, LOYALTY AND VOICE
The key strategies in the framework of the social contract are loyalty, «voice»
(expressed in protest actions) or «exit» (a withdrawal from the contract or, on
a larger scale, from the sphere of influence of the state). As of today, most
nonworkers show loyalty (they agree with the key components of the social
contract). However, the level of loyalty observed in this group is lower than
the average for all respondents, largely because of high demands and
requirements from the state.
One of the mechanisms formed to support «super%loyalty», which may be
defined as the expression of a greater%than%usual loyalty through support for state
initiatives, is the participation in pro%governmental public associations and parties,
especially the Belarusian Republican Youth Union. The state welcomes this sort of
activity.
However, this strategy is only applicable in a relevantly narrow segment of
representatives of youth and nonworkers (10% said they were members of public
organizations, and many of them are evidently members of the BRYU). As we see
from Figure 18, the main reasons for membership in the BRYU are both coercion
and expectations of promised benefits, such as tickets to concerts and other
entertainments. The participation in initiatives of this kind is therefore to a large
extent not an element of the social contract (when additional benefits are offered
for membership), but an element of the coercive mechanism (they are all forced to
participate). The opinion that young people join the BRYU out of ideological
reasons was supported only by 10% of the respondents.
The protest potential in the group of nonworkers is low. Despite the
dissatisfaction with the degree of social support, citizens that hold no jobs do
not wish to come in conflict with the state. They believe the most adequate
way to assert their interests is to adapt to new conditions, whereas problems
should be resolved using personal contacts – some 25.3% of the respondents




Figure 18. Answers to the question: «In your opinion, why do students and pupils
become members of the BRYU?»
The results referred to above are the same as the average for the entire sample.
The main difference is in the number of those undecided: the share of respondents
that provided no answer stood at 15%, 5 percentage points above the average for
the population at large. The most popular ways for nonworkers to actively uphold
their interests are appealing to local authorities, 13.7%, appealing to court, 11.2%,
and to the media, 10.7%.
Figure 19. Answers to the question: «If you are dissatisfied with what the state is
doing for you, how could you change the situation?»
The least popular instrument to express «voice» is to participate in protest
actions. However, we cannot say nonworkers have a negative attitude to rallies
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and their participants: 45.9% of the respondents broadly approve of protest
actions, which is markedly higher than the average of 30.3% for population at
large (Table 2).
Table 2
Respondents attitude to protests and protesters, %
Source: BISS.
Only 2.6% of nonworkers believe the participation in protest actions should be
punishable, while 11.7% believe existing rules should be obeyed, not challenged.
This compares to 6.4% and 24.2% for population at large, respectively (Table 3).
Most nonworkers are certain people should be given the right to speak out, and
mass protests are regarded as instruments to express voice. The group under analysis
have a generally positive attitude towards protesters, unlike the majority of the
population: 46.3% of nonworkers call protesters brave men and women of principle
who are ready to assert their interests despite reprisal.
Table 3
Attitude to protests: «I agree with the following», %
Source: BISS.
As a result, nonworkers generally do not condemn mass protest actions and to
a great extent sympathize with protesters, but do not perceive protests as a
Protests Protesters 
 nonworkers population nonworkers population 
Absolutely positive  8.7 5.1 9.5 5.1 
Rather positive 37.2 25.3 48.3 30.0 
Rather negative 27.3 30.3 19.4 28.6 
Absolutely negative 5.2 16.4 2.6 10.9 
No answer/Undecided 21.6 23.0 20.3 25.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 Nonworkers Population at large 
Participation in rallies should be punishable: criminal and administrative 
measures must be applied 
2.6 6.4 
As a citizen, you must obey the rules, not rebel against them by having rallies 
and protests 
11.7 24.2 
Rallies and protest actions are normal: people must be given a chance to speak 
out 
42.0 28.8 
Rallies and protest actions are acceptable, as they express people’s will 23.8 21.0 
Other 1.7 2.0 
No answer/Undecided 18.2 17.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
I believe demonstrators get paid for rallies 14.3 23.1 
I believe demonstrators act foolishly, as they will not reap anything except for 
punishment 
21.2 25.7 
I believe demonstrators are brave people who adhere to their principles, are 
ready to assert their interests, despite reprisal 
46.3 30.4 
Other 0.9 1.5 
No answer/Undecided 17.3 19.4 




mechanism to settle their problems. Many of them (21.2%) believe taking part in
rallies is foolish, as they will only lead to punishment (see Table 3).
Another strategy to address material and social problems in Belarus is migration.
A total of 39.7% of nonworkers would like to leave the country, much more than
the average for the entire population, standing at 18.8%, which on the one hand
emphasizes the mobility of youth and nonworkers and on the other hand indicates
the high degree of dissatisfaction with the opportunities available in Belarus.
Moreover, another 14.7% of nonworkers remained undecided when asked whether
they would like to leave Belarus, which means this option should not be ruled out
for them.
The proportion of those willing to leave Belarus almost coincides with the share
of citizens who believe nonworkers live better abroad. This is the only social group
that thinks life abroad would be better. The main reasons behind potential
emigration is the improvement in the material status, either direct (for 78.3% of
the nonworkers willing to migrate), or through enhanced social protection and
benefits (for 32.6%). Other motives, connected with personal development and
further training are not so popular with nonworkers, although they were mentioned
more frequently than the average for the sample (Figure 20).
The main reason behind the unwillingness to leave the country is the wish to
stay together with friends, family members and close ones (for 57.5% of the
respondents who said they did not want to leave Belarus). One more reason is the
uncertainty connected with expatriation. A high share of nonworkers, 23.6%, would
not leave Belarus because they are short of money required for migration. Another
peculiarity of this group’s motivation is the inability to identify the reasons why
they would not like to leave Belarus – 21.7% compared with the average of 7.8%
for the population at large (Figure 21).
Figure 20. Main reasons behind the wish
to migrate, %
Figure 21. Main reasons behind
unwillingness to migrate, %
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One of the weakest motives for nonworkers (and other social groups) to stay in
Belarus is the pride in their country (only 16% of the respondents said so) and
satisfaction with everything in Belarus (lower than in other groups). On the whole,
nonworkers are rarely proud of their country: 42.7% said they had never thought
how good it was to live in Belarus (Figure 22). The share of wage workers, pensioners
and entrepreneurs that have never felt proud of their country is on average twice
as little, and the average for the entire sample stands at 23.2%.
Figure 22. Answers to the question: «When you last thought ‘It is great I live in
Belarus!’, what was it connected with?»
The main reasons to be proud of Belarus, in this group, are «beautiful nature»
(23.2%) and «kind sympathetic people» (19%), but there are also quite subjective
cultural and natural factors. Contrary to the general trend, nonworkers tend to be
proud of the higher education system in Belarus, which is even more important
than political stability (9.9% in the group of nonworkers compared with the average
of 17%) or active construction and redevelopment of settlements (10.3% and 16.7%).
For this group, ideological constructs are the least effective benefits of the social
contract. The pride in their country, political stability and redevelopment of villages
and towns are not reasons enough to express loyalty. Other emotional components –
beautiful nature and sympathetic people – are not so prominent, either.
There is a wide range of reasons why people do not work. «For family reasons»
is naturally the key motive for people to stay at home (Table 4), because it is the
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main thing that makes women choose to become housewives. The unemployed
attribute their choice to low wages and absence of jobs requiring their qualifications.
On the other hand, many of them found difficulties in answering this question or
said they could not find a job they liked or simply did not want to work. As a result,
39.1% of jobless people have not tried to find a job (open their business) in the past
30 days. The figure stands at 86.7% for housewives, which almost coincides with
the share of housewives who do not work for family reasons. However, those who
have been trying to find a job, would be ready to start working immediately almost
with no exceptions.
Table 4
Answers to the question: «Why don’t you have a job?», %
Source: BISS.
4. NONWORKERS AND THE SOCIAL CONTACT;
EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC STATUS
The living standards in the group of nonworkers are lower that the average for
Belarus. Besides, the group has the largest share of respondents who believe their
living standards are low, 18.6% of the total (Figure 23). The rest of nonworkers
consider their incomes to be average or below average. This group is also
characterized by negative welfare trends – subjectively, their level of well%being
has decreased over the past 12 months. Of the total, 16.5% said the reduction had
been serious (compared to the average of 11% for the entire sample, see Figure
24), 33.3% said the deterioration had been slight (vs. 30.9% for the population at
large); only 3% reported improvements, whereas the majority of respondents said
their incomes had remained unchanged. Nonworkers proved to be more optimistic
than population at large, though: 16.4% said they were expecting improvements,
which is markedly above the average share of optimists, at 9.6% (Figure 24).
Thirty%one per cent expect deterioration, both serious and slight, 4.5 percentage
points less than the average for the entire population. Responsibility for potential
deterioration in their material status was evenly «distributed» between the
influence of the global economy and state policies. Other groups tend to blame
their poor economic status on the impact of the world economy more than on the
state policy.
 Total Housewives Unemployed 
No job to use my training  12.4 4.4 17.4 
No job to my liking 7.1 0.0 11.6 
No wish to work 4.4 2.2 5.8 
Low wages 15.9 4.4 24.6 
Health problems 4.4 0.0 7.2 
Family reasons 38.1 84.4 7.2 
Other 7.1 4.4 8.7 
No answer/Undecided 10.6 0.0 17.4 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Consumer inflation is perceived as the worst problem Belarus has encountered
(Figure 25), mentioned by 79.9% of nonworkers, which is roughly the same as the
average for all respondents. Unemployment was named a serious problem by half
this number, 39.3% of the total, which is expectedly above the average for all social
groups, standing at 25.6%. The second%worst problem for the population at large is
alcoholism, indicated by 47.8%, which is only slightly above the share of concerned
ones among nonworkers. The latter are almost equally worried about the poverty
of a considerable part of the population. Equal groups of nonworkers called high
housing prices, high utility fees and low incomes serious problems. This social group,
therefore, believes economic problems are the worst in Belarus, which may be
attributed to the large share of lower%income persons among the respondents.
Alcoholism is the only social problem mentioned by nonworkers, although they
did not emphasize it, unlike population at large.
Nonworkers are to a lesser extent concerned about the efficiency of state
management: swollen bureaucracy was noted only by 6% of nonworkers (compared
to 9.3% for the entire population), and corruption and bribery, by 12.8%, less than
in other social groups. At the same time, nonworkers are more sensitive to
sociopolitical problems: the share of those who recognized the absence of democracy
and freedom of speech, oppression of entrepreneurs, and poor relations with other
countries as grave problems, was higher among nonworkers than the population at
large. Nevertheless, these problems are generally perceived not as serious as
economic restraints.
The least important problems for nonworkers and the population at large are
the quality of the education system and harassment of the Belarusian language and
culture.
Figure 23. Answers to the question:
«How high do you think are your  living
standards?»
Figure 24. Answers to the questions
about how the material status of
respondents changed in the past 12




Figure 25. Answers to the question:
«Which of these do you think are the most serious
problems for Belarus?»
Despite the fact that, according to the respondents, the quality of the healthcare
and education systems is not a matter of major concern, it was into these two
segments that nonworkers would recommend channeling more money. Additional
financing of medical services was supported by 68.1% of nonworkers, and of
education, by 60.6% (Figure 26). Even more respondents support increases in
financing of pensions, benefits and education allowances.
Sources to raise investments in the above segments could be formed by
cutting expenditures on state authorities, the police and law%enforcement
structures, nonworkers believe. Also, the majority of respondents favor the idea
of reductions in spending on army and construction of sports facilities. Other
expenses should be increased, according to respondents, especially on
manufacturing, infrastructure, high technologies, and agribusiness. It appears
that nonworkers would like to see an increase primarily in social expenditures,
while spending on the real economy is perceived as secondary (Figure 26). These
preferences almost fully coincide with the average values for the population at
large.
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Figure 26. Desired changes in the structure of expenditures in the group of
nonworkers
The economic values of nonworkers are more liberal compared with the values
of the rest of the population (Figures 27, 28), but we cannot consider all members
of this group to be liberal. The share of consistent liberals that chose a reduction in
the role of the state in all the 11 areas amounts to only 6.5% of the total number of
respondents in the group of nonworkers. Liberal attitudes prevail only in three
groups of reforms: privatization of small and medium%sized enterprises, cessation
of subsidies to loss%makers and liberalization of labor regulations. In other respects,
the share of market%minded respondents is either smaller than the share of those
preferring state regulation or equal to it (regulation of the securities market and
protection of separate enterprises).
Figure 27. Advocates of reforms and state regulation: nonworkers
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Figure 28. Advocates of reforms and state regulation: population at large
Support for market reforms among Belarusians taken together is even weaker.
Liberal moods prevail only when it comes to financing and restructuring of loss%
making enterprises. In the remaining 10 areas, state regulation enjoys solid support;
the domination of state regulation among general population is more significant
than in the separate group of nonworkers.
Most of the population at large and nonworkers support the desire of the state
to retain its control over large enterprisers, infrastructure and banks. If essential
assets should be privatized, the respondents would prefer to see investors from
Belarus rather than foreigners (Table 5).
Table 5
Answers to the question: «If stateMrun enterprises are privatized, where would you
prefer to see new owners come from?», %
Source: BISS.
A third of all the respondents in the group of nonworkers and in the population
at large would accept sales of Belarusian assets to Russians. Also, 36.8% of
nonworkers support engaging European investors, which is much higher than the
share of pro%Europeans in the population at large, standing at 25.8%. Nonworkers
also seem to have a friendlier attitude towards investors from the U.S. and Israel.
 Nonworkers Population at large 
Belarus 65.2 77.0 
Israel 4.8 3.3 
Iran, Venezuela 1.2 1.4 
China 5.7 5.1 
Russia 33.1 34.5 
EU 36.8 25.8 
USA 12.9 7.5 
Ukraine 1.7 2.0 
No answer/Undecided 13.5 8.9 
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5. CONCLUSION
The social group of economically inactive population, which includes youth, the
unemployed and housewives, is the least involved in the social contract compared
to all other social groups. This interesting observation does not corroborate the
first proposition we put forward, namely, that the young and nonworkers would
seek state support aimed at improving their social prospects. If the members of this
group are economically inactive, they do not reap direct economic benefits from
the state (wages for budgets sector employees, social benefits, allowances and
preferences for state officials, etc.).
At the same time, empirical evidence shows that this group, with its incomes
below average, believes improvements in its material status should be connected
with a withdrawal from the area of state influence rather than with state interference.
Young people have no specific human capital yet and prefer the exit option to loyalty
or voice. This is in some measure due to the fact the neither the young nor
nonworkers expect social support, which is not perceived as an essential advantage.
On the one hand, it is considered to be insufficiently effective, and on the other, it
is not relied upon because of more liberal presets that this group has compared to
all other groups.
The main unsatisfied demand of this group is the requirement to have clear
«rules of the game» and improvements in the environment that would enable them
to work and make money (the group feels its potential in this respect). Another
crucial demand of this group is for assistance in employment, however, obligatory
job assignment is not acceptable to half of this group (especially in the capital city
and region centers).
The young and nonworkers thus appear to have a less paternalistic attitude in
comparison to other groups of population. At the same time, this group appears to
be content with the level of higher education in the country and hopes that the
knowledge and skills it gains are sufficient; the insufficient level of «payment» for
knowledge and skills must be attributed to state policies.
Both youth and nonworkers are quite pragmatic. «Ideological constructs»,
including pride in their country, political stability, redevelopment and construction,
are not regarded as serious benefits by this group, which means ideology does not
contribute to building up loyalty among nonworkers. Indeed, the degree of loyalty
in the group of the young and nonworkers is lower than the average in the population
at large, which is caused by more serious demands and higher evaluation of their
potential. Under the circumstances, the best option to improve the situation,
according to youth, is the exit strategy, for instance, work for a private business, or
migration.
The group of economically inactive citizens hence has a critical attitude to the
current situation and quite rarely relies on the state. Group members are pragmatic;
they believe they can choose the exit option, whereas their loyalty cannot be won
by pledges of state care. They would rather seek and implement various
opportunities beyond the social contract, being less prone to use voice. They may
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, the social and political regimes in most of the CIS countries,
including Belarus, have matched the formula coined by Russian political observer
A. Kolesnikov: «We pretend that we bring your living standards up to the European
level, and you pretend that you vote» (Kolesnikov, 2008). This formula looks a lot
like the Soviet one as far as political rights and freedoms are concerned. On the one
hand, the authorities guarantee that the population has access to goods and services
(with a better selection and higher quality compared to Soviet times), but on the
other hand the regime more or less coerces people to vote for it as well. Political
alternatives are «underrepresented», political competition is limited, which enables
the authorities to stay relatively indifferent and loyal to the political «kitchen%
talk» for the time being. In turn, society only demands a minimum package of
political benefits and freedoms, whereas the authorities are ready to provide this
package, and also guarantee an increase in incomes (wages and pensions) in exchange
for the recognition of their legitimacy.
The relations between society and the authorities in Belarus today are
characterized by a high degree of both mutual distrust and indifference, as well
as the population’s minimum demands for social and political freedoms. The
implicit subsidies coming from Russia, developed industrial base and
infrastructure inherited from the Soviet times, and skilled workforce have enabled
the Belarusian authorities to reap interest and export revenues and redistribute
them among all members of society. This distribution of profits was performed in
such a way that almost every social group could feel its well%being improve, which
guaranteed mutual satisfaction of the counterparties. Income hikes used to be
most noticeable on the eve of election campaigns (see the political business cycle
concept in Haiduk et al., 2004, Haiduk, Pelipas, Chubrik, 2007). Moreover, the
authorities have been very skillful at performing their «political%legal function» –
the coercive function. For example, repressive mechanisms were elaborated to
punish for the absence of political loyalty (including threats of dismissal, tighter
control of business, etc.).
Under the circumstances, smaller social groups – business representatives,
directors of state%owned enterprises, high%ranking officials, scientific and cultural
workers are often characterized by inner conflict. Such groups are frequently aware
of the drawbacks of the current state policy, but remain loyal in exchange for certain
compensations and privileges. They are therefore embedded in the existing
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framework of the social contract, which in their case is defined by the formula: «We
understand everything, but we are playing by the book». Otherwise, these groups
choose exit.
It ought to be noted that Belarus has recently seen changes in the relations
between the state and private business, expressed in a simplification of the business
environment and slackened controls. Nevertheless, these moves should not be
considered sufficient to bring about a new «social contract», because the relations
along the «authorities%business» axis are modified following commands from
«above» to the extent and in the areas suitable to the state.
In this chapter, we study the relations between the authorities and business
(state and entrepreneurs) in Belarus from the perspective of the «social contract».
The subject of the study is socioeconomic practices formed in the process of the
interaction between business and the authorities. The empirical basis of this study
is formed by (1) unstructured interviews with 10 representatives of small and
medium%sized businesses; (2) results of three focus group tests with representatives
of small and medium%sized businesses; (3) findings of the sample sociological survey
of entrepreneurs and non%entrepreneurs conducted by NOVAK axiometric
laboratory ordered by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS, Vilnius);
and (4) previous SME research findings of the Research Center of the Institute for
Privatization and Management (IPM Research Center).
This study has the following structure: the second part studies the nature of
the social contract in Belarus, defines its parameters and formulates the key
hypotheses. The latter are checked in the third part, which analyzes the results of
the interview, focus groups and the questionnaire for entrepreneurs. They allow
identifying the specific mechanisms of the social contract in the «loyalty – voice –
exit» framework. The fourth part offers the conclusions.
2. SOCIAL CONTRACT BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES AND
BUSINESS IN BELARUS
2.1. «AuthoritiesMbusiness» social contract framework and key hypotheses
This study defines «the authorities» as a structure that guarantees that everyone
plays by the «rules of the game», produces public benefits and has the right to
make decisions binding on all economic entities and powers to control the execution
of such decisions.1 «Business» is defined as a complex of entrepreneurial entities
(from individual entrepreneurs to large private companies) that are engaged in
business activities on the market in order to derive profits.
The ideal stratified theoretical model of the relationship between the authorities
and business offers a stable image of this relationship in conditions of the «ideal
market economy». It identifies the roles of the parties to this relationship: the
1 One has to remember the specific nature of the Belarusian system of authorities, that is, the
top%down command structure and total dependence of all regulatory bodies on the central
executive branch (the Presidential Administration).
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entities representing the interests of business negotiate the rules of the game and
vest the power to ensure their abidance to the state, which performs the role of the
agent%guarantor. The obligations of the parties are as follows: the state guarantees
a favorable environment for business and produces public benefits necessary to
conduct business, including production, social and institutional infrastructure,
whereas business undertakes to pay taxes and reproduce the economic resources it
uses.
The ideal stratified theoretical model is confronted by the real national
(Belarusian) model of the relations between the authorities and business, which
directly reflects the current economic reality. The exiting model is based on the
country’s history, the track record of state development and emergence of private
business, as well as the perception of what is right and fair from the perspective of
businessmen and functionaries, etc. All this to some extent modifies the roles of the
authorities and business in their interrelations and adjusts the volume and nature
of mutual obligations.
In Belarus, the absence of real economic liberalization has led to the emergence
of specific property rights and rules of the game. As a result, the institutional model
of the interaction between business and the authorities has a hierarchic structure,
with an important component of informal and discriminating rules and practices,
whereas formal rules (laws) are diversified and changing all the time. Furthermore,
there are violations of the constitutional norm requiring equal rights for various
types of ownership, freedom of entrepreneurial activities, property protection rights,
etc.
Large privately%owned businesses are almost nonexistent in Belarus due to the
absence of a privatization processes, complicated and non%transparent business
conditions, and massive support for the state sector, redistribution processes and
growth in monopoly trends in separate sectors of the economy. At the same time,
small and medium%sized businesses are scattered, their economic role is insignificant
(with 8%%10% of GDP in the past few years), hence a weak negotiating position of
businesses when they bargain conditions of their social contract with the state. In
Belarus, unlike Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan or CEE, the state has nothing to
bargain about and no one to negotiate with, especially the «rules of the game» in
business. The decision makers do not trust business and do not see why they should
promote «greenhouse conditions» for business (although the effects of the global
economic crisis may change the situation).
For their part, representatives of Belarusian business do not trust the authorities,
but, despite the complicated and discrepant «rules of the game», they remain loyal,
preferring the advantages of independent entrepreneurship, a business of their own.
One reason is the high cost of starting a business, thus, to «exit» is often harder
than to «enter» a market. Exit presupposes a loss of spent resources, accumulated
skills and knowledge about the work in specific Belarusian conditions, experience
and connections, etc. These factors could be regarded as «specific institutional
barriers to exit» (Hirschman, 1970, p. 79).
As a result, the efficiency of the dialogue between business and the authorities
has remained low for years, which is corroborated by the absence of changes in the
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legal framework regulating business conditions. The social contract is being adjusted
from «above» along the «authorities%business» axis (for instance, the liberalization
of business environment in late 2008 – early 2009). This process is almost completely
controlled by regulatory bodies, which act on only those few recommendations of
the business community that they believe should be followed. As for business, its
demands from the state mostly concern stability of the rules of the game and the
possibility to do business independently.
To outline the contours of the social contract we put forward the following
hypotheses:
1. Business, as the most socially mobile group with professional market
skills, shows the lowest demand for the services of the «welfare state»,
and is therefore the most marketMoriented force in the country.
2. There is a vertical (asymmetric) social contract between the authorities
and business, whose framework is used by the state to dictate its rules of
the game to business.
3. Entrepreneurs rarely choose the «voice» mechanism.
2.2. Perception of the state and expectations of business
When it comes to the general attitude towards the state, the expectations of business
people are almost the same as the prevailing expectations of Belarusians in general.
Entrepreneurs, just as representatives of other social groups, expect that the state
will be providing free medical services, secondary and higher education, assist
citizens in acquisition of homes, etc. The study shows that entrepreneurs prefer the
same social benefits and guarantees as other population groups (Figure 1). The
main difference is that business expects fewer preferences and privileges from the
state, but has higher hopes that the state will allow its citizens to do business, secure
political stability and compliance with the law.
As a result of the factor analysis (principle component analysis) of the findings
of the opinion survey in the subgroup of business people, two groups of factors
characterizing the attitude of business to the state were detected. One of them
(component 1) is connected with the perception of the state as the social guarantor.
In this respect, business is little different from other groups of the population. The
other one (component 2) pertains to the economic aspects of the relation between
the state and business. It is worth noticing that in this group of factors the possibility
to make money is evaluated as being ‘negative’, while the possibility of doing
business is estimated as «positive». These factors characterize the market orientation
of business and its self%identification as a self%sufficient and independent agent. In
other words, Belarusian businesses do not expect material benefits from the state
(possibility to make money), but rely on their own efforts in business activities.
The list of economic aspects (component 2) includes housing and soft home loans,
which are very serious issues in Belarusian society. However, for this factor, the
weights are almost equal for both components (Table 1).
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Source: data based on BISS research.
Figure 1. Expectations from the state: answers to the question: «In your opinion,
what must the state do for people like you?»
An identical component analysis for the population at large does not isolate
economic factors. The provision of possibilities to do business is generally
interpreted as one of many possibilities and guarantees secured by the state.
Despite the fact that entrepreneurs and the population at large has almost
identical expectations from the state, the former are less satisfied than other
social groups with what the state really does for them. In the first place, this
concerns privileges, the size of educational allowances and pensions, quality
of medical services and other social benefits.  Besides, according to
entrepreneurs, the state fails to provide relevant deposit guarantees, does not
ensure an acceptable business environment and offers no possibility to make
money (Figure 2).
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Table 1
Factor analysis of the perception of the state by entrepreneurs:
matrix of components
Source: data based on BISS research.
Another important aspect in the context of the analysis of the parameters of the
«authorities%business» social contract is that entrepreneurs form the most independent
social group compared to the rest of the population. Business representatives to a greater
extent rely on their own efforts and expect less assistance from the state as far as their
health, education and employment are concerned (Tables 2, 3).
Table 2
Distribution of average scores in answers to the question: «Do the following
aspects of life depend on the state, or your own efforts?»
Note: 1 – entirely on the state, 4 – entirely on my own efforts
Source: data based on BISS research.
Table 3
Answers to the question: «Imagine you have serious financial problems.
Who/what would you rely on?», %
Source: data based on BISS research.
 Component 1 Component 2 
Possibility to make money 0.53846867 –0.5703883 
Privileges, benefits 0.56040962 –0.4604069 
Pensions 0.61075871 –0.4806464 
Educational allowances 0.78266531 –0.4423356 
Free secondary education 0.73898383 0.03132384 
Free higher education 0.68623582 0.04888098 
Quality medical services 0.49549234 –0.1085333 
Protection from crime 0.64425318 0.50121523 
100% guarantee of bank deposits 0.80395392 –0.0847901 
Guaranteed employment 0.76667988 –0.0617501 
Free medical services 0.44684141 –0.1233523 
Political stability 0.71014097 0.43778937 
Law and order, efficiency of courts 0.48385963 0.15930721 
Employers’ meeting their commitments 0.57928692 0.55475215 
Possibility of entrepreneurship 0.25311009 0.38049589 
Assistance in housing acquisition, concessional home loans 0.49032791 0.49777891 
 
 All population groups Business 
Well-being 2.8 3.2 
Health 3.2 3.4 
My education and my children’s education 2.7 3.1 
Employment 2.9 3.2 
 
 
All population groups Business 
My own efforts 58.1 74.8 
State, social security programs 9.9 9.2 
Friends 17.8 19.4 
Relatives, parents 58.2 42.3 




Moreover, business representatives are not only more independent (compared
to other population groups), but also have a market%oriented vision of economic
policies.2  This is especially true for pricing rules, protectionism policies shielding
domestic producers, and property of small businesses (Figure 3).
Therefore, both the perception of the role of the state in society and economy
and the attitude to the services and guarantees provided by the state in this social
Source: data based on BISS research.
Figure 2. Evaluation of state performance, breakdown of answers to the question:
«In your opinion, what does the state really do for people like you?»
2 The respondents were offered opposite positions (state paternalism vs. market orientation,
liberal position) for each basic component of economic regulations. The answers were marked
1 to 5, where 1 stands for state paternalism, and 5 stands for market orientation.
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group are different from other social groups. Representatives of the business
community tend to rely on themselves more, prioritize the environment, allowing them
to earn, and believe the role of private business is significant. Entrepreneurs, like no
other social group, are very well aware of the illiberality and inefficiency of the
development model applied in Belarus.
Source: data based on BISS research.
Figure 3. Market orientation of the population at large and business
2.3. Structure of the social contract between the authorities and business
As we will prove below, in the social contract in Belarus, the state (authorities)
acts as the party that defines the conditions, not as a partner or counteragent that
will negotiate or discuss. The «pro%market» attitude of the business community
does not allow it to agree with the country’s policies regarding business, but enables
it to independently survive in the established environment. The dialogue between
the authorities and business is not effective; doing business conditions are dictated
by the state, because the contract is built «vertically».
The Belarusian social contract between the authorities and business has a
vertical structure, and formal and informal rules enable the authorities to manipulate
the business community and its economic (political and social) activity with ease.
The key feature of the vertical nature of the social contract is the right of the authorities
to withdraw rights and redistribute them. The amount of payment for loyalty and
compensations is set by the authorities, not the law or mutual agreements.
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The vertical structure of the social contract is identified with the help of the
following instruments that the authorities use to manipulate business:
• numerous campaigns to re%register SMEs and complicated business termination
procedures;
• constant changes in taxation, pricing, licensing, certification regulations, etc.;
• complicated procedures to have administrative authorizations, licenses;
• weak court system, limited possibilities to have legal protection of business
and create organizations and associations to protect mutual business
interests;
• appeals of economic entities or business associations seeking to resolve problems
directed to the «top level» – the government, president, Supreme, Constitutional
Court; unwillingness or absence of authority to have problems settled at a lower
level;
• absence of a developed intermediary between business and the authorities,
namely, organizations capable of protecting business interests during bargaining
with the state;
• unequal operational conditions for various economic agents, selective law
enforcement (corruption), etc.
The problem of complicated and variable rules of the game for business is
analyzed in numerous publications of the International Finance Corporation, World
Bank, and the IPM Research Center. They all report intricate business regulations,
frequent regulatory changes, complicated and non%transparent procedure for
obtaining administrative authorizations (including locally), weakness of the judicial
system, possibility of pre%trial confiscations, etc.
This makes business extremely vulnerable and often defenseless in its relations
with the state (amid frequent and numerous inspections and high fines). As a result,
many private companies opt for «making a deal» with the state in one way or another,
choosing corruptive schemes or otherwise adapting to existing procedures.
Table 4
Answers to the question: «In your opinion, how typical are the
following responses of enterprises in your sector to external obstacles
(administrative arbitrariness, etc.)?», %








2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 
Try not to argue and comply with all demands  23 10.3 53.8 49.0 23.7 40.7 
Complain to higher authorities  29.3 26.3 64.8 63.2 5.9 10.5 
Institute actions in courts 20.8 24.0 70.4 63.5 8.8 12.4 
Try to evade meeting some requirements 25.1 21.5 61.0 64.8 13.9 13.7 
Try to «get a deal» (incl. bribing) 22.6 23.8 61.1 53.9 16.3 22.3 
Transfer their business to other countries  42.4 46.2 49.2 43.4 12.4 10.5 
Partially transfer their business to the 
«shadow sector» 
43.8 30.4 49.8 56.0 6.4 13.7 
Try to unite to protect their interests together  30.3 34.0 53.4 57.3 16.3 8.8 
Assist one another providing information  25.0 19.5 45.6 54.9 29.4 25.6 
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It should be noted that corrupt forms of the interaction between the
authorities and business have become more popular. Corruption and informal
(shadow) economy are integral parts of Belarusian business. Notably, whereas
the availability of vacant market niches and high export revenues forced and made
it possible for some Belarusian businesses to stay completely out of the «shadow»,
the remaining businesses, mostly those servicing the domestic market, perceived
corrupt schemes as a survival factor. According to previous studies of the research
center with the Institute for Privatization and Management, some 23–44% of all
SMEs hand out bribes on a regular basis, and another 38–45% offer bribes «from
time to time».
The fact that corruption has turned into being «part and parcel» of the package
to buy loyalty and increase the informal income of functionaries (the authorities
turn a blind eye to officials’ being bribed) is corroborated by studies of international
organizations: Belarus had gone down to position 151 in Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index in 2008 from position 107 in 2005.
The behavior models characteristic of entrepreneurs are often interlaced: many
SMEs choose to combine strategies, for example, struggle and evasion, or evasion
and abidance by all rules, which is why an analysis of adaptation models is somewhat
difficult. For instance, the cluster analysis based on the IPM Research Center studies
in 2007 identified six groups of companies (clusters) depending on their reaction
to the specific character of the regulatory framework, including evasion with
elements of mutual aid, submission, solo survival, etc. (Rakova et al., 2007).
3. MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BUSINESS AND THE AUTHORITIES
The entire range of relations between this or that social group and the authorities
in the framework of the social contract may be analyzed within the loyalty%voice/
protest%exit triad. Combinations of these components in society result in certain
balance of demand and supply of formal and informal rules and practices that make
protest less attractive. Below is the analysis of these components based on
unstructured individual interviews with representatives of business, focus groups
(italicized) and opinion polls.
3.1. Loyalty
Business’ loyalty to the authorities is revealed in the evaluation of the benefits
provided by the latter. Entrepreneurs do not form an isolated part of Belarusian
society. Despite the fact that this group is well%educated and the most mobile one,
it is susceptible to the same stereotypes as the population at large. Asked «Why do
you think it is good to live in Belarus?» they give typical answers characteristic of
other social groups, the most frequent being neatness and order, redevelopment of
settlements, sympathetic and hospitable people, and beautiful nature. Many of these
features are not connected with the merits of the state, but nevertheless these factors
are often mixed in people’s conscience.
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Other advantages of living in Belarus, according to businessmen, include the
relatively high level of law and order, relative economic security of pensioners,
support for sports, social housing programs – and all of them are indeed elements
of the package of benefits provided by the state in the framework of the social
contract between the state and society. These benefits are quite conspicuous, owing
to the state television efforts, and seen in comparison with the conditions observed
in other CIS member%states.
However, as was mentioned above, the degree of businessmen’s loyalty to the
policy conducted in Belarus is low, as entrepreneurs prefer focusing on their own
business and perceive the state as a «default environment» that they have to accept.
Many businessmen see the defects of the system and compare the appreciable
benefits (neatness, etc.) to a picture, «a screen put on a rotten wall». Business has a
generally negative attitude to the work of the propaganda machine: «We talk too
much and often start believing in what we say. That everything is fine. Because
propaganda works better in Belarus than in WWII Germany». According to one of
the respondents, the main drawback of the country is the «universally destructive
lie. What does it destroy? … human consciousness and personality».
As a better%off and more progressive part of Belarusian society, business people
see defects in all areas in which the state is involved. Both social and economic
lapses of the actual state of affairs are noted: «First, people drink themselves to death…
The best brains cannot find decent payment here, cannot have their products patented
and leave the country. The third thing is concerned with business – taxes look like
extortion, and it is even worse than back during the Mongol invasion…» Similar
evaluations were registered during opinion polls (Figure 4).
The advantages of doing business in Belarus, which secure entrepreneurs’
loyalty to the regime (according to businessmen) include:
• skilled personnel;
• relatively closed economy;
• low competition;
• awareness of and capability to adapt to complicated regulations and rules of
the game;
• lower «kickback» than in neighboring countries, lower corruption rate;
• possibility of self%realization (through business).
It is interesting that business welcomes the «protectionist» function of the state.
In real business practice, the barriers formed by complex and contradictory
regulations and «closed» nature of the national economy are transformed in quite
a peculiar way into advantages. According to one of the respondents, «if it were not
for state barriers, everything would have been divided and devoured, and many of us
would not be here, but would be working at factories».
The fear of foreign capital expansion, especially of Russian capital, is very
strong in the Belarusian business community. If not the state, «there would be no
Belarusian wholesalers, no public catering sector, no services offered by domestic
companies. We would have Russian, Ukrainian and Polish conglomerates that would
eradicate locals». This once again confirms the conclusion, that the multitude of
barriers to business on the one hand, and the ability to adapt to them on the
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other hand provide a competitive edge of Belarusian business (Rakova et al.,
2007).
Despite the complexity of the business environment in Belarus, the number of
individual entrepreneurs and small and medium%sized enterprises has been growing
recently. Entrepreneurs attribute the increase in their number to the attractiveness
of doing own business: «I know why I work and who I work for; I enjoy the results of
my own work».
The external factors that complicate business procedures in Belarus are few.
Most of the problems for business are created by the tax system, administrative
Source: data based on BISS research.




barriers, inspections and fines. The complexity and inconsistency of regulations
has been a major obstacle to business development for years. The government started
working on business climate liberalization back in 2007 and continued its efforts in
2008 – 2009, when it eliminated some administrative barriers, reduced turnover
tax rates and cut some taxes, introduced simplified licensing, etc. Nevertheless, the
efficiency and productivity of these measures are not yet certain.
Some entrepreneurs appreciate the introduction of the «one%stop» principle
and some simplified regulations. But on the whole, it follows from interviews and
focus groups that «nothing has changed» considerably in business regulations. What
is meant here in the first place is the frequency of «new amendments», which are
often «backdated». Consequently, such changes amid frequent inspections3 and high
fines make private business vulnerable, especially the SME segment.
According to the business community, the country does not have the stability
that is declared in the official media. It mentions political stability (with certain
reservations, though), but businesses require both economic and legal stability,
«certainty that at least some rules of the game will remain unchanged». In this
[business] area, «everything changes too fast». Entrepreneurs do not mind following
official rules for doing business, but these rules must be clear and consistent. They
say: «No one refuses to pay taxes … but we wish we knew the rules, poor as they are,
but those that do not change every other day».
According to legal experts «the language of laws is absolutely incomprehensible,
some things cannot be read at all». Also, there are documents «For Official Use
Only», which are not available to wide public. Nevertheless, they are essential for
correct business document flows. Thus, businesses are at risk to make unintentional
mistakes when drawing up documents. The absence of clear and easy%to%understand
instructions makes it possible for the state to punish even law%abiding businesses.
Entrepreneurs are certain that «laws are written in such a way that there is no chance
they will not be broken», «in order for us to violate them unintentionally and for them
to fine us». The respondents believe entrepreneurs and directors of businesses are
completely dependent on the authorities: «They can interfere in your business any
time, they can change the rules of the game any time, they can change your taxation
base and lease rate any time, they can take your license…»
Entrepreneurs mention a rude and indifferent attitude of functionaries to their
official duties and explanation of rules (procedures) to businessmen. According to
one of the respondents, «they may just not tell you the details, but if you use your
contacts, they may give you more detailed information».
The inequality of commercial opportunities for different types of business is part
of the social contract between Belarusian business and the authorities. Impairments
of private businesses’ rights, non%uniform fees, discriminatory contracting procedures
3 Their number has fallen in the past few years, though. The number of inspections per SME a
year is hard to measure. There have been no serious empirical studies in the past few years.
According to the IFC (see IFC, 2008), the average number of inspections per SME fell to four
in 2006 from 10 in 2004. The IPM research center released a higher average of 7.7 inspections
annually in 2006, but respondents admitted the number of inspections had fallen.
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and court decisions are common for Belarusian business. Moreover, entrepreneurs
claim that «we have no untouchables», which means any business – small, medium or
large, successful and inefficient, close to the authorities or having no connections in
high places – is vulnerable to the decisions coming from the top.
3.2. Protest
Nonconformity, or protest («voice»), protection of rights in courts of law are often
costly and inefficient instruments in the framework of the interaction between the
authorities and business in Belarus (because of the peculiarities of the court system
and sweeping powers of repressive authorities). As a rule, «it is cheaper to get a
deal» than to take a case in court. Nevertheless, according to a study of the IPM
research center, about 30% of offended SMEs have tried and protected their interests
in court in the past few years. This means this practice is sometimes successful.
Business does not consider rallies to be an efficient mechanism to assert its
interests. Entrepreneurs consider politics «dangerous and inefficient», because «there
are no rules at all in politics», and «politics will put an end to business». Furthermore,
entrepreneurs believe that in this case not only businessmen, but also families and
loved ones are at risk. Business is not ready to risk this much. Punitive measures are
taken against protesters in order to «control the political situation in the country».
«The state is doing its best to prevent business from being involved in politics».
On the other hand, entrepreneurs note a shortage of knowledge, and, consequently,
the inefficiency of voicing protests to fight for their rights. They admit that legal
actions may be a more efficient and civilized way of protest. «If there are stable rules
of the game, business does not need politics at all for sure».
Still, representatives of business have a generally positive attitude to protest
actions and assertion of interests per se. For example, the business protests of 2008
were not well known to individual entrepreneurs, and none of the respondents
participated, but «everyone sympathizes with the people who were brave enough to
take to the streets and suffered». With that, business reiterates, «protesters once
again made sure protests were not worth it. A negative result is still a result». At the
same time, representatives of the business community criticize the absence of the
possibility to have alternative political views. They feel they lose because of their
inertness and passiveness: «We do not even see our conscience being destroyed, and
we are getting weaker».
The opinion poll showed that about a quarter of the population would not
struggle to seek «fulfillment of conditions» of the social contract or modifications
of the contract by the state. About the same number of respondents would try to
either adapt or look for individual ways to resolve problems. However, compared
to other social groups, business is more active in fighting for its rights. If they are
dissatisfied, 20.3% are ready to take legal action, and 14.5% would appeal to the
mass media. At the same time, they are less likely to appeal to the authorities or
public organizations. Mass protest actions became the least popular instrument to
assert their interests in their relations with the state, although business is less




Answers to the question: «If you are to some extent dissatisfied with what the state
is doing for you, how could you change the situation?», %
Source: data based on BISS research.
Source: data based on BISS research.
Figure 5. Answers to the question: «What is your attitude to protest actions and
protesters?», %
Table 6
Attitude of business and the population at large to protests and protesters, %
Source: opinion poll.
 All population groups Business 
Would not change anything 24.8 16.7 
Would try adapting, look for ways out using personal contacts  24.9 24.6 
Appeal to court  11.8 20.3 
Appeal to media 9.7 14.5 
Appeal to local authorities with a proposal or demand  16.1 13.3 
File a complaint  9.8 12.3 
Vote in elections  10.7 11.3 
Appeal to public organizations  7.2 6.6 
Appeal to elected representative  7.7 5.8 
Take part in mass protests 3.1 4.9 
 
 All population groups Business 
Rallies and protest actions are normal: people must be given a chance to 
speak out 
28.8 38.4 
Rallies and protest actions are acceptable, as they express people’s will 21.0 28.3 
As a citizen, you must obey the rules, not rebel against them by having 
rallies and protests 
24.2 12.2 
Participation in rallies should be punishable: criminal and administrative 
measures must be applied 
6.4 11.6 
No answer/Undecided 17.6 9.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
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3.3. Use of exit strategy
When withdrawing from business voluntarily (and, consequently, from the «social
contract» with the authorities) a citizen loses the entire package of benefits intrinsic
to the contract while avoiding retaliatory measures. It appears that in Belarus,
business has to either accept the conditions imposed from above or refuse to comply
and lose the chances to do business: «You want to work – you work, you don’t want
to – you just don’t work». According to business representatives, thus far the
(subjective) benefits from doing business in Belarus have exceeded potential
costs, formed by punishment, adaptation expenses or forced migration.
Accordingly, businessmen prefer keeping up their business without protesting.
According to one of the respondents, «my business income is higher than possible
costs of the struggle against the state». On the other hand, the scales that measure
such benefits and expenses are now being tipped towards costs, making business
(especially successful) leave the country.
Migration is an exit option. About 30% of the opinion poll respondents believe
that people like them have better possibilities abroad (Figure 6). This figure does
not represent the real number of those willing to leave the country, though.
Source: data based on BISS research.
Figure 6. Answers to the question: «In your opinion, where do people like you live
better – in Belarus or abroad?», %
About a third of representatives of the business community would like to leave
Belarus, much more than the share of potential migrants in the population at large
(Figure 7).
This is theory. In practice, businessmen admit that «it is not so easy to leave».
On the one hand, many do not consider Russia or Ukraine, «not to change one
trouble for another». Businesses admit that it is «a bit better» elsewhere, but not
enough to abandon everything in Belarus. To start a business «from scratch» in
Social contract: Business
110
Europe is either impossible or costs too much: «Each location is specific, and it
takes time to study the peculiarities; if you are not aware of them, your business is
inefficient».
Source: data based on BISS research.
Figure 7. Answers to the question: «Would you like to leave the country?»
Moreover, it is psychologically hard to start a business in a new country. All
entrepreneurs emphasize the importance of «home and Motherland», such factors
as family, friends, mentality, possibility to enjoy life in Belarus, which cannot be
measured in money and business (59.3% of the respondents named this reason).
All these factors are institutional barriers on the way to using the exit option (they
also contribute to the attractiveness of the loyalty strategy).
Another exit option is to change jobs and be employed in the public sector.
Noteworthy, entrepreneurship is a very serious «social drug» – most business owners
do not consider getting back to state%run enterprises or budget organizations. They
would rather leave the country than get back to the package of benefits and
guarantees that the state offers to the rest of the population.
3.4. Current changes in the framework of the social contract between the
authorities and business
Throughout long years of discrimination and harassment, business has managed to
develop immunity to the policies of the state and the «mutual untouchability»
formula evolved: «We perceive our Motherland, the state as it is… The state gives us
the rules, we follow them. We can only ask to change them, there is no use
shouting that they are bad; they are there for us». This is the formula of the
modern social contract between the state and business in Belarus.
At the same time, in a new economic environment the authorities gradually
start to realize that they need business. Lately, representatives of the business
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community have noted certain changes in the contours of the social contract,
initiated from «above». «Some five years ago the following trend was very clear: if
some entrepreneur failed to please the state, or there was any other reason, the business
would be closed. They do not shut them down … completely, now». Inspections and
sanctions resulting from them could be ruinous to business, but «something will
remain». Other improvements include changes in the work of banks, more
convenient lease procedures, advantages of «being transparent», and faster
administrative procedures.
The state has been making efforts in improving the business climate, but business
believes it happens only because the state is interested in developing business now.
The reason is not that the opinion of the business community is finally heard.
Entrepreneurs are not certain what the ultimate goal of the current liberalization
campaign is – to recognize the efficiency of the private sector, reach certain
indicators, liberalize for some foreign users, etc. «The goal is not clear … If we are
moving towards some specific rules of the game, we need to know what we will have at
the finish. If we were shown some code of practice – that we are moving to some body
of rules, and in order to achieve it, we have to take measures… But it cannot be done
overnight – at least a year or two will be required to make it clear that we play according
to preliminary rules, some initial rules. But they need to indicate the moment when we
reach absolute rules».
So far, no specific goal has been named; on the contrary, liberalization has
remained uncertain, thus contributing to mutual distrust of business and the
authorities. In response to its policies, the state expects changes in business activity
and emergence of new business models. In turn, business, both small and large,
distrusts the authorities and expects that liberalization is being pursued «to make
it easier to check, punish and take everything». It is clear that some distrust still
remains between the parties to the contract.
4. CONCLUSION
The social contract between the authorities and private business in Belarus is
asymmetric and vertically structured. According to a focus group member, «the
state gives us the ‘rules of the game’, and we can either accept them or refuse to comply.
There is no use shouting or trying to demand, you can only beg». This opinion is a
perfect illustration of the nature of the social contract. Moreover, business perceives
the state as some «default environment», not a counterparty for dialogue and
bargaining with due consideration of each party’s requirements. The best formula
for the business%state relationship is: «do not interfere». Entrepreneurs have
formulated a strong demand for a regime that would not interfere with their work
by setting selective administrative barriers, a regime that would apply identical
evaluation criteria to all and perform its administrative functions to high standards.
The «vertical» social contract between business and the authorities is not clearly
spelt out, but the parties tend to stick to fixed lines of conduct. The list of stimuli
that ensure loyalty of businesses starts with the very possibility of doing business
(that is, the possibility to have a different social status and incomes). Entrepreneurs
Social contract: Business
112
agree to capture the niches and segments, in which the state does not mind having
them (where there is no competition with the state sector or business interests of
senior officials). Furthermore, entrepreneurs, business owners, and top managers
mention the relative ease of doing business as far as the search for workforce is
concerned, as Belarus offers highly skilled and disciplined personnel. It is notable
that state protectionism is perceived as a positive phenomenon – it includes a certain
«inaccessibility» of the Belarusian market and complexity of regulations (domestic
entrepreneurs have already adapted), and the presence of social connections. The
business community is well aware of and appreciates these factors contributing to
competitiveness.
The main instruments the regime is using to force business to cooperate are
differentiated rules of the game and selective application of sanctions against the
violators of formal norms and rules. As a result, it is easy to manipulate any business
in Belarus. The discriminatory nature of the state attitude to private business is
evident; inequality of the rules of the game is everywhere – from pricing procedures
to courts. However, the authorities realize that business generates profit, creates
jobs and pays taxes.
In turn, Belarusian business does not find the idea of political protest (the
«voice» strategy and protection of economic and civil rights) particularly appealing.
«To get involved into politics» would mean to lose a business and any chance to
«prove anything to anyone», according to the business community. At the same
time, a small group of entrepreneurs (as a rule these are successful businesses
occupying certain niches, in which they are beneficial to the authorities, as they
pay taxes and generate currency proceeds) tend to choose legal methods to struggle
for their rights. They can afford the best lawyers and judicial protection of their
interests. However, the absolute majority of businesses, especially SMEs, are
incapable of meeting all norms of the law, which makes them most vulnerable.
The combination of stimuli in the form of the environment suitable for doing
business and mechanisms of coercion (reprisal) encourages loyalty. The possibilities
of exit (migration or employment in the public sector) are hardly ever considered
(although some mobile or the most competitive businesses have been relocated
elsewhere in the CIS or foreign countries beyond the CIS) because of high
institutional barriers.
Belarusian business has not yet grown into a mature homogeneous entity
interested in uniform rules of the game. As a rule, its representatives are guided by
personal interests when interacting with the authorities. This means that, while
the established institutional model of the interaction between business and the
authorities fails to satisfy most of the entrepreneurs taken separately, it preserves
its stability because business does not show sufficient demand for new universal formal
rules of the game. As entrepreneurs themselves note, it is only possible to resist the
pressure of inspections, demands for informal payments and disrespect of the
authorities in a consolidated union. Businesses are not yet ready to get together,
though.
There has been a growing sense of changes in the social contract between the
authorities and business lately. This change is being pushed from the top, under
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complete control of the state, and embraces certain liberalization of current
regulations and a somewhat softer attitude to private business. The authorities
must have come to understand that the private sector would contribute to economic
growth if it works efficiently. Still, this modification of the attitude of the authorities
to business is a least%evil solution prompted by economic and political circumstances
rather than awareness of the significance of business for the economy. Business
understands this very well, playing down the importance and efficiency of the
reform.
The high degree of businesses’ distrust in the authorities reduces the possibilities
of horizontal cooperation. To alter the current social contract terms and change to
the horizontal type of social contracting from the vertical structure it is essential
to promote civil society, intensify the real dialogue between the authorities and
entrepreneurs (business associations, analysis centers), and generate the «state
order» for expertise and proposals for improving contracts.
To conclude: the business community is regarded as the most independent and
mobile social group in Belarus; moreover, business is less prone to paternalistic
moods and expectations; businesses are less satisfied with the set of services and
guarantees provided by the state compared to all other social groups. The potential
contribution of this group in the well%being of the entire country remains
underestimated. The recent sporadic measures aimed at liberalizing the business
environment are perceived as unimportant and partial. According to business people,
the changes have been mostly shallow and failed to alter the existing system of
regulation and business opportunities.
Their liberal mood does not allow businesses to consent to the current business
policies of the state, but facilitates independent survival in the exiting environment.
Business has built up a system of relations with the state and prefers the «mutual
immunity» regime. The business community is not eager to take up politics, but
tends to adapt and hope the rules of the game will be improved from «above». The
state understands the importance of the presence of the private sector in the country,
especially in the niches where business does not compete with the state. On the
whole, the social contract between the authorities and business is not clearly defined,
and business is not only deficient in bargaining power, but also highly dissatisfied
with the existing institutional framework in Belarus.
At the same time, if unfavorable conditions for business persist, many
entrepreneurs will be ready to choose the «exit» option and migrate (the other
possibility, to get a job at a state%run enterprise is not seriously considered by
businesses). In this case, the state risks losing the most advanced and active members
of society.
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Chapter 6
SOCIAL CONTRACT: CIVIL SERVANTS
Tatiana Lisovskaya, Elena Rakova
1. INTRODUCTION
Civil servants play a crucial role in the management structure of contemporary
society. They act as a connecting link between civil society and the state and have
an important mission of carrying out the state will and implementing state policies.
It is on the qualitative composition of the corps of civil servants and their formal
and informal terms of office that the socioeconomic position of the state and
progressive development of society depend.
There is a variety of theories of bureaucracy as an administrative system for
officials, for instance the theories of Weber (1976), Merton (1952) and Crozier
(1963). These describe the nature of bureaucracy, its efficiency, competence,
inevitability of overgrowth, etc., as well as the extent to which officials are ready to
protect state interests.
As a rule, theoretically, the following qualifications (competences) of officials
are identified: strict compliance with the law, provision of high quality public
services to the population, transparency and efficiency, desire to listen to people’s
requests, responsibility, professionalism, etc. However, in practice, many former
Soviet Union countries, including Belarus, sometimes fail to meet these standards.
It often happens that real demands and expectations of the state and real motivation
of civil servants do not coincide at all; improper use of official powers is common,
and the same holds for officialism and abuse.
The objective of this study is to analyze the psychological and professional
characteristics of modern Belarusian civil servants, their motivation to perform
their duties to high standards, their powers and dependence on their employer
(state, authorities). The study also aims at assessing the positive and negative aspects
of being employed as a civil servant in the Republic of Belarus, the mechanism of
self%identification of officials with the concept of «authorities», and the combination
of the responsibility of the official for what he or she does and legal and illegal
compensation for the «rigors of service».
The authors attempt to answer the question whether there are informal rules, a
sort of social contract between the authorities (state) and such a social group as
civil servants, and its mechanisms in the framework of the «loyalty – voice – exit»
triad. The authors have formulated the following hypotheses:
1. The authorities are interested in officials and offer them an attractive
working environment compared to other public sector employees; at the
same time, the exit option is fairy easy.
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2. Civil servants identify themselves as an influential social group that is
entitled to special labor conditions.
3. The special conditions offered by the state build up loyalty of civil
servants.
4. There is a social contract between the authorities and officials, but it is
not as explicit as between the state and other social groups.
The study is based on the analysis of in%depth interviews with ten civil servants.
The respondents, with various statuses and ranks, are either incumbent or former
officials of various administrative agencies: the Council of Ministers, Energy
Ministry, Construction and Architecture Ministry, Interior Ministry, Finance
Ministry, Trade Ministry and the State Control Committee.
The second part studies the peculiarities of the legal status of civil servants,
their rights and obligations, compensation conditions, etc. The analysis of the
existing regulatory framework shows that civil servants enjoy the best material
conditions. One has to remember, though, that there are no transparent mechanisms
to control possible unearned incomes, generated through abuse of authority. This
may give rise to corrupt practices and corresponding motivation among those who
perform their duties honestly. The third part presents empirical data regarding the
advantages and drawbacks of civil service in Belarus and some other aspects and
trends. The findings are used to show the nature of the social contract and mutual
expectations of officials and the authorities. The fourth part contains the
conclusions.
2. CIVIL SERVANTS IN BELARUS
2.1. Legal framework of civil servant status
The legal status of civil servants in the Republic of Belarus is determined by the
Law «On Civil Service in the Republic of Belarus»1 and a number of other regulatory
acts (the Constitution, Civil Code, etc.). The current law replaced the previous
law («On the Basic Principles of Service in the State Apparatus»). The very name
of the law expresses and presupposes the attitude of the state to its servants and
expectations from them (in many countries laws of this kind are named «On the
Legal Status of Civil Servants», etc.). The law emphasizes the word «service», that
is, state servants are supposed to serve the state, by analogy with military service.
A civil servant is a citizen of the Republic of Belarus who holds public office in
accordance with procedures established under current legislation, has relevant
authority and performs official duties for remuneration in money paid from the
republican or local budgets or other sources of financing under current legislation.
When studying the essence and efficiency of civil service, it is important to
note that the Belarusian law on civil service does not have a clear definition of
«state interests», which civil servants are supposed to protect. Article 6 has it that
1 Law of the Republic of Belarus #204%З dated June 14, 2003 with amendments.
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civil service is based on the following principles: supremacy of the Constitution of
the Republic of Belarus; service to the people of the Republic of Belarus; law and
order; priority and guarantee of human and civil rights and freedoms; humanity
and social justice; unity of the system of civil service and its differentiation based
on the separation of powers (legislative, executive, and judicial); publicity;
professionalism and competence of civil servants; controllability and accountability
of civil servants, personal liability for non performance or substandard performance
of duties; voluntariness of performance of civil service; equal access to any
opportunities in civil service and possibility of promotion in accordance with
abilities and professional training; stability of civil service with a view to ensuring
continuity of the authorities; economic, social, and legal protection of civil servants.
These principles are fair in their essence, but their can be interpreted in various
ways.
Besides the principles of performance of civil service, the law contains a wide
range of rights and obligations of civil servants, which theoretically ensures that
they perform their functions properly.
Advanced training
The state emphasizes the importance of advanced training of its employees.
Under presidential ordinance2 and other regulatory acts3, training, additional
training and advanced training of executive staff are based on the principles of
consistency, obligation, differentiated approach, and usefulness in the long run. To
ensure a continuous improvement in professional skills of executive staff assigned
to new positions, all senior and top executives of government agencies
(organizations) are supposed to take advanced training on a compulsory basis.
At the same time, there are serious obstacles for officials who want to take a
study course abroad, even if the host country is ready to foot the bill. According to
article 38 that the procedure of authorizing official business trips abroad, identifying
sources of financing, guarantees and compensation for civil servants during business
trips abroad are determined by the president of the Republic of Belarus or an
authorized agency. A foreign business trip of a Belarusian official that is financed
by government agencies of foreign countries, international or foreign organizations,
2 Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Belarus № 354 «On Work with Executive Staff
in the System of State Authorities and Other State Organizations» dated July 26, 2004.
3 Besides the law indicated above, separate legal regulations pertaining to professional training
of administrative personnel are included in Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Belarus
№ 354 «On Work with Executive Staff in the System of State Authorities and Other State
Organizations» dated July 26, 2004 (the version approved by Ordinance of the President of
the Republic of Belarus № 122 dated March 14, 2005), Ordinance of the President of the
Republic of Belarus № 489 «On the Adoption of the Provision on Certification of Civil
Servants» dated October 21, 2004, Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Belarus № 1321
«On the Adoption of the Provision on the Commission for Ranks of Officials Service in
Republican State Administration Bodies», Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection № 32 «On the Adoption of the Structure and General Provisions of the Directory
of Ranks and Titles of Civil Servants» dated March 30, 2004, etc.
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individuals and legal entities (except for government agencies of the Republic of
Belarus), is authorized only when such a business trip is arranged in pursuance of
international agreements of the Republic of Belarus, or by agreement between the
state authorities of the Republic of Belarus and state authorities of foreign countries,
international or foreign organizations, unless the president of the Republic of
Belarus decides otherwise.
Restrictions on civil service
Being employed as a civil servant entails certain limitations. A civil servant of
the Republic of Belarus is not entitled to:
– be involved in entrepreneurial activities personally or via authorized agents,
assist close relatives in entrepreneurial activities using the official position, or
represent a third party in any matter connected with the activity of the state
agency where he works, or that is subordinate or accountable to him;
– take part personally or via authorized agents in the management of a commercial
organization, except for the cases stipulated in legislation;
– take part in strikes;
– do any other gainful work (activity) during standard working hours, except
for teaching, scientific, cultural and creative activities by agreement with the
head of the state agency, in which the civil servant is employed, or an authorized
person;
– hold more than two offices, except for work in state organizations in accordance
with procedures and on conditions stipulated in labor legislation;
– use the official position in the interests of political parties, religious
organizations, other legal entities, and citizens if this runs counter to the
interests of civil service;
– accept property (gifts) or gain other benefits in the form of services in
connection with the performance of official duties, except for souvenirs
presented during official protocol or other events. The gifts received during
protocol and other events are transferred to the state by the decision of the
commission created by the head of the state agency, in which the civil servant
is employed, if the value of gifts exceeds five base units;
– use material and technical facilities, finance or information technologies, other
property belonging to the state agency for purposes other than official duties,
and disclose official secrets;
– have accounts in foreign banks, except for performing official duties in foreign
countries and other cases as required by the law;
– accept decorations of foreign states, unless authorized by the president of the
Republic of Belarus.
Political affiliation and job rotation
One should note that the qualitative and quantitative composition of Belarusian
officialdom is determined by the peculiarities of the Belarusian political system.
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The political system of Belarus has a traditional structure for post%Soviet countries:
the executive branch led by the president and devoted executive (government and
ministries) and territorial (region and district executive committees) offices; the
legislative branch led by the bicameral parliament; and a few political parties
performing what seems to be a marginal role in the political system of the state.
Under the Constitution, senior state officials do not belong to any political party,
whereas under the Law On Civil Service, state authorities do not represent interests
of any political parties.
Declaration of incomes
Under the Law On Civil Service, a declaration of income must be submitted to
a relevant state agency (or official) by:
– a citizen of the Republic of Belarus – when he or she starts civil service;
– a civil servant – when he or she is transferred to another position;
– a civil servant, his or her spouse and adult close relatives (parents, children,
adoptive parents, adoptees, siblings, grandparents, grandchildren) that reside
in and maintain the same household – annually;
– a civil servant, his or her spouse and adult close relatives that reside in and
maintain the same household – in other cases stipulated in legal acts on
combating corruption.
Declaration of income and property follows the procedure stipulated in the
Law of the Republic of Belarus.4 The persons appointed to top executive
positions in the Republic of Belarus and other public positions included in the
personnel register of the president of the Republic of Belarus, their spouses
and adult close relatives that reside in and maintain the same household are
obliged to produce annual income and property statements to the head of the
Presidential Administration of the Republic of Belarus, who determines which
declarations will be checked in the current year. The head of the Presidential
Administration reports to the president on the results of the check annually
prior to December 31.
Despite the fact that civil servants and their relatives are supposed to submit
annual income statements, the procedure of inspection of declarations is still based
on a subjective approach : the head of the Presidential Administration
independently decides whose income statements (among top officials and the
persons included in the personnel register of the head of state) should be checked
in the current year. All other civil servants – MPs, judges, members of election
commissions and other civil servants – also have to submit their income
declarations to their superiors, that is, not directly to tax agencies and other
controlling organizations, like it is normally done elsewhere in the world, but to
senior officers, who may check the authenticity of information and divulge it, or
may not check it at all.
4 Law of the Republic of Belarus «On Declaration of Incomes, Property and Sources of Income
by Natural Persons» dated January 4, 2003.
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The issues of inspecting income declarations of civil servants are also regulated
in other standard acts of the president and the government.5 The most important
thing is that the information about income and property of state officials is an official
secret and is not subject to disclosure. Consequently, besides the frequently formal
and subjective approach to checking declarations, their results are never made
public, which renders the relevant norms of the Law On Civil Service inefficient
and creates attractive preconditions for corruption and manipulating the law.
Termination of office
Civil service is terminated in the following cases:
– reaching the age fixed as maximum for civil servants (65 years);
– expiration of the tenure, early termination of office;
– failure to remain within limitations stipulated by civil service regulations;
– disclosure of information that constitutes official secrets;
– refusal to take the oath;
– violation of legislative requirements when being accepted for civil service;
– resignation;
– gross violation of official duties; transgression that is incompatible with civil service;
– termination of citizenship of the Republic of Belarus as a result of withdrawal
from citizenship or loss of citizenship;
– unsatisfactory results of preliminary tests;
– coming into effect of the court verdict of guilty.
2.2. State policy on compensations, incentives
The law provides for considerable room for material incentives to civil servants by
way of increments, extra pays, bonuses, regular and additional leaves, pension
compensations, etc. A standard compensation package includes the position salary,
additional pays for the rank, seniority, bonuses and other payments in accordance
with legislation. The size of increments for the rank and conditions of payment are
determined by the president of the Republic of Belarus. The position salary and
additional pays for the rank form the calculated official salary.
Civil servants are entitled to monthly seniority pays depending on the public
service period:
– 6 months to 3 years – 10% of the calculated official salary;
– 3 to 8 years – 15% of the calculated official salary;
– 8 to 15 years – 20% of the calculated official salary;
– 15 to 20 years – 25% of the calculated official salary;
– over 20 years – 30% of the calculated official salary, unless decided otherwise
by the president of the Republic of Belarus.
5 Ordinance of the President #577 «On Some Aspects of Personnel Management in the System
of State Authorities» dated November 2, 2000; Resolution of the Council of Ministers #952
«On Some Aspects of Declaration of Incomes and Property by Civil Servants and Other
Categories of Citizens» dated June 29, 2007.
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Civil servants that have academic degrees enjoy monthly bonuses:
– 5% of the calculated official salary for the degree of Master of Science;
– 10% of the calculated official salary for the degree of Doctor of Science.
Civil servants may be awarded for successful and conscientious performance of
official duties, continuous irreproachable state service and performance of important
and complicated tasks:
– commendation;
– one%time monetary reward;
– valuable gift;
– early assignment of the next rank of the civil servant.
A civil servant is provided a regular 28%day leave with a single lump%sum
allowance for recreation in accordance with the current legislation. After five years
in civil service, an additional two%day leave is provided, and after ten years in service,
an additional four%day leave.
A severance benefit to civil servants is paid in case of:
– early termination of contract because of non%performance or substandard
performance through the fault of the employer – amounting to three average
monthly salaries. Severance benefits are not paid to civil servants who have
reached retirement age (60 years for males and 55 years for females) and are
entitled to full pensions, and civil servants who have not reached the indicated
retirement age, but receive pensions (except for disability pensions, survivors
benefits and social pensions);
– retirement – three average monthly salaries;
– liquidation of the state agency, staff reduction, with seniority up to five years –
three average monthly salaries; from five to ten years – four average monthly
salaries; from ten to 15 years – five average monthly salaries; over 15 years –
six average monthly salaries. The dismissed civil servants are paid up to three
average monthly salaries in a single payment, and the remaining part is paid in
three months’ time only to the persons that apply for assistance in employment
to the state employment service, but fail to find jobs. When dismissing civil
servants that reach retirement age the state pays them severance benefits in
full.
Civil servants are entitled to have length%of%service pensions as soon as they
reach 60 years of age (males) or 55 years (females) and have at least 20 years of
service (with at least two years of work in a public position after March 1, 1994). A
length%of%service pension amounts to 40% of the salary over the period of any five
years in a row in the 15 years preceding the retirement year. Pensions are increased
by 2% for each year in excess of 20 years in service; however, a pension cannot
exceed 50% of the average salary.
Some peculiarities of social assistance to selected categories of civil servants,
especially the monthly financial allowance, are noteworthy. Such allowances are
determined by the president of the Republic of Belarus (article 55), that is, they
are absolutely subjective. Under Ordinance № 666 dated November 13, 2006 «On
Preferential Calculation of Service Record for Admission to Pension», a special
procedure is used to calculate the length of service for some civil servants. Under
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Ordinance № 705 dated November 30, 2006 «On Monthly Financial Allowance
for Some Categories of Civil Servants», some officials enjoy a special monthly
allowance when they retire, and the size of this allowance is much higher than
current pensions. The list of the people that enjoy special allowances does not
include former heads of state (S. Shushkevich or S. Sharetsky), or Supreme Council
members, however, it contains the name of the chairwoman of the Central Election
Commission L. Yermoshina and senator V. Malofeyev, etc. Other types of incentives
for selected state officials (like additional leaves, etc.6 are regulated by special
legislative acts of the president.
3. CONTENTS AND PARAMETERS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
«AUTHORITIES – CIVIL SERVANTS»
3.1. SelfMidentification and basic features of the social group «civil servants»
According to most of the respondents, civil servants can be regarded as a separate
social group in the fabric of Belarusian society because a number of formal criteria
are present: their «special» status, official duties, and their membership in the system
of state authorities. As was noted in the previous part, the state is aware of the
importance of this group and supports it in a special way via the Law «On Civil
Service» and other regulatory acts. In practice7, this group is united by the following
features:
– special status of the employer and special position in the state system – «it is pleasant
to serve the state, not someone else», «everyone has the same employer that cannot
run bankrupt, won’t die, won’t be hit by a car», «the most financially stable and
reliable employer of all», «officials always have a legal path of their own»;
– number of civil servants, which, despite numerous declarations about cutting
red tape, keeps growing – «the real number does not fall, we don’t have fewer
officials, they seem to be redistributed in some peculiar way»;
– shared objectives (which nevertheless range from «readiness to be of benefit to
the state», «develop and adopt legislative acts» to «self%advancement» and «to
be well off and do nothing»;
– absence or minimization of risks («dismissals are rare», «my employer will never
run bankrupt», «whether the potato harvest is good or not, whether or not
cows are milked and sows farrow, I will get my salary»);
– special benefits and privileges compared to budget sector employees (teachers,
medics, etc.) and real sector;
– isolation, caste%like nature of civil service («it is your closed world», «danger
draws people together»).
Many officials do not identify themselves with the state machine in the broad
sense. First of all, they associate themselves with the ministry or agency that employs
6 These ordinances are «For Official Use Only» and are not available in the open database of
legislative acts.
7 Italicized are the words of the respondents (civil servants) during in%depth interviews.
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them, without identifying themselves with the government machine as a whole:
«People believe they belong to a specific ministry, where they work, and associate
themselves with it. There are some that identify themselves as officials, but they are
few». A staff member of any state agency performs concrete tasks set by the
administration. He is primarily concerned about his own interests, whereas
performance of the set task comes second, hence no initiative and inertness. In
most cases officials do not work for the purpose of the state, i.e. for some more
important cause.
At the same time, this group is quite heterogeneous (civil servants themselves
think so). The non%uniformity of civil servants as a class is revealed in various aspects:
1) provision of material and other needs:
– material support («we have different salaries», «law8enforcers are making much
more»);
– access to various privileges («construction of homes on special terms, recreation
and treatment in special facilities», «even ambulances are different», etc.);
2) level of power authorization:
– lower and medium rank officials «form an army, they are ordered to assault, they
do it», «nothing really depends on them»;
– power elite: «starting from department heads and deputy ministers. Those who
have signatory authority – without their signatures documents won’t pass. They
are few, though»;
3) education level: «the level of education of state officials is very different, you
cannot compare the education of a Foreign Ministry official and the same level
staff in the Agriculture Ministry. A diplomat would be offended if he is told about
such a comparison»;
4) level of subordination and frame of reference:
– regional subordination and possibility to contact the «customer» directly: the
central authority, ministerial officials that «perform orders» and «draw up
regulatory acts», and regional local authorities, which are «numerous», which,
according to respondents, have quite different powers and possibilities,
connected with the issue of authorizations, sanctions, etc («regional officials
have more power», «a district head is the tsar and God, and supreme authorities
hardly ever check him», «today it is better to work in an executive committee»,
«only the executive committee makes it possible to settle all your matters and see
real results – all licenses and registrations, and votes – there is everything you
need there»).
Furthermore, being a civil servant in provinces is very prestigious, because «it
is hard to find a decent job»;
– frame of reference: «law enforcers», «people in uniform», who follow orders –
«law enforcers have special powers, wages, status, but they are subject to special
requirements and control», and economic, other ministries and agencies. At the
same time, representatives in «power ministries» note that inside this group
the division is quite visible – border guards, the police, prosecutor’s office staff
and State Control Committee have different labor and compensation terms
(«even they don’t have it all the same»);
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– subordination to supreme authorities (National Bank, Presidential
Administration, Council of Ministers, State Control Committee) and all other
state agencies; differential subordination determines various legal and informal
statuses, opportunities, ambitions, etc.;
5) non%uniformity connected with the attitude to civil service and official duties.
Some respondents divided all civil servants into:
– young temporary workers and professional old%timers («lots of young people,
who come to work temporarily to work on their personal connections, and then
make careers in business, consulting, etc.», «youth do not have experience, they
are inert and have no connections», «personnel turnover in some state agencies is
close to 50% in two years», «the current wave is poised to settle their problems
within a year of two, develop new connections and leave; they are not interested
in getting to know their work», «new people come with a wish to get vertical and
horizontal ties or settle their problems at the expense of the state: homes, their
children’s education, summer houses… The current wave is doing exactly this. They
are much less prepared than the previous wave. It seems it is the time of temporary
workers»; at the same time, «there are too few professionals», they are «idealists»,
«dinosaurs»;
– there is a division between «fair and normal people that are thorough in their
work (left from previous times, but there are few of them) and young modern
time8servers (may sit their time quietly for a decent salary and then leave the
system, or wait for their hour to jump to the next step). And there is the golden
mean, which has no aspirations (but just lingers)». Or a division between «decent
people (who often occupy low positions and cannot influence anything) and those
who came to work only for money, not for their principles (many of them)»;
– there is a division between «small clerks» with no ambitions and people «going
up to the level of politics» (ministers, vice%premiers, etc.);
– another classification is possible, which identifies generations of officials
(«although there are various people in each wave; it all depends on the proportion»).
In the class of officials, they identify the group of «idealists» with the motivation
«I can do something for the country…» – «there were many of them in the early
1990s, they were doing their best for the country and thought they would pull it off
(but they were shown their place early on, as a rule, dismissed)». Then came
pragmatists, who were only interested in «filling their pockets, getting as many
personal benefits as possible… They are sometimes sacked, if they are caught stealing,
they are punished – and exchanged for the same kind of officials. From the
professional point of view, they are either weak, or have no plans to develop at all
(they plan to remain in power not too long or they have protectors)».
It should be noted that many state officials mention insufficient motivation for
the best performance of their official duties: «I am doing something useful for the
country – you encounter this attitude rarely, and it passes off very fast. You’re just a
cog in the machine; you will be shown your place (if not by your immediate supervisor,
then by some other superior)». «It is more often observed among younger newcomers,
but it wears out, because your personal opinion is nothing; the commands you get are
your opinion». Here is another statement: «You are a cog in the vertical, your business
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is to monitor the situation, inform the higher authority, and the main thing for you is
to execute the orders». The following explanation is also possible: «Officials protect
the interests of separate persons, not the interests of the state as a whole. Naturally,
they also protect their own interests».
Civil servants are aware that they are a nonproductive class that is a heavy
financial burden on the state budget: «The state holds on to the economy and is fed
by those who work and gain profits. The task of officials is to regulate more, to win
more», «Officials form a machine of coercion. We have the army, police, ministries,
state control…enormous expenses calculated per real sector worker».
Cooperation among civil servants
The Law «On Civil Service» has clear instructions that civil servants must
have mutual contacts and interact, that they are entitled to have relevant
information from related ministries (organizations). Technically, professional
performance of duties envisages obtaining all the necessary information (including
«For Official Use Only» files), joint development or amendments to the regulatory
framework, etc. However, in real life, cooperation between state authorities and
separate civil servants is very poorly organized (in civil servants’ opinion). As a
rule, this cooperation «is a formality; there is no real cooperation», «everyone wants
to be the ruler in his own eparchy», «there is no natural connection; on the contrary,
everyone emphasizes his independence», «no one ever wants to get together to settle
problems jointly», «it is only at the personal level that you can get the required
information. Otherwise, you make an official request, but it does not mean you will
succeed, because there is an entire system of back8passing. There are ministries with a
stable image – you will never get anything from them. Everything will be loused up,
spoilt and buried». «Almost no one cares about their common cause. Everyone only
covers themselves and maybe the person they care about».
Despite the requirement to make proposals and approvals regarding each legal
act, every official prefers the «runaround». «Every organization writes that there are
no proposals; they know nobody wants their proposals. As a result, the Justice Ministry
does not consult the Economy Ministry, the National Bank will not consult the Finance
Ministry without an instruction from higher authorities». The respondents explain
that there is a conflict of «being indispensable» – everyone is trying to prove personal
usefulness. The situation is aggravated if the organization has a high status (for
example, the National Bank), or its status is being raised: «The Statistics Ministry
has had its status increased, and it is impossible to speak to them now – ‘we are with
the president now, and who do you think you are? You’re just the Finance Ministry’».
As a result, an ordinary staff member cannot get information (data) required to
perform instructions: «you can only get information from your contacts or if you
make a special call (official request)», «interaction is only possible at the personal
level». Furthermore, the respondents note the low level of competence and
professional ethics, which impedes efficient communication: «It all depends on the
professional level of the specific official. If he or she addresses you professionally
and respectfully, you will be able to cooperate; but it happens seldom».
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Respondents admit that in the framework of the Belarusian bureaucratic
machine, «if you send any good initiative along the bureaucratic path, nothing good
will happen, everything will fail». In practice, in the existing system of authorities
only the Presidential Administration has real levers of control and coercion: «There
is a sort of strike/sabotage by officials – to work only following the official instructions.
Everything will stall then. If there are direct instructions from the Presidential
Administration, though, everything will progress much faster».
Belarus has been combating red tape and trying to reduce the number of officials
for years, but official statistics show that their number has remained unchanged
and even showed a slight increase (see Table 1).
Table 1
Number of civil servants, persons
Source: BELSTAT.
A glance from the inside: the respondents admit the low efficiency of Belarusian
state run public authorities, but note that the bureaucratic machine is expanding:
«Officials have sunk into bureaucracy. The state machine is growing, and each
bureaucrat is looking for and getting a job (as a rule it is useless)», «the number of
officials is constantly growing, for instance, there have been more users of the
government communications network», «the circle is getting narrower and then
expands; when they need to get rid of someone, they do so; on the whole, the number is
stable or even increases a little (they make reductions in one place to compensate
elsewhere)», «the talks about staff reductions only lead to a reduction in the number
of vacancies, real officials are never sacked, no one cuts staff for real».
Thus, the self8identification of officials as civil servants qualified to protect the
interests of the state is quite low. We should consider this social class as a nominal
group united based on the following criteria: the special status of the employer,
availability of benefits and privileges, absence or minimization of wage risks.
In the modern social stratification theory, the key criteria identifying the
belonging of an individual to a certain stratum include occupational prestige,
educational status, frame of reference in the power system and income. It is
noteworthy that the respondents named the same criteria when speaking about
the non%uniformity of the social group of civil servants. However, the respondents
were unanimous that officials stand out against other social groups because of their
special status in the state system, which envisages certain privileges. There is a
contradiction between self%identification of officials as a privileged stratum on the
one hand and the presence of a distinct hierarchy in the framework of this social
group on the other hand. The most relevant differentiation is received owing to the
reputation method (Warner, Lunt, 1947).
 2004 2008 
Administration,  
including: 
84 047 85 315 
state administration bodies 68 896 68 196 
judicial and legal institutions 7 320 7 375 
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The hierarchic structure of the social group of civil servants, therefore, looks like
this (based on the respondents’ opinions):
– low level (specialists, minor executives in departments) – «ordinary executives,
nothing depends on them», «this is the army: they are told to attack – they attack»;
– medium level (division, department heads) – «their position can mean
something only on condition their immediate superior does not mind; if the
superior does mind, though, there is certain variability in the position. Normally,
the boss allows direct initiatives, bypassing himself, if he agrees with the
proposal, but does not want to share responsibility»;
– upper level starts from directors, those «who can visit ministers directly and
get direct messages across to the top level officials», «those who have the
signatory authority, without whom no paper will move on, but there are few
people like this»;
– top level, the elite in power – starts from the ministerial level, «not every
ministry, though, as they have their own rules of the game».
The significant divisions among civil servants are not only vertical, but also
horizontal. Most of the respondents noted permanent difficulties in the interaction
with other state agencies and organizations. The questioned officials note a growing
horizontal stratification tendency over the past few years. Efficient cooperation
among various state agencies is only possible by way of personal contacts with
representatives of a counterpart agency or out of fear of the supreme authorities.
3.2. Advantages of civil service
The Law «On Civil Service» enumerates almost all of its material advantages. The
respondents representing civil servants tend to mention them, too:
– higher and more stable salaries: not all of the respondents agree, though; some
civil servants claim high salaries are only offered in the regions, whereas in
Minsk, many specialists in ministries make 700 000 – 1 million rubles a month,
which is the same as a «porter and vendor» (it should be remarked that those
were younger respondents). Furthermore, various ministries pay various
salaries, which may differ a lot («some ministries are subordinate to the Council
of Ministers; there are constitutional bodies – KGB, National Bank, Council of
Ministers, Presidential Administration – their staffs make more»);
– pensions – higher and earlier pensions (statistically, civil servants’ pensions
are twice as high as regular retirement pensions). At the same time, it should
be noted that high pensions are called one of the advantages of civil service
mostly by elderly respondents, whereas younger officials do not mention it;
– privileges: they include special medical centers and other types of treatment
and recreation (health resorts, preventative clinics, etc.). Special medical centers
(treatment commission, or lechkomissiya) are «important and convenient».
(«You are greeted with a smile; maybe they are not the best specialists of all, but
you are satisfied, there are no lines or waiting lists, you understand that free of
charge medicine is good and you are proud of your country; higher8ranking
officials are offered family treatment; they have their own ambulances, health
Social contract: civil servants
128
resorts»). Some respondents, mostly younger ones, noted that privileges of this
kind were not essential factors, albeit very pleasant: «Health resorts and the
special treatment commission may be crucial for older staff members, it is hard to
give up these benefits and get back to regular clinics, but it is not the key motive».
They also tend to mention travel privileges («although they have been abolished
for many»), service vehicles («very limited lately»), and service apartments (for
ministers, some MPs and prosecutors, etc.);
– side jobs («give lectures that will be interesting, because you have access to
information»). But this sort of moonlighting is not available to all, despite its
legal status (stipulated in the law). «It depends on the attitude of bosses; some
are loyal, some do not allow this. Last year, 20 people were fired from the Tax
Ministry, because their teaching and consulting salaries were over their official
salary; the administration thought they had ignored their official duties, although
there were no remarks or complains whatsoever»;
– possibility to settle the «housing problem». However, «they do not hand out
apartments to all», «the waiting list is not for all, it could be closed or include the
chosen ones», «in the National Bank, State Control Committee and the Council of
Ministers they build a lot [of dwellings], in ministries they give one apartment a
year, and it is not clear how they choose to give it», «concessional home loans are
only granted to security officials, in other ministries it is much more difficult –
there is one apartment for the entire ministry», «where they build a lot, they can
legally build two or three apartments (for children and grandchildren)», «top
officials have their dwelling problems settled fast and elegantly, smaller officials
may have it harder, but as a rule, it is easier for them to deal with housing than for
other people», «ordinary officials may hardly resolve their housing problems easier.
If you have contacts, then you have more possibilities. They do not share their
possibilities with their subordinates»;
– possibility for high%ranking officials to have additional incomes (such
possibilities and limitations will be described below).
– Most of the respondents therefore admit that civil servants enjoy special
privileges and benefits. However, they tend to mention discrimination,
«defectiveness of their benefits» compared to Russian officials’ privileges: «A
medium rank official does not have to hide and drives his Land Cruiser, a second8
rated official goes to Africa on a safari». That is, there is a huge difference
between salaries and other benefits available to Belarusian and Russian civil
servants.
– Besides material benefits, civil service provides non%material ones. The main
non8material incentives and advantages of civil service are:
– prestige, status – this factor was named by the majority of the respondents,
most of the younger ones (30 to 35 years of age) made it the most essential
factors («you are not working for some firm selling diapers», «decent position
that sounds nice», «many believe they are very important and are proud of their
status», «the sense of the high status and prestige»);
– career prospects («a step, a launch somewhere», «easier to break through or
self8identify», «you can become a department head when you get 31, but you
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will look like you’re 40, because you have to work nights», «you either get
connections or climb the ladder». But «everything depends on your luck and
abilities – there are examples of meteoric careers, and some sit in the same chair
for 25 years», «chance to get to the very top of authorities» (long%term career).
The latter is mentioned by younger respondents. There is a different opinion,
though: «Some become civil servants out of desperation after they fail in business
or production»;
– chance to bolster self%esteem, improve self%appraisal and address personal
complexes («some like walking in suits with a brief case»), «possibility to indulge
your vanity», «a red jacket with golden letters», «for the sake of talking about the
interests of the country and their special mission»;
– establishment and development of connections, contacts and networks that
help deal with personal problems faster and easier than other people: «mom
works for the Education Ministry – the kid will enter the university, dad is a police
officer – easier for the kid to get away with it if he misbehaves»; («then get a
good position in a business that deals with the same things», «you have contacts,
you know people to call, to make arrangements», the main thing is «to get to
know people and leave for the real sector», «to a better position in real production»);
– possibility to advance professionally. Unfortunately, many respondents mention
the formal character of career progression programs, besides, «advanced training
is available only in the Presidential Management Academy, where the teaching
staff leaves much to be desired». «It is easy to take a training of the National
Bank in Raubichi, but it is only a chance to have fun». At the same time, real and
efficient advanced training, especially abroad, is quite problematic: «The Council
of Ministers sometimes decides on sending its staff abroad, but each ministry must
provide financing independently. As a result, there is no money, and the best
specialists of the ministry write down lectures read by a university lecturer who
knows everything from books and has never seen a real share». Only the Vienna8
courses are available now, although some representatives with some state
organizations have been trained in China;
– confidence in stable employment and sense of stability on the whole («some
feel better feeling that they work for the state»). The respondents believe the
state system is rather tough at the lower and medium levels («if you care just a
bit, if you don’t tell your boss to get off your back when he asks you to do something,
and if you are not two hours late every day – then you won’t get fired, you will
stay despite all the contracts»);
– chance of self%fulfillment: «Someone works for the Foreign Ministry because they
simply like it. They are not many, but there are some».
It should be remarked that despite the disagreement of many respondents that
high salaries could be considered an important incentive and privilege in their jobs,
statistics prove that salaries of civil servants stand way above the average wage for
Belarusian’s (about 50%), and are higher than salaries in the budget sector (see
8 IMF training at the Joint Vienna Institute (JVI) is open to officials from Central and Eastern
European countries, the former Soviet Union in Russian and English.
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Figure 1). Officials’ salaries were growing fastest in 2004 and 2007 (see the
appendix).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BELSTAT data.
Figure 1. Salaries in state administration as opposed to salaries in other sectors and
the average for the country
At the same time, most civil servants seem to experience cognitive dissonance: on
the one hand, Russian salaries and Ukrainian corruption are on everyone’s lips; on the
other hand, officials want not only higher%than%average salaries, but also compensations
similar to those in the banking sector and oil processing. The U.S. $400–600 «normal
average» salaries are not considered at all, they simply dismiss them. Many officials
believe the adequate level of compensations today «is when a person can pay the home
loan and also have something to live off. Today this is about U.S. $2,000–2,500. But many
officials would be so happy if their salaries were raised to U.S. $1,500».
3.3. Disadvantages (limitations) of civil service
While there many advantages of civil service, there is also a negative side. The list
of disadvantages proved to be quite long and varied. The main shortcomings of the
economic position of civil servants, according to the respondents representing this
social group, are the following:
– low salaries that fail to correspond to the responsibility («it is easy to get a low
ranking position, there is often a formal waiting list, but when they learn about the
salary, they leave. As for jobs in control agencies and other plum jobs, the competition
is fierce»), «young civil servants get 600,000 rubles a month after they graduate»;
«you sometimes meet people who are definitely below your level, who deal with less
important stuff, and they make twice as much because they work for another
organization. You start thinking whether you work for the right one»;
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– limited possibility of additional earnings – only in state%run universities and
only if the top management agrees; publications are possible only in the
shortlisted media, etc.;
– no chance to acquire a service apartment; hard to improve housing conditions;
– targeted bonuses – material aid is only provided for recreation in Belarusian
health resorts: «They give you ‘recreation money’ – two official salaries – on
condition you go to the industry8sponsored sanatorium».
In their depth interviews, the respondents emphasized non%material costs
hidden behind the status of the civil servant:
– too much red tape, too much obligatory unnecessary work («much paperwork,
most of which often goes to the wastebasket»; «the work that many officials do
may be described in a single phrase: ‘the day is lived in vain’». Many civil servants
mention the necessity to fit in «certain framework», meaning both excessive
red tape and absence of logic, rationality and goal orientation («some limitations
are especially evident because of the bureaucratic moronism, which permeates
the activity of officials, and which we all have to put up with»; «insanity is always
there: you call the embassy to prepare a top8level visit, and you have a number of
questions to discuss. But it is a rule that you can make a telephone call to a foreign
diplomatic office not longer than 5 minutes, or you will pay for the rest from your
pocket. And then you spend some of your worktime on a memo trying to explain
why you spoke for 18 minutes, not 5»);
– irregular working hours or overtime work («the administration seems to be
making up tasks, and you have got to work late at night», «they find it convenient
to set you a task at 18:00 and want it done by 10:00 the following day», «Saturdays
are often workdays»); these additional hours, which run counter to regulations,
are not compensated; («non8standard workday and improper use of work time
have become a rule, and you cannot refuse, or you will be fired»);
– too many inspections, when «you have to check somebody all the time, and then
write reports, which can never be ‘positive’, as you must have remarks; if there are
none, the inspector has failed to do the job right and may be punished»;
– no possibility of self%realization, no creative initiative, necessity to perform
orders instead of showing initiative; absence of independence («initiative is
punished», «permanent pressure caused by endless orders, this bustle kills creativity,
wish to self8improve»);
– impossible stress (mostly for top administration) – «constant meetings,
conferences, calls on the carpet». Some peculiarities are important here: «at the
low level they never do overwork – they turn off lights at 18:00»; «the low and
medium ranks do not burn at work». However, «the administration (1–2 ranks of
civil servants) have it worse – they have a completely different level of orders
and meetings; the stress is enormous – they have got ambulances nearby, they
have strokes…». At the same time, there is an opinion that «most civil servants
are capable of adapting, surviving, taking is easy, so they deal fairly easily with
stress and silly orders»;
– strict working hours; 9:00 to 18:00, with a fixed dinner break: «We cannot be
late (although no one starts working at 9:00 – they have a cigarette and coffee),
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you have to sit 9 to 6, there is a register with arrival and checkout time, they can
always make a call and check whether you’re in»; «you cannot be one second late
or leave one second earlier»; «to take one hour off is a very hard thing»;
– your contract needs to be extended on a regular basis (as a rule, the contract
covers 12 to 24 months, which «discourages»; «gags you, makes you nervous,
prompts you to avoid ‘sharp corners’»);
– formality of trade unions, absence of real benefits («trade unions only mean
flowers on March 8 and New Year candies for kids»);
– trifles – no pens and pencils: «we only have Belarusian paper, but the printer
does not accept it»; «they do not pay compensations for the car and cell phone
used to perform official duties»;
– impossibility of labor appraisal: «there is no result in specific physical units. It
may lead to decay of personality, especially of production workers»;
– no chance to have additional earnings except for teaching and scientific activity;
– subordination to many authorities, instead of a single chief.
The respondents most often mentioned inefficient managerial decisions. One
widespread opinion is this: quite often state authorities make wrong, bad decisions.
There are many reasons; explanations are often based on the mechanism of decision%
making: «There are many bad decisions in all ministries, because a single person is
often responsible for many areas, in which he is not an expert. This person makes
decisions based on his own vision; as a result we have legal lapses, norms that do not
correspond to real practice, ill8considered reforms». «The norms of this or that law
often depend on a single person. This person is often biased, for instance he may hate
private notaries or knows nothing about securities regulations, or has his own opinion
about adoption. So adoption regulations will be exactly as this person writes». «The
existing mechanism of decision8making may be used to pervert any idea, and a good
initiative is turned into an anti8reform (reform of education, abolition of privileges).
Someone initiated something, had it approved… and the final result is of a very poor
quality».
The number of non%material costs of the status of civil servants therefore prevails
over the general discontent at their material status.
The following tendencies are observed:
– most of the relatively young officials of the low and medium levels of civil service
are dissatisfied with their salaries (except for power ministries). However, in
the future, if their careers are successful, they expect a dramatic increase in
salaries because of the increase in official compensation package and additional
possibilities and privileges that they see their bosses enjoy («additional material
privileges become tangible only at the top level of civil service», «no one would
criticize a minister with an official salary of, say, 5 million rubles, if he has a
service house in a nice location, service cars, one private house (build under very
soft terms), foreign business trips every month with excellent daily allowances.
His children study in very good universities abroad, etc.»);
– older officials, who as a rule have higher positions in government institutions,
do not mention the economic factor at all, when talking about the drawbacks
of civil service and instead emphasize non%material factors;
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– the majority of respondents note additional privileges and special possibilities
of top level officials. These privileges and «special» possibilities are perceived
as «quite adequate and natural». They justify them in various ways: «This is the
way the state makes up for ‘underpayments’, as the level of responsibility and
scale of tasks the official tackles do not correspond to the level of salaries. At the
same time, it is unusual for our socially8oriented country to allow a large gap
between official salaries of regular civil servants and bosses; state organizations
are not a private business, where this is quite possible; here, people will start asking
questions»;
– the most emotionally charged and most frequently mentioned disadvantage is
bureaucracy. Nearly all the respondents tend to use strong language when they
make comments on red tape, irrespective of their sex, age, status and functions
(«cretinism», «idiotism», «degeneracy»), which attests to the negative emotional
coloring of this factor. Many civil servants note the systemic nature of
bureaucracy («you understand that these are systemic things, and if a person is
deeper and has a broader vision – there will be too many limitations and absurdity
for him to stay»). Therefore, the civil servant either accepts the rules of the
game and is ready to remain within «certain limits» of bureaucracy or leaves
the system;
– the overwhelming majority of the questioned officials note «certain limits» –
informal rules of the game, which they have to accept, otherwise they must
leave the system. Some respondents draw a parallel between «certain limits»
and bureaucracy, thus emphasizing the systemic, binding nature of the latter.
Civil servants interpret bureaucracy in the following way:
– uncritical attitude to acceptance and performance of superfluous or erroneous
decisions: «You arrive in a ministry in the receiving country and tell local officials
that our authorities have made a very odd decision; everyone understands it is
perfectly absurd, but you got to understand us, let’s try to reach some civilized
decision here. When you are responsible for trade and economic relations, you
have to fight off the decisions coming from the Council of Ministers after [Prime
Minister Sergey] Sidorsky dresses down the government. As a result, they come
up with ideas that knock you speechless. But you have to make requests and
write analytical memos, although each mutton8head understands it is a time8
waster»;
– binding orders that cannot be discussed: «Even if your boss is a moron, you got
to perform the orders, you are not supposed to argue or even think; it is like the
army; if you refuse to comply, you will have to leave». «Even if the order is stupid,
you have to execute it. You cannot say that it is absurd, that it fails to correspond
to world practice. You sometimes hate what you have to do, you may be ashamed
of it, but you execute orders». «You are told to dig – you will dig, or make believe
that you dig»;
– absence of personal opinion, personal vision (except for the top level): «Your
personal opinion is nothing – your orders form your opinion». «Normally all your
thoughts and visions stay inside, but if you are at the top, there is a chance they
may be expressed»;
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– formalities: «Everyone is trying to shuffle off work and responsibility onto someone
else, and since the state structure is so far from being perfect, some functions are
not only doubled, but even trebled… A lot is done just for the sake of appearance»;
– actions are inconsistent with statements: «In accordance with changing state
concepts, officials try to adjust their activities primarily at the verbal level in order
to comply, while nothing changes in reality»;
– low valuation of personal contribution: «A civil servant (except for the top level)
is a cog in the state machine»; «the state wants lower and medium level officials
to work like robots to implement the ideas formulated at the very top level»;
– absence of initiative: «Nothing depends on our ministry – it is just a ‘crowd of
extras’. The minister is informed about the ideas that must be implemented, but
initiatives from the bottom level never reach high places. If an official starts
brainstorming excellent ideas, his boss will believe he has too much free time»;
«the immediate supervisor might dislike the initiative and affect some very sensitive
issues: the contract, promotion, bonuses and vacation»;
– perception of the official as the proprietor of state assets: «Many officials transfer
their private8ownership interests to state property. The official as the owner of
state property is unwilling to lose his influence. He regards state organizations,
enterprises as his personal possessions, and he cannot cede control. They are
managed like his domestic belongings»;
– unprofessional performance: some respondents believe major posts are filled
by «absolutely untrained people», who «can only do harm because of their
incompetence, poor education and ignorance».
3.4. State and civil servants: established system of mutual expectations and
relations
Expectations of the state
As was noted above, civil servants are aware that the state provides direct
support for their group. Officials admit that, theoretically, the state expects high%
quality performance of their duties, reasonable decisions and professionalism.
Besides these logical qualities and requirements (all of them are stipulated in the
law), there are informal expectations, which include:
– «Can%do» spirit: «the state expects that low and medium rank officials will be
working like robots to implement the ideas generated at the very top»; «even high
qualification and knowledge are often less important than efficiency in
performance». «It is not necessary to think, it is even harmful. You must do what
they tell you. If you start asking, thinking, the administration will freak out and
cut you salary»;
– obedience: «We do not need clever ones, we need obedience»; «an official should
not think – it is harmful»; «they tell you to dig – you will dig; you don’t like it –
you will lose your job»; «no one needs your creativity – the bosses might feel
uneasy»; «I have no honor or dignity – I perform orders». The authorities have
the strictest obedience requirements for senior officials: «Whereas low8 and
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medium8ranking officials have detailed job descriptions covering all peculiarities
of their labor relations, high8ranking officials are a totally different case – if
they fail to deliver, there is always something to punish them for, even putting
them behind bars. There are no people in high places without prior transgressions»;
– political loyalty: «You must work for this regime, and you must support it; if you
oppose – choose some other place»; «political loyalty is 100%, you immediately
lose your job without it». «But you should be subtle and feel what is allowed. You
can read Belgazeta with some bosses, but if you see the person is serious – just
keep silent and smile». On the whole, «there is a variety of political views and
visions among civil servants, but they can only be expressed in private», «in a
sauna». «Your personal, subjective position that you have in private life is never
controlled, but they expect that in your public addresses and comments you will be
politically loyal»; «normally, they have a meeting where they tell you this: ‘you all
understand everything very well – start working…’. What you do after that is
never checked»; «but in public, during official events – everyone is always ‘a
supporter’».
According to many respondents, «election campaigning happens and is fairly
easy to pursue». However, «you are free to not attend elections, you can even
participate in a rally, if you are careful enough». Campaigning is quite mild: «Some
chiefs ask you to vote early, some don’t. Some just remind that you should vote, some
say ‘you know who you should support’». At the same time, «retaliatory measures
(for failing to vote) are rare». «But this is true for low and medium ranks. Senior
officials are under a tighter control, and they must secure the desirable voting result».
As was mentioned above, civil servants’ expectations from their jobs as a rule
come to material benefits, stability of their job and connections. Idealism and wish
to «be of use to the Motherland» are characteristic of newcomers who «never stay
long».
Besides official benefits and advantages, there are special informal mechanisms
of compensation designed for civil servants. The higher the status, requirements
and responsibility – the higher the compensation level. («If we are talking about
additional material privileges, they are tangible only at the top level»). Some of them
may be discussed and analyzed only hypothetically because of the existing political
system9 and elementary non%transparency.
Informal compensatory mechanisms include:
– connections and contacts: «you can settle many issues without giving bribes»
(this advantage has been discussed above);
– chance to provide your children with a good position (good university, good
job); «all kids are taken care of, but some tend to hide their children. Some push
their kids to high places: if they get fired, their children will stay»;
– possibility to «live above one’s means».
This takes us to a sore aspect of interrelations between civil servants and the
authorities – the sensitive issue of corruption. All respondents admit that
9 The Criminal Code stipulates criminal liability for insult of high%ranking officials, publication
of unsubstantiated information, etc. (incurs a punishment of up to two years in prison).
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«corruption is there». «The problem is, the environment encourages corruption. Snigir
[ex8prosecutor of Minsk oblast, who was arrested for corruption in 2008] would never
have behaved like this if it had not been for tacit approval of his circle. Someone has
contrived to get a nice flat, but what about me?» Moreover, corruption is informally
sanctioned – «the main thing is to make it look legal». Quite often, such instances
are interpreted not as corruption and violations of laws, but a way to «share» («if
an entrepreneur makes, say, U.S. $50,000, it is only fair to ask for U.S. $5,000 for
assistance»).
The scale, nature and reasons for corruption vary. It is often expressed in trifles
(friendship, protection), or breach of laws («help someone with road police»; «help
enter a university»; «get a preferential loan»). On the other hand, «corruption is
very serious, because everything is closed and over8regulated. Privatization and land
transactions are inaccessible. Who owns modern hotels and business centers in Minsk
downtown?» «Executive committees, which issue authorizations and licenses, are very
much corrupt; they don’t need liberalization at all».
As a rule, «at the bottom and medium levels, corrupt practices are observed only
in executive and controlling agencies (it all depends on the position and agency)»,
because they have «many possibilities». («Everything that is connected with the direct
‘customer8official’ interaction is corrupt»; «where they can nip something off, they
certainly do it»). At the top level, the scale of corruption is different, as so are its
varieties: «Corruption flourishes where there are controlling or licensing and
certification functions. In executive committees (which issue authorizations), there is
much more corruption than in agencies distributing money and benefits – even if
there is a decision of a superior authority to give money to a bank or an enterprise, you
can make this transfer on the same day or in a month». «Keep an eye on them during
Christmas – which ministry gets most gifts and candies – there are often long lines of
those wishing to present something». Regional corruption is even more widespread:
«it is easier to tackle an issue there – they have more clans, it is more evident who you
should contact to make an arrangement, they try to remain friends and lose fear of
meeting with businesses». «State control authorities are the most privileged class of
officials – superiors over superiors. They combat corruption in word, but in fact they
are the richest officials with the best corruption options, as they can redistribute
financial flows».
Another type of corrupt practices is «your relatives having a business that you
protect10». «You own or control some business, but in order to prevent attacks from
above, you use distant relatives».
Civil servants are skeptical about the necessity to produce annual mandatory
declarations of income: «Who checks annual income declarations?», «they are checked
at random, following orders from above», «declarations of top officials are never
checked». «All people with a high status have fraudulent incomes, apartments, country
houses, etc., they are allowed to circumvent the system, your income declaration must
look nice, but it is never checked; in order for someone to get interested in your income
statement, there must be a call from superior authorities, otherwise no one will ever be
10 Sometimes state regulation is used to artificially monopolize these businesses.
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interested in you or your house». Nevertheless, «low rank officials may be kicked out
for U.S. $200 of apartment lease incomes undeclared for taxation».
The respondents emphasize that corruption is less widespread in Belarus than
in Russia and Ukraine11. «In Belarus, you cannot just ask ‘how much’; you cannot
offer money, you cannot buy directly … you need a ‘hotline’ to the right person. When
a businessman comes and sees that the official would not mind a gift, his eyes are
shining in anticipation, but he says nothing and does his job poorly, formally. As a
result, both are dissatisfied: one does not know how to give, the other has no idea how
to take. The businessman is sorry he was unable to give, because it is the law – you
won’t survive without bribes».
The fight against corruption in Belarus is a mere formality, «it is public whipping;
if someone needs to be sacrificed, the sacrifice is made». The fight against corruption
is inconsistent: «They can dismiss (an embezzler) and immediately give him a new
job». Those guilty, unwanted or excessively independent are often sent abroad on
diplomatic missions: «The KGB Chief winds up in the Belarusian embassy in one of
the Central Asian CIS countries». «Our laws do not allow anything, but life creates
different conditions. If an official managed to pull off something quietly, and there is
not a weak spot anywhere, you can promote this fine specialist; besides, you will always
have some weak spot to use in case of need. But if the violation is discovered and
made public, the ‘stupid’ official is punished». «On the one hand, they are allowed to
steal; on the other, they are all on the hook». «The state tolerates abuse, but at the
same time controls everything (the huge number of authorizations and licenses – it is
all just perfect for corruption)». «The fight against corruption is more in word than in
deed – how can the chief corruptionists fight corruption? Who is involved in the latest
scandals – the Interior Ministry and Prosecutor’s Office … those who are supposed to
combat corruption. They are first to get land, apartments in violation of the law. First,
the system allows you to get something (not quite legally), and they you cannot get
off the hook».
Civil servants admit that «there are more regular executives, and most of them
are honest; the elite is totally dishonest. But ordinary executives simply have no chance
to cheat, and if they have it, the temptation is impossible to resist; as long as salaries
are tiny, every time there is a chance, they use it. There are few honest people». «On
the other hand, as soon as you get promoted, you will feel that the responsibility does
not correspond to your salary, and a compensatory mechanism is called for (abuse of
authority)». «If there is a chance to make money – I will ‘steal’, the state sometimes
turns a blind eye to it, it is not omnipresent, and you know it, and you understand you
can cheat. A widespread motive is this: ‘You don’t know when you will get fired, framed,
when they get over your head, so you got to hurry’».
The chance of being pardoned if the damage is compensated is also considered
to be an informal compensatory corruption mechanism. «Sometimes Lukashenko
pardons those who are already imprisoned, and once in a while he interferes in the
investigation». «How can you honestly make millions being a civil servant and working
11 Transparency International provides different figures, though. Belarus ranked 151st in 2008
(by Corruption Perceptions Index), below Russia (147) and Ukraine (134).
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for, say, the Presidential Administration, and then buy your way out of jail?» «As a
result, those who can steal must steal more in order to have money to pay off later. The
mechanism of pardoning with compensation of losses is in itself a corrupt practice».
«The law must be the same for everyone – a thief must go to prison».
The materials published by official state agencies of Belarus also confirm that
corruption among Belarusian civil servants has reached a very high level. The
information and analysis center with the Presidential Administration has recently
issued a document titled «Fight against Corruption in Belarus»12. It follows from the
fact that in January – November 2008, an estimated 79,875 billion rubles’ worth of
losses were inflicted on the state as a result of corruption%related crimes, up 13.4%
from the same period in 2007. Compensations amounted to only 3,868 billion rubles,
a drop of 44.3% from January%November 2007. The largest «shadow» administrative
transaction took place in the Belarusian manufacturing sector and cost the state 22.31
billion rubles, and only 1.2% of the total sum was compensated (271 million rubles).
According to the study, almost one in three Belarusian civil servants and
businessmen anonymously confess they have been involved in corrupt practices.
Furthermore, the study of the prosecutor’s office showed that 48% of all officials
perceive corruption as something natural and justified and believe a bribe is a normal
way to address acute problems.
In sum: despite the fact that, according to respondents, the level of corruption
among Belarusian officials is lower than in neighboring Russia and Ukraine, it
remains quite high. Corruption is regarded as a systemic mechanism of informal, but
binding rules of the game (if an official wishes to stay in the system). It would be
wrong to claim that every official is corrupt, though: if we try describing a trend, a
few aspects would be essential. First, the corruption potential depends on the
position and organization: the higher your rank, the higher the potential («you
either have this potential or you don’t»). Second, how scared you are: «If you have
potential, and you are not too scared, there will be corruption for sure».
3.5. «Voice» (protest) and exit from the system
State officials almost never resort to voicing their dissatisfaction and protest. As
was mentioned above, obedience, unexacting perception and indifference are the
key attitudes of civil servants to their work. They admit the inefficiency of the
state management system when the existing machine takes erroneous and «silly»
decisions, but they hardly ever protest. A protest of officials happens very rarely,
but «it takes the form of negligent performance of official duties; no one argues
openly». The hard labor conditions (as civil servants themselves perceive them)
and numerous disadvantages of the official status, both material and nonmaterial,
are not reasons enough for officials to stage a protest, either.
Compensatory mechanisms (instead of protest) are manifested in attempts
to materialize and maximize potential benefits of the profession and the special
12 See: http://prokuratura.gov.by/sm.aspx?guid=20023, Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of
Belarus.
Tatiana Lisovskaya, Elena Rakova
139
position of civil servants. Voice – giving voice to one’s dissatisfaction – is never
considered an efficient mechanism to alter the actual state of things: officials either
agree with the conditions of work in the existing system, or leave. Exit and job
change are fast and easy, according to the respondents. As a rule, «it [exit] is
voluntary» (upon the expiry of the contract, by agreement of the parties); «they
rarely dismiss (for the most part, officials resign voluntarily)»; «only if you ‘goof
up’ – and then they still will take time talking and discussing». A subjective reason
is not uncommon: «they can fire you for not wearing a tie»; «because they simply
don’t like you», for excessive (absolutely official) incomes that are not connected
with the «core activities».
Once they reach certain level – starting with department heads and deputy
ministers – it is impossible for officials to exit: «they don’t leave, or they leave the
hard way», «only with consent of supreme authorities», and after lengthy preparations
of their exit and pledges of loyalty and security. «It is not easy at the top level, there
is a heap of ‘dirty laundry’ that may be used to punish anyone for all it is worth».
Many officials, therefore, complain about the difficult working environment
and salaries that do not correspond to the efforts on the one hand; on the other
hand, for low and medium rank officials exit is deemed quite easy (contracts are
concluded for 12–24 months). What keeps them in the system? «You come, you sit
there for some time, and you get a salary». «No need for overwork. Where can you go?
Factory workers make a million, and they must work». «Many officials keep working,
because they are scared they won’t be able to find anything else», «a person works for
the KGB, does something he is not cut out for, but keeps working to get the best pension
you can have». Normally, «they are kept by salaries (the wish to do something for
their country at the bottom level is caused by naivety, and at the top level, this wish is
just a cover)», «expected privileges, although they are available only at the top level»,
«status, prestige» (these factors were described in detail above). As a result, «only
those get rattled who are afraid of being kicked out».
3.6. Attitude to liberalization of economic policies and temporal changes of
the contract
Attitude to liberalization
All the respondents have a rather skeptical attitude to the liberalization of
economic policies. There is an opinion that «the Russian Federation acts as the
benchmark». If something changes there, and real liberalization starts, «ours will try
to catch up», «Belarus will not become a unique, most liberal country surrounded by
normal countries; no one will believe this, and this will not do anything». Civil servants
believe the bureaucracy intrinsic in the state machine will not leave liberal reforms
a slightest chance: «As fundamental state strategies change, the official tries to adjust
his activities more in word than in deed, in order to comply»; «if there is an order to
liberalize – we will execute it. Why be happy about it?»
According to civil servants, real liberal reforms are impossible in the framework
of the existing state system for a few reasons:
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– firstly, officials themselves are not personally interested in pushing liberal
reforms beyond declarations. The demand for reforms among officials is very
low, «you have to look for ways to enhance the efficiency of state assets»; «officials
never protest publicly, but write memos explaining why the idea is bad or
impossible», «many organizations find it easier to have no changes at all, and
elementary liberal initiatives are rejected»; «executive committees will not be able
to strip a store off its license – who will they order to sell Belarusian products, or
paint and clean the entire building, or redevelop the area?»
– secondly, there is a problem with trust in the state and authorities – «the trust
is seriously undermined, especially by the elections. Everyone knows that the real
results are different, therefore, the authorities are not to be trusted politically.
This attitude is shifted to the economic level»;
– thirdly, the deficit of professionals: «The situation is very hard – we need
professionals, but there are none, and no one is ready to vacate the place near the
‘feeder’13»;
– fourthly, formalities: «In general, liberalization and reform are the words to use
outside the system»;
– fifthly, in order for liberal changes to take place, a systemic approach that would
adjust the organizational structure and the entire national administrative system
is required: «It is necessary to liberalize on the basis of certain concept, either to
sever direct relations between officials and citizens, or make them all transparent».
The respondents therefore believe «there is no real progress», and it is highly
improbable. They take sporadic measures that can «nominally» be regarded as
liberalization, but «I did not see anything systemic». On the one hand, they reduce
the number of taxes, which means «the state will find something else to make up».
The same holds for the efforts to cut the number of inspections: «anyway, state
control will find some way to check, if it wants to», for example, in a private firm:
«Your tax payments are too small; start looking for reserves, or else we will start looking.
It is not an inspection, but if you wish to keep on working…» Being part of the system,
civil servants are aware how this system works, and assume with confidence that
«if some thing gets easier, other things will surely get more complicated»; «the changes
and simplifications they introduce now (starting a business/closing a business,
taxes…) – is a fleck of dust in a hurricane»; «globally, nothing has changed; everything
is like it used to be».
Changes in the framework of the social contract between civil servants and the
state
The expectations and requirements of the state regarding civil servants tend to
change as time passes. The respondents unanimously believe «the requirements are
getting tougher»; «there are more tasks, more work – the machine is warming up».
The state is trying to use the potential of officials to the limit. There is a shared
feeling that «the state squeezes out everything that people have to offer, and demands
13 Lukashenko’s words: «Everyone grunts the same way near the state feeder – rightists and leftists».
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of further growth in indicators may entail an overstrain of the system. They often set
knowingly impossible tasks and demand positive results at any cost». At the same
time, officials note an increase in the stress level; furthermore, they have to work
overtime more frequently. Non%standard workdays have become a standard. These
factors stand behind «the increase in the number of people who drink alcohol behind
their desks, judging by the number of empty bottles in bathrooms in the Council of
Ministers».
Some of the respondents note a trend towards «washing out of professionals»;
«professionals are discouraged to work»; «worthiest people leave». Why? The reasons
are different: «because your uncle does not work for the KGB», «because the
competition is not fair: I am a unique specialist, but someone new comes, and you lose
your uniqueness. Why tackle these difficulties if you can use your connections
instead?», «because someone decided to show that a lot depends on him and he is a
new decision8maker», «because if a person is deeper and has a broader vision – there
are too many limitations for him, and he has to leave».
Besides, most of the respondents said they felt more severe political loyalty
requirements: «requirements regarding political loyalty are much stricter than they
used to be in 2001», «there is a certain margin that you should not cross; political
discussions are not encouraged, even positive and praising rhetoric».
The respondents differ as to the character of changes in economic benefits:
«salaries got lower» vs. «salaries got a bit higher over the past few years, but in
November it all stopped». However, being aware that salaries remain one of the most
crucial aspects of the contract with the state, officials expect that «now that there is
no potential for further increases in salaries and bonuses, they are likely to start looking
for new methods to prove that they will make up for everything after the crisis».
4. CONCLUSION
The state is interested in maintaining civil servants and offers them special labor
conditions, including a number of advantages, such as higher official salaries,
bonuses, earlier retirement age, better recreation possibilities, medical services and
housing conditions. However, these advantages are not really significant, because
low% and medium%rank officials’ salaries do not differ much from the average
Belarusian wage; as for the rest of the benefits, they are not available to all. But the
state is not trying to «bond» with this social group – many civil servants work
under short%term contracts, and voluntary redundancy is easy, hence high staff
turnover rates and insufficient qualification of personnel.
The study shows that at the moment it is hard to regard civil servants as a
monolithic group with a high degree of solidarity. Moreover, officials do not perceive
themselves as a team summoned to implement and protect the interests of the state.
Nevertheless, the group is not devoid of self%identification and self%actualization:
civil servants are aware of the specific nature of their status: «Officials form a special
category of people that try to prove their usefulness by issuing prohibitions». We
analyze civil servants as a separate social group on account of the following common
features: special status of the employer and special position in the state system;
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their number; absence or minimization of job loss risks; special benefits and
privileges; and «isolation», caste%like nature of civil service. The findings of the
study reveal a range of social%psychological features enabling us to outline the profile
of this social group: significance of prestige, status; career aspirations; attempts to
assert themselves and bolster self%esteem, and compensate for their complexes;
willingness to have connections and contacts; pursuit of stability.
However, respondents tend to identify a set of non%uniformity criteria in this
group:
– provision of material and other needs;
– level of power authorization;
– education;
– degree of subordination and frame of reference;
– non%uniformity connected with the attitude to civil service and official duties
Classifications of civil servants based on these criteria vary (see Chapter 3.1
for details). We believe the most significant differentiation is based on the level of
power, income, prestige of the profession and involvement in the informal system
of connections:
– low level (specialists, minor executives in departments);
– medium level (division heads);
– upper level (starts from department head or deputy minister depending on the
functions of the ministry);
– top level, the elite in power (starts at the ministerial level, not in every ministry,
though).
From the point of view of the stratification theory, the absence of one of the
mandatory classification criteria – the level of education – attests to the marginality
of the top level of officials. None of the respondents mentioned this criterion as a
necessary characteristic of the top level.
The existence of the social contract is hard to prove. It would be fair to say that
it is nonexistent at the low and medium levels, or, to be more precise, that its
significance is very low. At these levels, the interaction between the authorities
and civil servants is limited to position descriptions, material and nonmaterial
advantages, and labor contracts covering 12 to 24 months (that is, exit is
unhampered): «low8 and medium8ranking officials have detailed job descriptions
covering all peculiarities of their labor relations», «there is certain margin that you
should not cross», «definite framework of your activity».
For state officials of the low and medium ranks, the social contract consists in
acceptance of bureaucratic principles: civil servants undertake to reproduce official
red tape and sometimes even strengthen it. Civil servants describe bureaucracy in
the following terms:
– uncritical attitude to performance of superfluous or erroneous decisions;
– binding orders that cannot be discussed;
– absence of personal opinion, personal vision (except for the top level);
– formalities, indifference;
– sense of being a «cog», on which nothing depends at all;
– no chance to express initiative;
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– absence of a motivational system;
– absence of an efficient advanced training system;
– lack of expertise of personnel, often of superiors.
The manifestation of the state machine’s dysfunction (that bureaucracy is)
should not be considered a deviation, but on the contrary, the binding element of
the system, the chief component securing its balance.
At the top level, the social contract as a body of informal rules («informal»
meaning even more significant than «formal», though) regulating the system of
relations between the state and state officials, definitely exists. The findings of the
study clearly confirm this: the respondents most often used the terms «definite
framework» and «informal rules of the game». In their interviews, all the respondents
mentioned the presence of informal norms, their importance growing in direct
proportion to the official’s level in state hierarchy – the higher the level, the greater
the significance of the informal network. «High8ranking officials are a totally
different case – if they fail to deliver, there is always something to punish them for,
even to put them behind bars». Officials thus confirm that there are coercion%based
loyalty enhancement mechanisms.
This informal body of rules envisages, on the one hand, informal expectations
of the state regarding prompt performance of orders, obedience and political loyalty,
and, on the other hand, the availability of compensatory mechanisms, such as
connections and contacts, which make it easy to tackle a wide range of issues, a
chance to get your kids a place at university or get a good job for your relatives;
and generally the possibility to earn more than one’s regular income. The elements
of «patrimonialism» are quite evident in the contemporary Belarusian system of
state administration, which is manifested primarily in corrupt practices.
Voicing dissatisfaction and protest as mechanisms of the social contract are
almost never used. Protest sometimes takes the form of arbitrariness of officials or
boycotts, which render the state management system even more inefficient; however,
respondents admit that such instances are very rare. At the same time, as was
mentioned above, exit from the system and the social contract for the overwhelming
majority of officials (except for the top level) is quite easy. Moreover, many of the
most active, ambitious and competent civil servants opt for exit – as long as they
have sufficient contacts, knowledge and experience, or get other benefits offered
by their status and profession (housing, university education for children, etc.).
In its personnel policy, Belarus declares professional growth of civil servants to
be one of its key priorities. But is this policy really efficient? The results indicate
that the Belarusian personnel policy has serious defects (based on opinions of those
who this policy promotes), connected both with the understatement of the role of
an individual official («I am a cog in the machine»), excessive red tape in the
administrative system and immaturity of the system of material and nonmaterial
incentives of the low and medium rank civil servants. Because of insufficient
qualification and incompetence, even ingenious managerial solutions often get stuck,
or lose their efficiency when implemented. As a result, civil service becomes
unattractive, and most of the low and medium rank officials regard it as a launching
pad facilitating their way into business, consulting or other commercial activities.
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APPENDIX
Nominal average monthly wages/salaries in various branches of the economy
(thousands of Belarusian rubles)
Source: BELSTAT.




















Average in Belarus 253.8 350.2 137.9 469.4 134.0 590.7 125.8 701.1 118.7 885.6 126.2 
Administration 359.2 524.8 146.1 710.0 134.8 858.9 121.5 1051.5 122.6 1217.0 116.4 
State administra-
tion bodies 
354.8 520.9 146.8 701.6 133.9 847.3 121.1 1044.9 123.5 1198.1 114.7 
Judicial and legal 
institutions 




558.8 753.1 134.8 1004.6 133.6 1296.8 125.3 – – – – 
Healthcare, sports 
and social security 
223.9 306.9 137.1 418.3 136.5 522.6 124.8 598.8 114.7 714.0 119.2 
Education 214.3 289.8 135.2 398.4 137.4 488.3 122.9 544.6 111.5 629.5 115.6 
Culture, art 199.4 272.6 136.7 377.9 137.6 467.2 124.3 549.1 116.7 656.1 117.9 
Science, science 
service 
324.6 443.1 136.5 603.6 133.7 782.6 129.6 976.1 123.4 1256.5 127.6 
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Chapter 7
MODELS OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE
AND SOCIAL GROUPS IN MEDIA MESSAGES
(based on the content analysis
of Sovetskaya Belorussia daily)
Nadezhda Yefimova
1. INTRODUCTION
The social contract and its implementation involve constant interaction, exchange
of information, «signals» between the parties to the contract (actors). These
interaction and signal exchange mitigate the contradiction between the stability
of the relationship between the state and social groups in the framework of the
social contract and its variability brought about by changes in outward conditions
and «bounded rationality» (Weiland, 2008), the contradiction between the implicit,
«hypothetical nature» of social contracting and necessity for the parties to perform
definite recurring activities for each other (Ackerman, 1980). The process of signal
exchange between the parties may be manifested in many ways, that is, it may be
illustrated using a variety of examples (Haiduk, Chubrik, 2008).
We will focus on one aspect – the exchange of signals between the parties to
the social contract by way of media messages, which to a large extent has a symbolic
sense. The state (authorities), when taking decisions and performing various
activities, creates a «text» with an eye to its being perused by social groups, society
and its members. The thing is that the activities, just like the written text, are
based on the generally accepted language: in both cases, the authors make use of
symbols – universally comprehensible signs – in order to transfer information
(Gadamer, Baudrillard).
The subjects of communication, in our case, the authorities and social groups,
are very well aware of the symbolic sense of activities and decisions. The
contribution of the symbol and its interpretation to consensus building (within
the contract as the eventual result) may be very significant. For example, the
abolition of the ban on alcohol sale in public places during Victory Day celebrations
on May 9 has a symbolic sense and may be perceived as some text, a message targeted
at the social group of veterans and their distinctive interpretation of this decision
(in a way, it is a proposal to this social group). The results of the reading are returned
to the addresser in the form of a special attitude (more or less corresponding to the
expectations of the addresser).
The mass media not only describe the situation and transmit a sort of proposal
to the audience, but also indicate the range of options (models) of socially desirable
response to the proposal, as well as options outside the band, that is, undesirable
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reactions. The media thus instruct and prompt how exactly the audience should
perceive this or that text and act in response to certain proposals.
We have referred to the daily newspaper Belarus Today( better known by its
old title Sovetskaya Belorussia, or SB8Belarus Today) in order to identify the patterns
of interaction between the state and various social groups transmitted as socially
desirable and sanctioned, or, alternatively, disapproved of and socially undesirable.
The fact that the paper was founded and is published by the Presidential
Administration stands for its pro%presidential position, expressing the views and
interests of the authorities.
In accordance with the general approach that we have adopted for this study,
all behavior patterns (in our case the models of reaction to proposals) fit into the
framework of «loyalty» (that is, approval and consent), «exit» (that is, refusal and
understatement) and «voice» (that is, active denial and protest). The messages of
the newspaper where studied applying content analysis covering 12 months: July
1, 2007 through June 30, 2008. The study utilized stratified cluster sampling: the
total number of copies issued within 12 months was split into months, five uniform
strata were formed in each month, and one copy was selected at random from each.
Every issue was looked through to choose the materials focusing on the interaction
between the state (or separate representatives of various state institutions) and
social groups (or separate representatives of a group). The sample multitude includes
500 messages.
The content analysis%based study pursues the following goals:
a) to describe the engagement between the state and various social groups;
b) to analyze the messages and the social contract as a whole (what exactly and
on what terms the state offers to each group);
c) to study the response of the counterparty, that is, the reaction of this or that
social group to the signals transmitted by the state.
2. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
2.1. Frequency of descriptions of the interaction between the state and social
groups in the media
In a newspaper text, the frequency of references to and descriptions of the interaction
between the state and some social group traditionally indicates the degree of the
communicator’s attention to the group, and, in our case, the degree of importance
of the group in the strategy of the state.
The interaction between the state and the following five social groups were
most often covered in SB8Belarus Today in July 2007 – July 2008:
• wage workers (including budget sector employees) – 21.6% of the total number
of analyzed messages;
• business (entrepreneurs) – 21.1%;
• population of some particular region or type of settlement, for instance, a village
or small town (hereinafter dubbed «locale») – 15.4%;
• officials – 10.8%;
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• youth – 10.3%;
• the rest of the groups – 20.8%.
The five groups above (wage workers, business, locale, officials and youth)
were in the limelight of SB – Belarus Today in the period we studied, which means
the state was building relations with those groups more intensively. At the same
time, SB – Belarus Today described the relationship between the state and other
groups (directors of state enterprises, women, large families, pensioners, believers,
veterans, servicemen, etc.) less thoroughly – the events describing the relations
between the state with other social groups made up a total of 20.8% of all analyzed
materials.
2.2. Models of the interaction between the state (authorities) and specific
social groups
In the framework of the social contract, theoretically both the state and a social
group may initiate interaction. The results of the content analysis show that in
most of the cases described in SB – Belarus Today, interaction was initiated by the
state (or its representatives), that is, the social contract is built from above and is
therefore asymmetric. Specifically, in SB – Belarus Today messages, 87.2% of all
instances of interaction are initiated by the state (authorities). It is the state that
plays the role of the active counterparty that proposes its conditions. Social groups
are mostly presented as the reacting party: only 12.8% of all messages are initiated
by representatives of social groups; as a rule, they are generated in response to the
proposals and actions of the state (authorities).
Business
The model of interaction between the state (authorities) and business is clearly
ambivalent. The newspaper presents two different types of business: «bad» business
and «good» business, and the state has different strategies for each. The inconsistent,
non%uniform approach to business and the existing communication strategy are
evident (Table 1) in :
• specific topics, in which the newspaper describes the interaction between the
state and business;
• the objectives declared by the state in its policies on business;
• the described instruments to achieve the objectives.
In terms of the social contract, the data presented in Table 1 may be
interpreted as follows: entrepreneurs interact with representatives of the
authorities not only on «entrepreneurship in various areas», but also on
«corruption, financial and other violations and crimes». Small town development
is another area where entrepreneurs draw attention to themselves. On the whole,
judging by the range of topics shared for the business, entrepreneurs are
perceived both as a positive force, on which certain hopes are pinned, and the
social group that does not enjoy trust of the authorities, the group that comprises




Interaction between the state and business: topics, objectives
and instruments in media messages, %
Source: author’s own calculations.
State goals towards business are also ambivalent: on one hand, state argues for
«promotion of development» and «facilitation», on the other, it wants
«punishment». The list of methods to achieve objectives comprises both «tax cuts»,
«privileges» and «lawsuits», «inspections and control».
The old contract with business is being rejected as outdated and inconsistent
with the present%day situation. That contract is qualified as inefficient – both in
terms of production and social relations (for instance, in world practice, large
producers place orders with small businesses, but in Belarus they cannot be included
in such labor division mechanisms, because they are not focused on production;
business organizations fail to ensure proper social security schemes for its personnel),
and are unfair compared to all other social groups (that is, offering preferences to
small business in the prejudice of the domestic light industry).
A new framework of the social contract is offered to replace the existing one
and to counterbalance the status quo. The instruments and projects advertised in
SB – Belarus Today seem to be too narrow to cover all the provisions of the new
contract, but SB – Belarus Today messages make it clear that state offerings to the
business community come down to a single option: the authorities suggest business
should go to villages, small towns, get involved in the state program to recover
small towns («small towns» is a dominating topic in business descriptions). It is
this sort of business that is presented as positive and socially desirable. Such business
must deal with:
• rehabilitation of insolvent enterprises in small towns;
Main topics that SB – Belarus Today uses to describe the engagement between the state and business 
− Entrepreneurship in various areas  42.3 
− Corruption, financial and other crimes 24.9 
− Recovery of small towns 10.3 
− Other  22.5 
Objectives regarding business   
− Punish, ban, detect violations  28.2 
− Offer possibilities 20.5 
− Increase efficiency 7.7 
− Encourage development  7.7 
− Make controllable  6.4 
− Other   29.5 
Instruments to achieve objectives   
− Lawsuit  19.3 
− Change in status, reorganization  17.9 
− Inspection, control  14.1 
− Law, ordinance  11.5 
− Privileges, preferential auctions  10.3 
− Tax cuts 10.3 
− Reduced, lax control 6.4 
− Combat against bureaucracy  5.1 
− Other 5.1 
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• creation of new products;
• job creation, combating unemployment, cessation of labor migration to Russia
and other regions;
• infrastructure development, housing construction and redevelopment of
settlements, etc.
The business that will come to small settlements will be offered complete
support of the state as a whole and particular  officials: SB – Belarus Today
has a column «Entrepreneurs and Officials Work for a Common Cause»
(November 30, 2007). «Good» business is offered a broad range of preferences
and privileges:
• lax state control;
• simplified bureaucratic procedures, connected with business registration;
• significant tax reductions;
• auctions and property sale on easy terms, etc.
The taxes that businesses pay locally remain in local budgets, facilitating a
«bond» between entrepreneurs and officials (or «solder joint» if we use the language
of the first Soviet five%year plans), which is positioned as a powerful success factor.
Two quotations from SB – Belarus Today materials would be in place.
Interview with Gomel Region Executive Committee Chair (January 15, 2008):
«The executive committee organizes businesstours to the countryside for
entrepreneurs – our potential investors. We must interest entrepreneurs in business
development, especially in smaller localities. Even if two or three projects are
initiated during such a business trip, in which dozens of businesses take part, it is
worth it».
Deputy chair of the Chavusy District Executive Committee (November 30,
2007): «We, officials, give businesses nothing but support. We often draw up all
documents for them. We understand that should an investor come across a tiniest
piece of red tape, it will go elsewhere to find partners that are more convenient. To
efficiently tackle the problems of business, our staff often work during their free
time. But look at the town – it has changed for the better – mostly because of the
taxes paid by business people».
«Bad» and «good» businesses are contrasted and juxtaposed to show how things
should be done and what is unacceptable. Below is an SB – Belarus Today text
reflecting the ambivalent model of the interaction between the state and business:
«Activists [those taking part in rallies of businessmen. – N. Ye.] believe the state
used the «stick» to turn them into unitary enterprises. But they say nothing about
the «carrot», especially presidential Decree № 8, adopted the other day. It does
simplify registration procedures. To «enlarge» and change the market niche will be
possible without lengthy bureaucratic procedures. The new «carrot» shows where
to channel the initiative. The Decree signed into effect yesterday offers excellent
preferences to anyone who starts a business in the countryside. Instead of the routine
«buy%and%sell» business, entrepreneurs may take up lucrative productions»
(V. Volyanyuk, SB – Belarus Today, December 21, 2007).
Entrepreneurs are much more likely to opt for «exit» and «voice» than the
other social groups described below. Of all the analyzed texts on entrepreneurs:
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• 34.1% demonstrate the tolerance of entrepreneurs for state proposals (not
exactly a very high percentage, given the propaganda orientation of the
newspaper);
• 25.6% – exit;
• 6.4% – voice;
• remaining 34% deal the reaction of entrepreneurs is not identified, that is, there
is no indication of any response at all.
Few caveats apply to the exit strategy. In the «social contract» theory, «exit» is
perceived as a search for and use of some positive alternative: if you are dissatisfied
with the business environment, you may get another job or find any acceptable niche.
The newspaper offers no «exit» in the sense of having a positive alterative. It shows
«exit» as law evasion, failure to comply with or disregard for an ordinance, instruction,
concealment of incomes and tax evasion, denial of guilt, arbitrary actions (for example,
they close down stalls) or nonfulfillment of requests. «Exit» is depicted not as a
positive alternative, but as a «negative withdrawal», or tacit protest. The possibilities
of positive exit are not described whatsoever, and the government’s proposals to
business are shown in the SB – Belarus Today model as having no alternative.
«Voice» is an open articulated protest. It is expressed in letters addressed to
the media, including letters signed by a group, open letters published on websites,
and strikes of entrepreneurs. Here is a letter to the newspaper (its website) signed
by an entrepreneur (in response to the government’s campaign for «business
privileges», real bargain of acquiring loss%making enterprises in villages and
revitalizing them using investments and expert management) (February 2, 2008):
«There are no advantages in investing in villages, helping bankrupt producers stay
afloat. You won’t recover them, but cut your profit. You had better raise taxes if you
believe businesses are too well off in cities».
Officials
As in the case with entrepreneurs, the pattern of the government’s interaction
with civil servants is also ambivalent. The media, being the mouthpiece of the
authorities, both «punish» officials and «expand» their powers, give them additional
benefits (taxes stay in local budgets in smaller towns), describe them as responsible
and sagacious project «implementers» (free economic zones). However, in the social
group of officials there is not enough balance between the «positive» and «negative»
treatments. In SB – Belarus Today, «negative» features prevail (in terms of the social
contract, the focus in the agreement with this social group is placed on sanctions)
(Table 2).
Officials (SB – Belarus Today mostly writes about officials of the region level
and lower) are presented as the «executive device» of the regime that are responsible
for the implementation of its projects and decisions, and at the same time as a
«scapegoat», someone to take the blame for all failures. For instance, the discontent
of the population with the abolition of privileges and the confusion with targeted
privileges that followed are interpreted as a result of sluggishness of officials, poor
awareness campaigns, etc.
Models of engagement between the state and social groups in media messages ...
152
Table 2
Interaction between the state and officials:
topics, objectives and instruments in media reports, %
Source: author’s own calculations.
The fact that scalding criticism is as a rule aimed against local officials may be
interpreted as an instrument to protect the supreme authorities (sort of
«delegation of liability and guilt»). It is quite possible that the public role of the
one «liable», «guilty», «accused» is an essential part of the social contract between
the state and civil servants. In opposition to this, media tend to note a growing
trend toward expansion of officials’ powers and their freedom in managing finance.
Below is the breakdown of officials’ response to such signals and messages:
• loyalty – 45.8%, of them 25% – explicit, declared loyalty;
• exit – 29.2%;
• indefinable – 25%.
Youth
Interaction between the state (the authorities) and the youngstewrs was for
the most part in the framework of such issues as «science, high technologies» –
32.1%, «education» – 21.4%, «employment» – 14.3%, «agriculture» – 10.7%, and
«social sector» – 7.1%. These are the key «fields of action», permeated by the cross%
cutting issue of employment, for youth, as seen by the state%run newspaper. The
objectives declared by the state include involvement of young personnel in the
Main topics that SB – Belarus Today uses to describe the engagement between the state and officials 
− Law, legislation  7.5 
− Powers, responsibility of local authorities 7.5 
− State leadership, managerial activities   17.5 
− Corruption  12.5 
− Illegal seizure of land   32.5 
− Recovery of small towns  12.5 
− Free economic zones  5.0 
− Other  5.0 
Declared objectives regarding officials  
− Punish, eradicate negative elements (for instance, abuse, corruption, red tape, illegal 
allocation of reserved land for construction, customs violations, etc.) 
42.5 
− Expand powers  17.5 
− Encourage work  15.0 
− Protect  7.5 
− Increase efficiency   5.0 
− Other 12.5 
Instruments to achieve objectives regarding officials  
− Ordinance, instruction  15.0 
− Lawsuit  12.5 
− Ban, sanction  10.0 
− Inspection, control  22.5 
− Administrative measures (lay off) 5.0 
− Introduction of market mechanisms  7.5 
− Expansion of authorities  10.0 




national economy, including for the development and creation of new industries
and enterprises (Table 3).
Table 3
Interaction between the state and youth:
topics, objectives and instruments in media reports, %
Source: author’s own calculations.
Unlike the social contracts with business and officials described above, the
contract with the youngsters shifts the focus from the stick to carrots – only 5.3%
of SB – Belarus Today materials are about penalties. The newspaper only mentions
sanctions against the graduates that failed to take on the assigned jobs.
On the other hand, there is a lot about «the carrot». Young people are lured into
large%scale attractive integrated projects (academic competitions, talent shows, special
study grants, etc.). For instance, the creation of the Belarusian Silicon Valley (High
Technologies Park) is positioned as a project for youth that offers unprecedented
opportunities for selfactualization, career advancement and high salaries. Many
projects offer young specialists employment and good career prospects; these
opportunities are often connected with the recovery of villages and small towns.
Of many projects described in SB8Belarus Today (and clearly being high%risk ventures)
there was one material on 10 graduates of the agrarian academy that were sent to
villages to lead farms. They were provided homes, service cars, high positions and
salaries, and their only task was to «take roots» and secure «high performance
indicators». None of the volunteers managed to stay for more than 12 months, but it
does not mean the authorities will not be generating new exciting ideas.
Main topics that SB – Belarus Today uses to describe the engagement between the state and youth 
− Education  21.4 
− High technologies  32.1 
− Employment  14.3 
− Agriculture   10.7 
− Social sector  7.1 
− Other 14.4 
Declared objectives regarding youth  
− Keep personnel  25.0 
− Provide opportunities  17.9 
− Offer material support  10.7 
− Promote innovation  10.7 
− Ensure comfortable living standards 7.1 
− Punish  7.1 
− Other 10.8 
Instruments to achieve objectives regarding youth  
− Laws, ordinances, directives 7.1 
− Wages, education allowances, grants, etc., financing 10.7 
− Projects (state projects)  17.9 
− Career advancement  17.9 
− Education, talent contests   14.3 
− Organizational adjustments 10.7 
− Sanctions  5.3 
− Housing provision 7.1 
− Other   9.0 
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The response of this social group to the proposals of the authorities may be as
follows:
• loyalty, including explicit, declared by the individual – 47.4%;
• loyalty that is not explicit, but assumed by the media – 10.5%;
• exit – 21.1%;
• not definable – 21.1%.
As far as young people are concerned, «exit» and «withdrawal» as a rule take
the form of refusals to accept the assigned job upon graduation, as well as refusals
to accept other proposals from the state (the winner of the physics contest will not
stay in the lyceum, because his parents, who live in a village, cannot pay for his stay
in the city; a young family turns down the «demographic proposal» of the president,
because of doubts that they will help their children get off to a good start).
Wage workers and «locale»
Two more groups that happened to be in the focus of attention of SB – Belarus
Today in the period under review (July 2007 – July 2008) were «wage workers» and
small town and village dwellers (dubbed «locale»). In specific publications of
Sovetskaya Belorussia, wage workers – teachers, doctors, workers, engineers –
represent 90% of the «locale». This prompted comparison of the «offers» made by
the state in various circumstances to this de%facto single social group. The «difference
of circumstances» was determined not only by the place of residence (in some cases
localities may be different, they are not always specified, as they are not relevant for
the development of the social contract; sometimes the place of residence – a small
town – is essential, and it is the type of settlement that determines the nature of state
proposals), but also the political significance of the social group: the period under
analysis was marked by the campaign to restore small towns.
The interaction between the state and the social group of wage workers, both in
small towns and other settlements, is presented mostly from the perspective of the
production sphere: manufacturing, agribusiness, construction – and much less in
science, education, healthcare and culture. However, the objectives declared by the
initiator of the engagement (as a rule, it is the state), are different. The objectives
regarding «wage workers» mostly pertain to labor relations, and production industry:
• labor efficiency upgrade – 27.5%;
• acceleration of development, higher competitive power – 17.6%;
• creation of new productions, industries – 9.8%.
The objectives declared concerning smaller towns and villages («locale») are these:
• to increase living standards in general – 23.1%;
• to ensure comfortable living conditions, provide housing – 19.2;
• to create jobs, keep personnel – 17.2%.
The chief instruments to achieve the goals are to raise wages, provide housing
and improve social conditions at the enterprise (for the former) and intensified
production, boost in entrepreneurship and state programs (for the latter).
The pattern of the interaction between the state and wage workers makes use
of various social measures (wage push, housing) as instruments to achieve the goals
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in the realm of social production. In the «state%locale» pattern, social measures
(higher living standards, comfort and decent wages) are declared not as instruments,
but as the goal in itself.
As we see, the state varies the goals and instruments when making proposals to
social groups depending on the continuing relevance of the group and the contract
with that group. If the state prioritizes the group and the contract, social measures
are declared to be the ultimate goal; otherwise, they act as instruments to reach
some objective in some other area (for instance, in production).
3. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION: COMMONALITIES OF THE STATE
STRATEGY IN THE SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH VARIOUS
SOCIAL GROUPS
The findings of the study enable us to identify the following common traits of the
strategy pursued by the authorities in the social contracts with various groups based
on interaction patterns transmitted in SB – Belarus Today messages.
1. Situational nature of the contract and, consequently, its short%term character.
The contract is concluded for each specific task or project and cannot be long%term
by definition. The campaign to restore small towns and villages in 2007–2008 shaped
the proposals of the authorities to many social groups, including youth.
2. Segmentation of the social group when making the contract. As a rule, the
authorities make proposals «on condition», that is, not to the entire group, but the
part that meets certain standards or has the required qualities. For business, the
condition is entrepreneurial activities in rural areas. The contract for youth fails to
cover all young people, and only applies to those talented and well%educated.
3. Shuffling of objectives and instruments in state messages. For a contract
with a more significant social group, the authorities present «socially important
measures» (higher wages, social benefits, new jobs, etc.) as the ultimate goals of its
policy (the goal in itself, so to say). Otherwise, they are used as instruments to
reach production targets.
4. Choice with no options. The contract with social groups in state messages is
presented as having no alternatives. «Exit» as a search for some positive alternative
is not mentioned at all in the transmitted contract patterns. There is only «exit»
from law, nonperformance of an ordinance or instruction, that is, a negative
withdrawal or tacit protest.
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Chapter 8
FROM SOCIAL CONTRACT TO SOCIAL DIALOGUE:
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE AND




In democratic societies, the social contract is an agreement between empowered
citizens on mutual commitments and the institutions of the state designed to
enforce these commitment and solve collective action problems. Authoritarian
systems may be based on the social contract to the same extent as democratic
societies, but their contract is asymmetrical in its nature. Whereas some of its
components are formed in a dialogue between the state and social groups,
essentially the state proposes the social contract in order to nip public discontent
in the bud, without resorting to excessive punitive actions. This contract therefore
takes form of information about restrictions, sanctions and incentives unilaterally
offered to society by the state and delivered both via informal and formal channels.
The state is capable of determining not only the severity of punishment, but also
the volume of benefits granted to this or that group for its consent.  At the same
time, the state has to take measures to demotivate society to sever these relations
by revolutionary actions. In the meantime, the state tests social groups for the
degree of their loyalty. If some policy is perceived as negative by some group, it
may be mitigated or reconsidered.
The asymmetrical nature of the social contract is caused by the inability of
social groups to self%organize and elaborate horizontal contractual agreements.
There is a chance for protest only when the authorities prove incapable of fulfilling
their obligations and after all «exit» possibilities have been exhausted. It must be
noted that apart from buying loyalty, the regime employs such strategies as the
deliberate breakdown of horizontal connections and prevention of emergence of
self%organization centers. This type of social contracting looks a lot like the life of
females in patriarchal societies, where the main advantage of married life is the
very fact of marriage, while the love of husband and his capability to provide material
well%being are secondary. The status of a single woman presents more serious
difficulties than the toils of an unsuccessful marriage: very few women have dared
dissolve such a contract.
The hypothesis about the existence of the social contract in society is quite
hard to verify. It is possible to use analytical methods to «reconstruct» the alleged
non%verbal agreements between the state and society, but it is much harder to detect
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any significant causations, say, between changes in public moods (demand) and
modifications of state policies (supply) in this or that social group or society as a
whole. These changes may not always be described using linear logic: the reaction
of the authorities to changes in public moods, or, on the contrary, the response of
citizens to the actions of the authorities that adjust their living conditions may
show serious delays and take peculiar forms. One important aspect of our
understanding of the social contract is the fact that we include not only the «stick»
and «carrot» (punishment for protest and incentive for loyalty), but also the «exit»
option as a special form of peaceful coexistence of the state and society. In other
words, we are dealing with a much more sophisticated set of rules of the game than
the one based exclusively on the «stick and carrot» pattern.
The subjects of social contracting appear to have a wider choice of instruments
to restore public balance and satisfy their interests. When studying social contracts
we have tried to not only and no so much to develop an analytical instrument to
detect the correlation between social trends and state policies, but also demonstrate
what opportunities these correlations open up for political and social actors,
especially when it comes to the dialogue with society and separate social groups on
the possible changes and development options for the country.
Beyond the framework of the question whether people will take to the streets
when the authorities seriously deteriorate their living standards, we focused on
the following essential points:
– to fix and bring home the rationality of the support for the existing state of
affairs by those who advocate the maintenance of the status quo;
– to detect and fix the inclination of some social groups to social contracting;
– to outline (based on everything mentioned above) the possible strategies for
engagement and dialogue with these groups.
2. GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN
BELARUS
2.1. Nature of social contracting in an authoritarian society
A social contract may be necessitated in an authoritarian society for two reasons.
The first one emerges when the authoritarian institutions of power go through a
crisis of legitimacy and/or encounter an open, and often violent, challenge, and are
bound to make concessions to society by offering not only new material benefits,
but also new rules of the game, which demark the borders, beyond which the state
will not interfere in the lives of those who it governs. One example of this social
contract type is Goulash Communism in Hungary in the 1960s%1980s, which was
practiced after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The then Hungarian leader
clearly defined the rules of the game between the authorities and society as «who is
not against us is with us».
Society was given three options: submission («loyalty»), protest in any of its
forms («voice»), or withdrawal from confrontation in case of disagreement («exit»).
It is important for the state to make «voice» the least attractive option – by way of
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increasing the severity of the punishment for the failure to comply (dismissals,
administrative punishments, etc.), or owing to some benefits offered in exchange
for «loyalty» or acquired independently as a result of «exit». In turn, citizens assess
the consequences of «voice» manifestations. If they believe the «voice» strategy, if
applied, will result in uncertainty and disorder, the existing social contract will be
valued more than any alternative strategy.
The second reason for social contracting in an authoritarian society appears
when the contract serves as a continuation of the paternalistic tradition, which
may be started both for ideological reasons and tactics aimed at maximizing the
authority of elites that seek to consolidate their legitimacy and engage public
support in their combat against rivals. This was the social contract patters used
back in Soviet Belarus, when high welfare rates not only ensured nation%wide love
for leaders (which was essential to secure official positions inside the country), but
also strengthened their hand in the Union%level power clashes.
In the same fashion, in conditions when «primary» accumulation of absolute
power called for electoral legitimacy, the authorities of post%Soviet Belarus chose
to restore and maintain the «Soviet» social contract, only slightly disrupted by the
stormy developments of the late 1980s%early 1990s. Reliance on society as an
instrument to consolidate the new group in power was also determined by the weak
structuring of the elite groups inside the country and somewhat uneasy relationships
between existing factions and the new chief executive.
The political memory of the commanding elite played its role, too: the strikes
of industrial workers in the spring of 1991 undermined the faith in the communist
model and shattered communism%related hopes. It appeared that the old
«Masherov»%style social contract was not executed. The attempt to completely
withdraw from the «Masherov» contract in the period of semi%reforms of 1991–
1994 provoked a backlash from the Belarusian society and ended in a political
victory of the conservative Soviet populism advocated by Alexander Lukashenko
in 1994. The new contract proposed by Lukashenko was a replica of the old Soviet
one, but at a lower level of incomes: «We don’t need this democracy with hullabaloo.
We need a democracy when a person works, earns some wages to buy bread, milk, sour
cream, sometimes a piece of meat to feed his baby».
2.2. Evolution of the social contract in Belarus
That was the material minimum of the contract offered to society during the initial
phase, in 1994–1996. The new authorities phased down political and economic
reforms and commenced to restore, albeit with modifications, the constituents of
the Soviet system. They included the dominance of state property, five%year
production plans, ideology, a youth organization resembling Komsomol, and other
ingredients of political and social control. However, the chief economic tasks were
economic growth and preservation of production without restructuring, including
through massive state support – in order to guarantee employment and permanent
increase in wages and pensions. Contractual relations have been modified over the
past decade, and often because of changes in «external» fundamental conditions of
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the functioning of the Belarusian system and need for adjusting the so%called
«selectorate» – the social and elite backbone of the system – in order to optimize
its stability.
The second phase in the development of social contracting took place after mass
campaigns against economic and administrative elites in 1994–2001, when a turn
to nomenclatura privatization became evident, and nomenclatura acquired broader
possibilities for corrupt practices (it is for this reason that the fight against
corruption is a burning issue for the state now, hence so many official anti%corruption
declarations). The need for that turn was caused by the situation when it was getting
harder and harder to maintain the conditions necessary for the existence of the
system (cheap energy resources and unconditional support of the Kremlin), whereas
the authorities needed to ensure 100 per cent loyalty of the central government
and its cooperation in safeguarding the chief executive.
Also, there were certain changes in the income distribution policies. During
the early years of the system, the authorities were «leashing the electorate» by
ensuring that incomes were growing fastest is the largest electoral group of
nonworking pensioners. In after years, the authorities were much less concerned
about the possibility of a defeat in elections (by 2004, the regime had managed to
liquidate the competitive electoral process, and only some external features
remained, like the plurality of candidates taking part), shifting their focus to
preventing any chance of a revolutionary (say, «orange») scenario of change of
power in the streets of Minsk and other large cities. As a result, the mid%2000s
saw hikes in real wages in urban areas, substantial improvements in the living
standards of the group that can be roughly categorized as the middle class, new
offers to young people (their social mobility increased), who were paid for political
loyalty and non%participation in the public life on the side of opposition
institutions, and campaigns to recruit and engage creative and media elites who
mold public opinion.
The third adjustment could be observed in the wake of the Russian%Belarusian
gas row in 2007. Overall, the rise in energy prices and the global financial crisis
that followed confronted the Belarusian authorities with the fact that it might be
impossible to preserve the current socioeconomic model in the long run. A structural
modification was indispensable, hence a major revision of the existing social pattern,
in other words, curtailments of social payments and mass layoffs. After the «gas
rift», the authorities started amending the system of privileges, which used to apply
to over 65% of population. The abolition of preferences and privileges, financially
insignificant as it was, affected the least protest%inclined, albeit socially immobile,
groups of pensioners and state%paid workers. This move was not only economic,
but also symbolic, indicating the first step away from the habitual «selectoral base».
However, the consequences proved unexpected: our study showed that virtually
all social groups were dissatisfied with the abolition of privileges, including those
who do not depend on privileges at all, since pensioners and physically handicapped
have young and healthy children, relatives and friends, who called that measure
cynical and unceremonious. As a result, under the pressure of changing public mood,
the authorities took care of revising the scheme of distribution of benefits. Decisive
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actions were postponed, and some of the privileges were reinstated (for instance,
subsidized suburban trips for pensioners and children in summer and fall).
3. SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN ATTEMPT OF «GLOBAL»
MEASUREMENT
In our study, we were trying to find instruments to «measure» the degree of social
contracting in Belarusian society. Although we spoke about the asymmetric nature
of the contract, we believe society has sufficient room to lay down conditions and
demands, while the state has to make allowances for these conditions and
requirements. The state and society exchange signals regarding acceptable
behaviors, sanctions and benefits. In this connection, we seek to understand how
the social contract offered by the authorities is interpreted by the public and how
voluntarily it is accepted. The fundamental thesis of this social contract, in our
opinion, is the following proposal to society: «Our state secures civil peace and
political stability, which justifies limitations on some civil freedoms».
According to the findings of the research, about 45% of all respondents agree
with this thesis fully or partially, and 36% fully or partially disagree. We also
«measured» the degree of acceptance of other fundamental provisions, which are
constantly declared by the authorities and included in the package of guarantees
offered in exchange for loyalty. This includes (Table 1):
– it is better to have lower wages, but a guaranteed job;
– it is better to work for a state enterprise than for a private one;
– mandatory job assignments (even though not so convenient) for students upon
graduation are acceptable, as they allow young specialists to have jobs;
– it is better for enterprises to make average profits than to be bought by
foreigners;
– it is better to have average quality medical services, but free of charge.
Table 1
Agreement with basic provisions of the social contract, %
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
Finally, we measured the degree of acceptance of fixed written contracts, in
other words, protest against time labor contracts, which were concluded with almost
 Agree Hard to say Disagree 
It is better to earn less, but have a calm, quiet job  58.1 5.8 36.1 
It is better to have medical services of medium quality, but 
free of charge  
52.5 4.0 43.5 
It is better to work for a state-run enterprise than for a private 
one  
57.5 13.0 29.4 
It is better to have Belarusian enterprises gain moderate 
profits than sell them to foreigners 
59.3 12.1 28.6 
Political rights may be sacrificed for the sake of stability  45.5 19.5 35.0 
I do not mind fixed-time employee contracts 24.8 39.8 35.4 
It is better to have mandatory job assignments (for 
graduates), but provide guaranteed employment  




all workers in Belarus in 2003–2004. While on average, we observe a high enough
degree of consent to the social contract in Belarusian society, it is only with respect
to the «fixed» contract that we see the number of those disliking the contract exceed
the number of respondents showing consent. It is interesting that during the mass
campaign to change open%end contracts for fixed%term contracts, the overwhelming
majority of employees were against the reform. There were no open protests, though.
Activists of the unions that were not part of the Federation of Trade Unions (which
did not oppose mass «contractization») were fired, which prompted other employees
to be more cautious, hence evident collective action problems.
On the one hand, the absence of horizontal bonds manifested itself (even in the
framework of a single organization, individuals may not be sure that their protest
would be supported by their coworkers, to say nothing of the rest of the industry).
On the other hand, the loss (of job, because of the non%extension of the one%year
contract) was tangible, too, while there was no certainty at all that the protest of
the entire staff would result in the abolition of the «contractual institute» in the
form of the fixed%term contract. The latter is imposed from «above» and backed by
official trade unions. A separate enterprise could never be regarded as a battleground
to fight for the rights of workers, let alone the economy as a whole.
3.1. Breakdown of society by degree of social contracting
After encoding the acceptance of the rules of the game («agree» and «rather agree»,
or «support» and «rather support» for contracts) as «1», denial as «3» and doubt as
«2», we gauged the degree of «concractization» of each respondent (7 points for
complete acceptance of the rules of the game vs. 21 points for total rejection). In
this case, respondents’ opinions along the scale appeared to be inclined in favor of
the contract. Based on this encoding system we split all respondents into three
categories: those with 7–11 points formed the «group of social contract» (SC),
12–16 points, «undecided» (U), and 17–21 points, «nonconformists/renegades»
(NC). The result is presented in picture 1.
The social contract group requires a differentiation between the «working»
and «nonworking» segments, as pensioners, dominating the latter, have a
distinct pattern of relations with the state differing fundamentally from the
model of the wage workers (apparently, workers have more options). As soon as
we identified and isolated the group of nonworking pensioners (NP), the social
contract group almost halved in size, the group of the undecided changed only
slightly, while the group of nonconformists remained virtually unchanged. This
enabled us to address pensioners as a separate homogeneous group in terms of
its relations with the state. Belarusian society is thus divided into four
comparable parts (Table 2).
Some variations are possible, depending on the place of residence, education
and sex of the respondent. In our study, only respondents with incomplete secondary
education, most of them being pensioners, stand out. Higher education in Belarus
is not an instrument to achieve more freedom in relations with the state, whereas
possibilities for existing outside the social contract in the capital city are limited,
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paradoxical as it may appear. At the same time, the degree of acceptance of the
social contract offered by the state may differ depending on the age group,
employment (in the state or private sector) and occupation, since labor and social
mobility that depend on skills and profession, are essential factors.
Note: the vertical axis shows the number of respondents scoring the indicated points.
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
Picture 1. Proportions of the three basic groups in Belarusian society
Table 2
Breakdown of society by degree of social contracting
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
As we noted above, the social contract in Belarus is quite rigid – it is a «path
dependency» rather than choice proper. The current situation, as well as the
available package of possibilities, depend on the steps and choices a person has
made during previous stages of life (choice of profession and education), because it
is hard to change them, and acquired, both subjectively and objectively, social status
(for example, as a result of ageing). Young people tend to accept the social contract
least of all groups, together with private sector employees (and representatives of
professions, in which market relations are developed the best).
In other words, «social renegades» have room for maneuver and search for
incomes in their lives, whereas the social contract group and nonworking pensioners
are deprived of it. When it comes to the social contract group, it seems paralyzed
 % % 
«Nonconformists/Renegades» group (NC) 21.1 20.0 
«Social contract» group (SC) 42.9 23.8 
Nonworking pensioners (NP) – 26.7 




with a bunch of limitations imposed on life mobility. For instance, the majority of
this group is formed by public sector employees, civil servants and servicemen –
those who will feel the consequences of any deviation from the rules of the games
proposed by the state immediately, while chances for diversification of life options
(for example, by changing jobs) are minimum (Table 3).
Table 3
Social contract: sex, age, education, place of residence, job, %
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
 SC U NC NP 
Sex     
Male 23.3 33.0 23.2 19.5 
Female 24.3 26.4 16.3 33.0 
Education     
Incomplete secondary 11.9 12.7 8.2 67.2 
Secondary 29.1 29.4 20.8 20.8 
Specialized secondary  26.0 35.0 21.3 17.6 
Secondary technical  32.2 32.2 18.3 17.4 
Higher 23.9 29.5 19.9 26.7 
Place of residence     
Minsk 22.0 37.7 23.0 17.3 
Large (over 100,000)  23.2 34.1 20.6 22.2 
Small town (10,000–100,000) 29.3 23.6 19.3 27.8 
Village (less than 10,000) 23.8 29.5 19.9 26.7 
Age     
18–24 21.8 42.3 35.9 0.0 
25–34 25.4 44.3 30.3 0.0 
35–44 32.4 39.1 26.8 1.8 
45–54 41.4 34.2 19.7 4.6 
55–64 18.4 13.0 4.3 64.3 
65+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Job     
Private enterprise 16.2 42.1 41.7 0.0 
State enterprise 40.4 39.9 19.7 0.0 
Does not know 25.0 53.6 21.4 0.0 
Does not work 9.2 13.0 12.6 65.2 
Occupation     
Manager, owner 28.0 40.5 31.5 0.0 
Worker 40.1 41.8 18.1 0.0 
Civil servant 42.9 39.3 17.9 0.0 
Serviceman 38.5 46.2 15.4 0.0 
Budget sector employee 35.1 40.5 24.4 0.0 
Entrepreneur 23.5 35.3 41.2 0.0 
Student 22.0 39.8 38.1 0.0 
Housewife 34.1 29.5 36.4 0.0 
Unemployed 29.0 37.7 33.3 0.0 
Pensioner 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Industry     
Manufacturing  36.7 43.3 20.0 0.0 
Services  30.0 41.9 28.1 0.0 
Transport 28.0 42.0 30.0 0.0 
Agriculture 36.7 39.8 23.5 0.0 
Construction 31.2 36.7 32.1 0.0 
Education, healthcare 38.2 40.8 21.1 0.0 
Housing and public utilities 44.4 33.3 22.2 0.0 
Science, art 23.1 61.5 15.4 0.0 
State administration 38.1 38.1 23.8 0.0 
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In turn, those who prefer autonomous lifestyles, mostly include private sector
workers and employees of the sectors with the best%developed market relations,
including construction, services and transport, and opportunities to have lives without
state guardianship are ample. Belarusians’ tolerance and moderation look like a
rational choice based on the conditions and restrictions imposed within the framework
of their relations with the state rather than peculiar features of the national character.
3.2. Expectations of the main social contract groups and their assessments of
the state performing its functions
The four groups were later divided in terms of their assessment of the state performing
its commitments and functions. This division may be considered one of the main
factors molding the acceptance of social contracting in Belarusian society. On the
whole it is noteworthy that Belarusians give the state very high marks for securing
political stability and provision of some basic guarantees, including high quality free
of charge secondary education, higher education and free medical services (Table 4).
Table 4
Social groups’ expectations regarding the social contract, %
Note. Points are calculated in the following way: the share of respondents that believe the state
meets its obligations minus the proportion of those who do not believe this. For instance, if 32.1% of
all respondents think that the state guarantees provision of preferences and privileges, and 54.5%
disagree, the score is (–)22.3%.
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
At the same time, the groups differ as to their assessment of the state performing
other obligations. It is evident that «nonconformists» and «the undecided» do not
give the state positive assessments when evaluating not only basic functions of the
state, but also possibilities for living a full life and achieving success (freedom of
entrepreneurship, employment in the private sector).
The consequences of the «rating trap» observed in the past few decades are
evident, too: the less paternalism%prone social groups criticize the current status of




The state guarantees political stability  +64.0 +51 +33,5 +71.0 +56.0 
The state guarantees high quality free secondary education +60.5 +53 +35.8 +41.7 +50.9 
The state guarantees high quality free higher education +49.4 +49.2 +24.7 +44.5 +43.2 
The state protects from crime +39.2 +35.4 +26.6 +55.5 +39.9 
The state provides free medical services +37.5 +28.6 +13.6 +52.5 +34.5 
The state helps acquire housing +53.5 +28.3 +6.7 +36.7 +32.2 
The state pays education allowances +35.9 +33.9 +7.3 +19.8 +25.0 
The state guarantees rule of law +26.5 +22.9 –7.0 +40.6 +22.5 
The state guarantees freedom of entrepreneurship +34.8 +4.0 –28.3 +24.5 +10.4 
The state provides 100% guarantee of bank deposits +20.7 –6.2 –1.3 +16.3 +7.2 
The state protects rights of hired workers +9.8 +4.3 –7.3 +14.5 +6.0 
The state provides possibilities to make money +14.6 +1.3 –12.9 +7.3 +1.2 
The state guarantees high quality medical services +3.1 –22.5 –30.4 +25.5 –5.3 
The state pays decent pensions +3.2 –17.1 –44.0 +16.8 –12.5 
The state guarantees employment –10.3 –22.1 –29.5 –0.47 –15.0 




the pension system and medical service; one can say this group has problems with the
«future» social contract that is being offered by the state now. This is evident from
the demand for private pension schemes and additional savings possibilities. At the
same time, pensioners seem satisfied with the quality of services that cater specifically
for them, such as pensions and social privileges. In other words, paradoxically as it
may sound, these topics can hardly become a subject matter of a dialogue with groups
of social contract, but would rather interest the groups that aim for self%sufficiency.
In general, we should note that these «satisfaction profiles» are almost identical in
the SC and NP groups on the other hand, and U and NC on the other.
3.3. Assessment by main social groups of the state performing its obligations
to their group
Of all the responses, we isolated those indicating how social groups assess the
state’s performance of commitments to the social group the respondent represents.
For instance, society on average may assess the level of pension payments as low,
but pensioners are satisfied. The results of this isolation are quite interesting (the
data should be interpreted as: jobless citizens answer how well the state is taking
care of the unemployed, etc.). As we see, the social contract group (pensioners,
security officials, servicemen, civil servants) think highly of the state care (this is
why they opt for civil service). Students’ appreciation for state efforts is rather
high, too. Villagers, young specialists, workers and budget sector employees are
behind here, although it is only in the social group of the unemployed that the state
totally «fails». In Table 5, the symbiosis of the «new» and «old» coalition (the one
we talked above) is illustrated amply.
Table 5
Assessment of the state’s attitude to the group the respondent belongs to
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
3.4. Social contract: room for personal efforts and changes
Social contracting should not be regarded as the only legitimate way for the state
and society to interact. In the end, the social contract is an analytical construction,
which helps define the room for change and possible dialogue with the identified
groups. Despite the fact that most Belarusians expect a lot from the state and pin





Villagers (settlements with population fewer than 5,000) 4.0 29.5 45.3 9.4 
Civil servants 48.3 34.5 6.9 10.3 
Teachers, medics (budget sector employees)  4.6 30.5 39.7 2.4 
Workers 3.8 23 49.2 17.9 
Police, special services, SWAT (OMON) (security 
officials and servicemen)  
21.4 50 14.3 14.3 
Students 2.5 41.5 34.7 15.3 
Pensioners 19.2 43.5 26.8 10.0 
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great hopes in it in the future, the society is aware that after all their well%being
and future depend on individual efforts of each citizen. Only pensioners and only
with respect to their well%being believe that it depends on the state, rather than on
their efforts. Household individualism of Belarusians is not an instrument to express
their liberal attitudes, though, but a way to «withdraw» from the head%on crash
with the state in the areas where and when it is incapable of performing their
obligations to society or fulfills them poorly (Table 6).
Table 6
Assessment of personal efforts, %
Note. Points are calculated in the following way: the share of respondents that believe that something
depends on the state minus the share of those who do not believe this. For instance, if 32.1% of all
respondents believe that education is something that the state should take care of, and 54.5% think
the level of education depends on people’s efforts, we have minus (–)22.3%.
Source: BISS
It is also indicative (and correlates with economic possibilities) that in case
material problems occur, all groups tend to rely on themselves, their own efforts or
help of their relatives. In other words, the «close circle» connections are sought,
because state assistance may prove too costly, while advantages could be
insignificant or indefinite. Only pensioners rely on the state, while the groups that
are prone to social contracting least of all have the strongest social connections to
resolve their problems (Table 7).
Table 7
Search for assistance in case of social difficulties
Source: BISS
3.4. Division of society by the degree of social contractization:
protest and «exit»
After addressing the search for social support, we turn to the patterns of behavior in
a more difficult case, namely, a conflict with the state. The group of «nonconformists»,
being the most socially active and mobile group, is more inclined to resort to active
 SC U NC NP Average for 
sample 
My employment depends on the state // myself 
 
–29.5 –39.6 –54.6 –25.2 –36.3 
My well-being depends on the state // myself  –44.9 –52.3 –58.8 26.4 –30.9 
My health depends on the state // myself 
 
–73.9 –83.6 –89.2 –52.6 –74.2 
My education depends on the state // myself  –28.0 –27.6 –27.9 5.7 –18.9 
 
 SC U NC NP 
Rely only on myself  62.6 59.5 55.0 54.7 
Rely on assistance of the state, social security programs  9.8 4.9 3.8 20.0 
Rely on friends 20.1 18.1 27.6 8.1 
Rely on relatives, parents 53.0 63.3 61.2 55.0 
Rely on the employer 2.4 3.4 2.1 0.4 




forms of protest (appeals to court, participation in rallies) and ready to pay the costs
of protest. But this sort of behavior is extreme rather than regular, that is, the most
preferable strategy for this group is «exit» from «contractual relations» with the state
or adaptation to the existing reality. The «social contract» and «nonworking
pensioners» groups are to a greater extent oriented towards allowed (and less efficient,
akthough «indicative») protest forms, such as appeals to local authorities or elected
representatives; however, these groups are mostly loyal to the authorities and often
declare their intentions without having any plans to act (Table 8).
Table 8
Behavior of main social groups in case of a conflict with the state
Source: Author’s own calculations
Let us now address a less «global» conflict, say, with the administration of an
organization or company (Table 9). The organizations designed to protect the
interests of workers, namely trade unions, seem of little interest to wage workers,
because they are regarded as local representatives of the authorities, therefore, to
have problems resolved, some superior authorities should be addressed instead.
The share of those who said «hard to say» is quite high, too, which indicates a wait%
and%see attitude. It is also noteworthy that in this situation the social contract
group is more oriented towards loyalty (acceptance of the rules of the game imposed
by the employer), whereas the group of nonconformists tends to use the «voice»
option to a slightly higher degree, with the «exit» strategy – voluntary termination
of service – clearly dominating here.
Table 9
Behavior in case of conflict at an enterprise or organization
Source: Author’s own calculations
 SC U NC NP 
Appeal to local authorities 14.4 13.5 13.8 22.4 
Appeal to court 13.6 12.7 12.0 9.3 
Appeal to mass media 101.0 99.0 133.0 65.0 
Take part in mass protests 1.1 3.1 7.9 1.2 
File a complaint 10.6 10.8 7.5 9.8 
Would try adapting 24.3 33.2 26.9 14.6 
Appeal to public organizations 5.5 8.0 10.9 5.1 
Vote in elections 7.7 12.2 12.7 10.2 
Appeal to elected representative 8.2 5.5 6.6 10.4 
Would not change anything 26.1 22.3 18 31.5 
Other 0.6 2.7 0.2 3.4 
No answer 8.1 10.5 10.2 10.6 
 
 SC U NC NP 
Would appeal to trade unions  12.9 9.7 5.7 2.1 
Would appeal to state authorities  14.5 17.2 17.8 5.0 
Would file a lawsuit against the employer  8.8 12.3 13.2 4.2 
Would quit my job  26.3 23.7 26.4 5.9 
Would agree to offered conditions  22.2 18.7 10.6 6.1 
Other 0.7 1.5 2.6 0.2 
Hard to say 14.5 16.8 23.6 76.4 
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The behavior of the renegade group largely depends on the scarcity of social
capital and weakness of horizontal and associative bonds. It is in this category that
nonconformists are even less «associative» than elsewhere, except for pensioners
(Table 10). With all that, nonconformists are more inclined to leave the country
(Table 11).
Table 10
Degree of involvement in public life, %
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
Table 11
Readiness for migration, %
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
3.5. Social contracting and readiness for reforms
It is not only redistributive paternalism but also to an active regulating role of the
state that gears the society into acceptance of the asymmetric social contract.
Liberal%reformative moods are only spread within the group of nonconformists,
but they are liable to some anti%market stereotypes, too, for instance, as far as state
ownership of largest enterprises is concerned. The most painful reforms, such as
restructuring, may only take place in Belarus on a «mandative» basis, just like in
many other post%communist countries, when the authorities isolate themselves from
public interests for the sake of pursuing collective public benefits. At the same
time, groups of social contract are ready to accept reforms if they result in
improvements in the position of a specific group, for instance, pensioners do not
mind reductions in state support for the public sector on condition that move results
in higher pensions.
A question arises: could reforms be «sold» to specific social groups on a targeted
basis? To answer, we have conducted a cluster analysis of a sample multitude based
on answers to questions (table 12).
The results of the analysis showed that whereas the share of net «marketers»
stands at 12%, and of paternalists, at 31%, 23% of the population is ready to support





Are not members 
of any 
organization 
Population at large 1.0 8.5 90.5 
Social contract group 0.3 12.2 87.0 
Undecided 1.1 12.5 86.5 
Nonconformists 1.9 6.5 90.5 
Nonworking pensioners 0.5 1.4 98.1 
 
 SC U NC NP Average for 
sample 
Yes 8.2 24.5 46.0 1.4 18.8 
No 85.1 61.8 43.8 96.7 73.1 




some restructuring initiatives and labor market reforms, and 32% may be called
undecided. The breakdown of «marketers», paternalists, «restructurers» and
undecided citizens according to social contractization groups is presented in
 SC U NC NP Population 
at large 
Most prices must be set and controlled by the 
state // Most prices must be set on the basis of 
demand and supply without state interference 
50.53 23.44 –15.87 72.14 35.03 
Sale and purchase of small enterprises must be 
authorized by the state; some small enterprises 
must remain state-controlled  // Small 
enterprises must be privately-owned and sold 
and purchased without limitations 
29.97 4.09 –31.75 44.05 13.77 
Most of the largest enterprises must remain 
state-controlled // Most of the largest 
enterprises must be privately-owned 
72.94 51.93 21.59 76.43 57.41 
Largest banks must be state-owned and perform 
state programs // Bank regulation must be based 
on international standards 
63.30 31.40 2.85 63.42 41.83 
Loss-making and uncompetitive enterprises 
must be subsidized by the state // Viability of 
enterprises must depend on their possibility to 
produce competitive products 
2.66 –27.31 –46.98 9.98 –14.14 
Export, import and foreign exchange trade must 
be controlled by the state // Minimum 
regulation of export, import and foreign 
exchange trade that meet international 
requirements 
52.25 16.74 –18.10 56.09 28.73 
State must offer special conditions to selected 
enterprises and support domestic producers // 
All enterprises, including foreign ones, must 
enjoy equal transparent rules of the game 
41.64 7.51 –30.38 45.35 18.12 
State must determine which shareholdings can 
be sold, and which cannot be sold  // Free sale 
and purchase of securities, regulations being 
based on international standards 
52.93 16.34 –23.81 53.10 26.84 
Power engineering, telecoms, utilities and road 
maintenance must be state-owned // Private 
business must be allowed into power 
engineering, telecoms, utilities and road 
maintenance 
65.69 52.26 6.67 73.10 51.90 
Employment and wages must be regulated by 
the state even at privately-owned enterprises // 
Employment and wages must be regulated by 
labor contracts between the worker, employer 
and trade union 
18.88 –12.02 –36.83 43.81 5.26 
Land must be state-owned, except for sale and 
purchase of small land plots, which must be 
restricted // With minor exceptions, land must 
be sold and purchased without restrictions, 
including by foreign citizens 
66.22 43.78 5.70 76.01 50.09 
 
Table 12
Attitude to key market reforms in the main social contract groups
Note. The figure is the difference between those who accept the former and the latter statements. If
72.1% of the respondents believe the land market should be controlled by the state and 24.5% claim
land should be sold with no restrictions, the score is 57.6%.
Source: author’s own calculations
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Table 13. It is clear from the table that a purely market program does not suit any
of the social groups, not even nonconformists, whereas paternalism commitments
prevail only in the group of nonworking pensioners. Therefore, a competent
pragmatic targeted management of reformative messages is possible for a majority
of the Belarusian population.
Table 13
Distribution of respondents in social contracting groups based
on attitude to reforms
Source: BISS, author’s own calculations
4. SOCIAL CONTRACT AND EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS
The social contract that we have studied belongs to the past. It had been formed
amid rather favorable external conditions, or to be more precise, when the Belarusian
economy was capable of financing the current account deficit using a variety of sources.
The external demand for Belarusian exports ensured sustainable growth and
guaranteed that the government could use the business cycle for political purposes,
by raising wages and incomes on the eve of crucial political events. Enterprises could
afford themselves to postpone modernization, because they were supported by the
state on the one hand and enjoyed a firm demand for their products on the other.
The crisis shook the status quo. First of all, the contractions in foreign demand
resulted in a balance of payments deficit, which threatened the macroeconomic
stability. The early 2009 one%off devaluation of the Belarusian ruble undermined
people’s trust in the national currency. The government used to show little
confidence in the ruble prior to that (by declaring U.S. dollar%denominated wage
targets and other parameters, like state%supported housing construction). The
government took real steps to respond to the lack of confidence, trying to dispel
the rumors of any further devaluation moves, while the National Bank denied
shortages of cash foreign currency (that people bought for saving).
It would not be premature to note that the change in external terms of trade
has led to a revision of the social contract. This is caused in the first place by the
quite sharp (up to 10% of GDP) reduction in budget expenditures the state has
been planning. Wage increases in the budget sector have been postponed, and loss
of working hours has been registered at factories, because of the curtailment of
production (the same happened in the late 1990s). There have been serious concerns
over the growth in official unemployment, as measures to increase unemployment
benefits were discussed – a move that targets the social contract group and some of
the undecided.
 «Marketers» «Restructurers» «Paternalists» «Undecided» 
Population at large 12.37 23.53 31.39 32.72 
SC 4.0 26.93 42.13 26.93 
U  12.47 27.96 19.35 40.22 
NC 33.23 10.76 9.49 46.52 




The pace and scale of the social contract revision depend on how serious the
consequences of the global downturn will prove for Belarus and how soon the
economic growth will resume not only domestically, but also (and more importantly)
in the key trade partners. The forecast has been quite pessimistic so far. Even if the
country manages to weather the crisis without serious changes in the economic
policy and keep the ruble stable, it will only be owing to growing foreign borrowings.
Debts will have to be repaid, which will require an increase in exports (which calls
for modernization of production and increase in labor productivity) and/or import
restrictions. Reforms in the economic policy are bound to happen sooner or later,
and they will certainly remake the social contracting pattern, which has remained
in effect in the period late 1990s through 2008–2009.
5. ON THE WAY TO A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:
POSSIBLE MESSAGES TO SOCIAL GROUPS
The analysis of expectations of various social groups and their vision of the
government’s role in the framework of the social contract indicates the possible
«tight spots», or discrepancies between possibilities and expectations.
These discrepancies may be used by civil society to elaborate messages to social
groups that civil society institutions and alternative political forces work with.
The analysis of existing relations between the state and society did not aim at
determining political preferences and disposition to this or that political party (left,
right or centrist). Finally, focus groups’ comments that Belarus has uniquely
beautiful nature that needs protecting do not mean all of them would support the
«green» party in a free and fair election.
We believe the analysis aimed at revealing the degree of the readiness of
Belarusian society for changes and identifying which changes are practicable. One
of the problems is how to rebuild trust in the state. The high degree of dollarization
of the national economy shows that people’s trust in the national currency as a
symbol of sovereignty is weak, because ideology cannot substitute for economic
realities. Having this in mind, the government was using the U.S. dollar to gauge
the increase in well%being.
On the other hand, the social contract always used to offer full employment.
Despite the existence of latent unemployment (which follows from questioning
households), there used to be concealed employment. The high share of «national
economy expenditures» shows that the government has made full employment one
of its priorities.
Economic growth amid full employment defuses social tension, especially now
that support for the unemployed is almost nonexistent.
During the study a few possible strategies for dialogue with Belarusian
society were crystallized – the latter may be offered reformative alternatives. At
the same time, evident recommendations for specific actions (originating from the
described nature of the sociopolitical stability in Belarus) suggest themselves.
1. Democratization of the social contract. The advocates of reforms should
refrain from overall criticism of the existing pattern of the relationship between
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the state and society. To start with, the «socially oriented» model clearly enjoys
public support in Belarus, and secondly, that model may survive, even if in a
downsized shape, systemic transformations in the country. The state will continue
spending huge sums of money on social programs, and will always be expected to
provide support for vital social sectors, such as education and healthcare.
Privatization of social services is a matter of distant future. However, in response
to the state’s taking all the credit for preservation of socioeconomic stability,
alternative actors can and should maintain that execution of obligations to social
groups is the state’s mere duty, not charity or concession. Alternative actors may
draw up a new social contract, which will stipulate that execution of the same or a
broader package of commitments to citizens does not depend on their loyalty. This
is true for such social and economic rights as the right to work. Another promising
strategy is the guarantee of public control of the state performing its obligations.
2. Monetization of the economic social contract. The study indicates
comparatively little interest of the population in special social support and assistance
programs targeting specific social groups, and low expectations. One can say
expectations are concentrated around the issues essential to entire society rather
than specific groups (for instance, healthcare and education). Otherwise, people
are ready to take the cash and expect higher wages (with guaranteed employment)
and pensions more than anything else. Therefore, it would be a farsighted strategy
for alternative forces to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the stability of the
national currency (listing them among key priorities in the future social contract)
as the principal items of the social contract that is yet to come.
3. Differentiation of group interests and understanding of the nature of social
groups not only in the context of their sectoral affiliation, but also based on
their attitude to the social contract. A considerable part of citizens that tend
towards state paternalism would be ready to accept reformative messages if reforms
serve their personal interests (say, facilitate an increase in incomes within this or
that social group). This way, certain political and information management solutions
may be applied to create ad hoc coalitions for most reformative messages.
Changes in the external environment result in the state disclaiming its previous
liabilities. Under the circumstances, budget support must be rationalized so as to
mitigate the negative effects for supporters of the social contract and create new
possibilities for «nonconformists» and «undecided ones». The latter group includes
those who will join the cluster of supporters and those who will seek exit by joining
the third group. The potential of the private sector in terms of creation of jobs
remains undeveloped. In conditions of full employment and vast budget support
for the enterprises that generate the lion’s share of GDP it would be odd to allow
workers to leave for the private sector. When budget support is not feasible, new
possibilities should open up for the private sector, even if it may lead to an increase
in official unemployment. Thus far, the government has acknowledged the existence
of latent unemployment, in view of the fact that costs of changes are still very high
compared to losses in social control. This happens because the effects of the crisis
are not yet tangible; furthermore, Belarus is still in talks over the amount of loans
the Russian Federation will provide. However, resources are not limitless, despite
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appeals to the IMF and the one%off ruble devaluation. Also, the «election year» is
quite close, and the political business cycle mechanism will be used yet again.
The impact on the social groups that are relatively immobile and possess skills
and professions that can hardly be adapted to a new environment raises major
concerns. The groups that include both supporters of the social contract and undecided
citizens require a clear indication that at least some of the difficulties they are faced
with will be overcome. An increase in unemployment benefits could become the first
step to appease the group of paternalists and some of those who need time to adapt
to new conditions. Furthermore, stepwise restructuring of enterprises, especially
larger ones, would facilitate clear budget expenditure planning, so that increases
in employment benefits would not result in additional burden on the state budget.
4. Awareness of the value of the nature of the new, forthcoming social
contract. The most advanced social groups prioritize not only stable incomes, but
also the achievement of higher living standards, which presupposes new
opportunities in education, career, etc. It is this social contract that implies
commitments as to political and social reforms aimed at a greater openness of
Belarus.
Those who do not accept the social contract terms find it essential to have
additional employment possibilities. By its economic development, Belarus belongs
to the countries with average incomes (its peers are some Latin American countries,
such as Uruguay and Costa Rica, and Iran, etc.). However, Belarus is well ahead of
them by the level of education, skills and technologies. Not all social groups consider
paternalism to be their value. It looked more like an instrument of interaction with
society during the period of sustainable economic growth. Representatives of civil
society and political forces should use new expectations and inability of the official
ideology to fill the vacuum caused by changes in the socioeconomic situation as a
lever to create new possibilities for work with their groups.
5. Support for transformation «here and now». The study shows that
alternative development options, just as alternative actors themselves, have became
hostages to the «frozen» structure of social and economic relations in Belarus. This
structural dependence of man on the state leaves no chance for citizens but to accept
the rules of the game dictated by the state. Loyalty vanishes where citizens exist
autonomously, therefore any reforms, even middle%of%the%road and unprofessional,
and any privatization, including nomenclatura privatization, that lead to a higher
degree of openness of the Belarusian economy and Belarusian society, will inevitably
lead to a broader social platform of the supporters for and actors of changes, even if
that openness and those reforms are paid by concessions of the authoritarian regime.
6. Facilitation of selfMorganization of potential «actors of changes».
Alternative civil and political actors must pay heed to the extremely low level of
socialization of potential «actors of changes». In the context of social atomization
and breaking of horizontal social bonds that is even more severe than in the case
with social contract groups, «nonconformists/renegades» are more than other
groups inclined towards «exit» – both internal and external migration.
Encouragement of self%organization and involvement of this group in the
sociopolitical life are challenging tasks. Success depends on the mitigation of the
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political climate in the country and ability of alternative forces to formulate
attractive proposals, which during the initial phase will unlikely to be of political
nature. Potential actors of changes are so far more interested in public rather than
political activities and are more willing to support affinity groups than political
parties. It is unsophisticated activities with rather down%to%earth purposes and
objectives that may awaken potential actors of changes. This group must see a





IDENTIFICATION AND SPECIFICATION OF
«SOCIAL CONTRACTS» IN MODERN BELARUS
Breakdown of answers to interview questions
BLOCK I. SOCIAL SITUATION
Table 1
How often do you think about how the state influences
your life and the life of your family?
  Number of respondents % 
Often 525 33.3 
Sometimes 778 49.3 
Never 274 17.4 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 2

















Provide possibility to earn  61.6 25.5 5.7 5.0 2.2 
Provide privileges, allowances 56.5 30.8 8.5 1.9 2.3 
Provide pensions 66.0 22.9 5.5 2.9 2.6 
Pay education allowances 42.7 28.7 12.3 10.8 5.5 
Provide free secondary education 51.6 27.0 9.7 8.5 3.1 
Provide free higher education 42.7 32.5 12.6 8.2 4.0 
Provide high-quality medical services 77.2 20.3 1.4 0.5 0.6 
Protect from crime 69.3 26.8 2.3 0.4 1.2 
Provide 100% guarantee of bank deposits 61.2 24.5 6.6 4.9 2.8 
Guarantee employment 56.3 27.0 7.9 5.5 3.2 
Provide free medical services 64.8 28.4 4.4 0.7 1.6 
Provide political stability 56.3 31.7 5.6 2.4 4.0 
Provide rule of law, so that I could have my problems settled in 
court 
63.3 30.4 2.9 0.7 2.7 
Ensure that employers meet their obligations to employees 56.5 28.9 6.3 4.3 3.9 
Provide possibilities for entrepreneurship 40.4 30.4 14.6 8.2 6.4 




In your opinion, what does the state do












Provides possibility to earn  5.9 42.0 35.7 10.9 5.6 
Provides privileges 7.7 36.7 38.3 11.8 5.5 
Provides decent pensions 9.7 31.2 38.7 13.7 6.7 
Pays education allowances 7.9 44.9 21.1 6.7 19.4 
Provides free secondary education 16.7 53.9 15.8 3.9 9.7 
Provides free higher education 13.3 52.1 18.0 4.3 12.2 
Provides high-quality medical services 8.5 37.6 40.9 10.4 2.6 
Protects from crime 11.3 56.8 23.8 4.3 3.8 
Provides 100% guarantee of bank deposits 8.7 36.5 27.3 10.5 17.0 
Guarantees employment 4.4 34.8 42.4 11.7 6.7 
Provides political stability 17.0 56.8 15.4 2.5 8.4 
Provides free medical services 13.4 52.9 27.1 4.7 1.9 
Provides rule of law, independent judicial system 8.3 46.7 27.7 4.8 12.5 
Ensures  that employers meet their obligations to 
employees 
6.5 39.9 33.4 7.1 13.0 
Provides possibilities for entrepreneurship 5.1 39.6 26.2 8.1 21.0 
Assist in housing acquisition, extends preferential 
loans 
8.7 50.4 21.7 5.2 14.1 
 
Table 4
What does the following depend on more –












Your well-being 10.8 23.3 37.1 28.0 0.8 
Your health  3.0 9.3 50.6 35.8 1.4 
Your education and your children’s 
education 
7.3 30.3 35.6 20.8 6.0 
Your employment  6.6 22.7 36.2 29.4 5.1 
 
Table 5












It is better to have lower wages, but have a 
guaranteed job 
16.3 41.8 26.5 9.6 5.8 
It is better to have to have medium-quality health 
services, but free of charge 
13.8 38.6 32.2 11.3 4.0 
It is better to assign jobs to university graduates in 
order not to leave them unemployed  
15.8 36.7 24.9 10.1 12.4 
It is better to work for a state-owned enterprise than 
for a private firm 
23.3 34.3 20.7 8.7 13.0 
It is better to have Belarusian enterprises gain 
moderate profits than sell them to foreigners 





Does the state take good care of the following
groups of population?
 Good Rather good Rather bad Bad NA/ Undecided 
Unemployed  3.3 23.9 36.1 17.3 19.1 
Pensioners 10.9 39.8 34.3 11.0 4.0 
Large families 8.5 47.6 21.1 5.7 17.1 
Children 9.4 50.5 17.8 4.1 18.1 
Young specialists 5.9 34.3 31.3 9.6 18.9 
Young families 4.9 32.4 37.2 10.7 14.9 
Students and post-graduate students 3.8 38.6 25.9 8.2 23.5 
Servicemen 35.7 38.3 8.4 1.5 16.1 
Police, special services, SWAT (OMON) 50.8 34.7 4.0 0.9 9.5 
Workers 5.0 30.6 43.3 12.9 8.3 
Rural dwellers 4.1 28.2 41.1 19.7 7.0 
Professors, teachers, medics 6.1 36.2 35.3 14.3 8.1 
Civil servants (officials) 55.8 32.0 3.6 0.5 8.1 
Athletes 35.3 40.7 5.8 1.0 17.2 
 
 Number of respondents % 
Social support has increased 104 6.6 
Social support has decreased 344 21.8 
Nothing has changed 1,031 65.4 
No answer/Undecided 98 6.2 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 7
How had social support for such people as you changed
over the past year or two?
Table 8
How had it affected your life?
 Number of respondents % 
To a great extent 103 6.6 
To some extent 269 17.1 
Has had almost no influence 78 5.0 
No answer/Undecided 1,126 71.4 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 9
What social support programs for such people as you
are you aware of? (name them).
Do you receive support under any of these programs?
Social support programs  I am aware of, % I receive support under 
this program, % 
Targeted support for lower-income and large families 65.5 2.0 
Concessional housing loans 77.8 3.7 
Social benefits for the citizens that were affected by the 
Chernobyl accident 
70.2 1.3 
Preferential medication prices 77.1 11.7 
Other 7.9 2.8 
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Table 10
Imagine you are faced with serious financial problems.
Who do you rely on in such a situation? (Two answers are possible)
 Number of respondents % 
Only on myself 916 58.1 
On state assistance, social support program 98 9.9 
On friends 194 17.8 
On relatives, parents 354 58.2 
On the employer 4 3.3 
No answer/Undecided 11 0.7 
 
Table 11
If you are to some extent dissatisfied with what the state is doing for you, how
could you change the situation? (three answers are possible)
 Number of respondents % 
Appeal to local authorities with a proposal or demand 254 16.1 
Appeal to court 137 11.8 
Appeal to mass media 90 9.7 
Take part in mass protests 32 3.1 
File a complaint 72 9.8 
Would try adapting, look for ways out using personal contacts 290 24.9 
Appeal to public organizations 36 7.2 
Vote in elections 62 10.7 
Appeal to elected representative 26 7.7 
Would not change anything 391 24.8 
No answer/Undecided 156 9.9 
 
Table 12
What is your attitude to rallies, protest actions?
 Number of respondents % 
Absolutely positive 79 5.0 
Rather positive 399 25.3 
Rather negative 478 30.3 
Absolutely negative 259 16.4 
No answer/Undecided 362 23.0 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
 Number of respondents % 
Participation in rallies should be punishable: criminal and 
administrative measures must be applied 
100 6.4 
As a citizen, you must obey the rules, not rebel against them 
by having rallies and protests 
382 24.2 
Rallies and protest actions are normal: people must be given a 
chance to speak out 
455 28.8 
Rallies and protest actions are acceptable, as they express 
people’s will 
331 21.0 
Other 31 2.0 
No answer/Undecided 278 17.6 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 13




What is your attitude to protesters?
 Number of respondents % 
Absolutely positive 80 5.1 
Rather positive 473 30.0 
Rather negative 450 28.6 
Absolutely negative 173 11.0 
No answer/Undecided 401 25.4 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
 Number of respondents % 
I believe protesters get paid for staging rallies  364 23.1 
I believe demonstrators act foolishly, as they will not reap 
anything except for punishment 
405 25.7 
I believe demonstrators are brave people who adhere to their 
principles, and are ready to assert their interests, despite 
reprisal 
479 30.4 
Other 23 1.5 
No answer/Undecided 305 19.4 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 15
Which of the following do you agree with?
Table 16
When you last thought «It is great I live in Belarus!»,
what was it connected with?, %
 % 
Developed manufacturing sector 
High administrative competence 
Strong state 
High-quality medical services 
High-quality secondary education 
High-quality higher education 
Kind sympathetic people 
High living standards  
Financial stability 
Political stability 
Security, no crime 







Good environmental situation  























I have never thought so 23.2 
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Table 17
In your opinion, where do such people as
you live better – in Belarus or abroad?
 Number of respondents % 
Rather in Belarus  737 46.7 
No difference 307 19.5 
Rather abroad 330 20.9 
No answer/Undecided 204 12.9 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 18
Would you like to leave Belarus?
 Number of respondents % 
Rather yes 296 18.8 
Rather no 1,153 73.1 
No answer/Undecided 128 8.1 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Table 19
If you would like to leave Belarus, what are the reasons?
(a few answers are possible)
  Number of respondents % 
This would improve my material status 243 15.4 
This would give me a chance to have good education 37 2.4 
This would give me a possibility to have high-quality 
treatment, medical services 
55 3.5 
I would have more social guarantees, better social protection 105 6.7 
This would give me a possibility to improve my skills, 
advance in career  
66 4.2 
Other  30 1.9 
No answer/Undecided 120 7.6 
 
Table 20
If you have no wish to leave Belarus, what are the main reasons for this?
(a few answers are possible)
  Number of respondents % 
Everything suits me in my country  339 21.5 
No money to leave 138 8.7 
I would not be able to find a job in another country 73 4,6 
My relatives – family, children – and close friends live in this 
country, and I do not want to leave them  
695 44.1 
Uncertainty scares me 264 16.7 
I am proud of my country, this is why I live here 185 11.7 
Other 38 2.4 




BLOCK II. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS
Table 21
What is your attitude to the fact that most Belarusian employers have fixed term
labor contracts with their employees?
 Number of respondents % 
Positive  143 9.1 
Rather positive 248 15.7 
Neutral 438 27.8 
Rather negative 291 18.5 
Negative 268 17.0 
No answer/Undecided 189 12.0 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 22
You have said your attitude to fixedMterm labor contracts
(for 12–36 months) is negative. Why?
 Number of respondents % 
It affects social guarantees for workers 92 5.8 
It strips workers of their rights in their relations with the 
employer  
337 21.3 
It requires more efforts from the worker to stay in current job  41 2.6 
It makes my life less predictable  74 4.7 
No answer/Undecided 15 0.9 
 
Table 23
There is a catchphrase «Workers pretend they work, and employers pretend they
pay». To what extent do you think this is true, %
 True  Rather true Rather not true Not true 
NA/ 
Undecided 
(a) In the organization where you work 5.3 15.4 31.9 16.7 30.8 
(b) In the country as a whole 6.4 23.2 30.9 11.2 28.3 
 
Table 24
Which of the two would you prefer?
 Number of respondents % 
To get moderate, but stable wages  753 47.8 
To get more, but take risks by assuming more responsibility 635 40.3 
No answer/Undecided 187 11.9 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 25
What is the type of ownership of the organization/enterprise
that you work for now?
 Number of respondents % 
Nongovernmental (private) 228 14.5 
State 676 42.9 
I work for an enterprise/organization, but I am not aware of 
the property type  
29 1.8 
I do not work  644 40.9 
Total  1,577 100.0 
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ATTENTION! QUESTIONS 26–31 WERE FOR WORKERS ONLY!
Table 26
If you work for a private (nongovernmental) organization, would you like to work
for a stateMowned enterprise/organization?
 Number of respondents % of employees of private 
organizations  
Yes 50 22.0 
No 144 63.2 
No answer/Undecided 34 14.8 
Total  228 100.0 
 
Table 27
If you work for a stateMowned enterprise/organization, would you like to work in
the private sector?
 Number of respondents % of employees of state-
run organizations 
Yes 127 18.0 
No 433 61.5 
No answer/Undecided 144 20.5 
Total  804 100.0 
 
Table 28
In which sector do you work (in your primary employment)?
 Number of respondents % of working respondents 
Manufacturing 180 19.3 
Service sector (retail, public catering, maintenance, consumer 
services)  
202 21.7 
Transport and communications 101 10.8 
Agriculture 97 10.4 
Construction 109 11.7 
Education, healthcare, welfare 151 16.2 
Housing maintenance and utilities 28 3.0 
Science, art, sport 13 1.4 
State administration 21 2.3 
Other 21 2.3 
No answer/Undecided 8 0.9 
Total  931 100.0 
 
Table 29
What suits you in your current job and what doesn’t?
(% of working respondents)






1. Wage/salary level 5.9 30.7 40.9 21.1 1.4 
2. Possibilities for career advancement 6.2 39.6 33.9 14.3 6.0 
3. Possibilities for advanced training 9.6 48.6 26.6 10.0 5.3 
4. Working hours 22.3 56.4 14.6 4.8 2.1 
5. Social package (social guarantees) 13.5 44.2 24.0 10.6 7.7 
6. Relationships in the organization 28.6 59.8 7.4 2.1 2.2 
7. Prospects of increase in wages/salaries 8.7 27.3 40.1 16.7 7.1 

















1. I have an interesting job 17.9 47.0 25.2 5.6 4.2 
2. With my qualification/education I will easily find 
a good job in Belarus 
10.1 37.2 37.0 9.4 6.2 
3. With my qualification/education I will easily find 
a good job abroad 
6.3 23.5 33.8 17.2 19.2 
4. My employer would find it very hard to replace 
such a qualified worker as I am 
7.6 25.4 41.5 15.2 10.3 
5. To a large extent I work because no one else 
wants to do my job 
4.5 15.7 46.8 27.6 5.4 
6. If it were not for my connections, my employer 
would have fired me long ago 
1.5 6.7 37.1 49.4 5.3 
7. If I were offered another job with a good chance 
of getting an apartment, I would change my current 
job eagerly  
25.1 28.4 23.8 12.3 10.3 
8. I work at my current job mostly to gain 
experience and then find something new  
4.9 19.8 43.2 25.6 6.6 
 
Table 31
How would you act (or have you acted) in case of a disagreement with the
employer? (% of working respondents)
 % 
Would appeal to trade unions  
Would appeal to state authorities that protect workers’ rights 
Would appeal to the tax inspection (or a similar agency) so that my organization is inspected 
Would file a lawsuit against the employer  
Would quit my job  







Other  1.3 
No answer/Undecided 35.8 
 
ATTENTION! QUESTION 32 WAS FOR ALL RESPONDENTS!
Table 32
What do you do for a living?
 Number of respondents % 
Owner (co-owner) of an organization, business (employer)  12 0.8 
Top executive (senior manager), director (except in schools)   7 0.5 
Middle manager, deputy director (except in schools) 55 3.5 
Qualified specialist, manager 246 15.6 
Worker, vendor, etc. 392 24.9 
Civil servant 28 1.8 
Serviceman, law-enforcer, etc. 13 0.8 
Budget-paid employee (teacher, medic, librarian, maintenance 
and utilities worker, etc.) 
131 8.3 
Individual entrepreneur, farmer 17 1.1 
Household worker making products for sale  5 0.3 
Pensioner 420 26.7 
Student 118 7.5 
Homemaker 44 2.8 
Unemployed 69 4.4 
Other 18 1.2 
Total  1,577 100.0 
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ATTENTION! QUESTIONS 33M35 WERE FOR PENSIONERS ONLY!
Table 33













Small pensions 12.0 17.5 37.9 31.7 0.9 
Absence of pension funds and other companies, 
where additional pension contributions could be 
made 
9.9 20.9 22.2 14.3 32.6 
Almost equal pensions are paid to all, irrespective 
of seniority 5.0 22.6 37.7 25.4 9.3 
Untimely payments 68.0 22.5 5.6 1.2 2.7 
 
 Number of respondents % of pensioners 
I guess yes 167 39.6 
I guess no 247 58.7 
No answer/Undecided 7 1.7 
Total  420 100.0 
 
Table 34
Do you think your pension is sufficient to live on?
Table 35
If you believe your pension is not sufficient, what is the reason behind low pensions
in Belarus? (three answers are possible)
 Number of respondents % of pensioners 
State inefficiently distributes money, hence low pensions 114 46.1 
General economic situation in the country does not allow paying 
more 
89 36.3 
Collapse of the pension system in the 1990s 10 4.2 
People cannot earn more and cannot contribute to the pension 
fund more 
13 5.2 
Money in the pension fund does not work; no interests are 
accrued 
14 5.8 
There are no insurance companies and pension funds, where one 
could make additional savings 
0 0.2 
People do not think about pensions, do not save 3 1.3 
No answer 2 1.0 
Total  247 100.0 
 
ATTENTION! QUESTIONS 33M35 WERE FOR STUDENTS ONLY!
Table 36
How can you assess your prospects of getting a job in Belarus?
 Number of respondents % of students 
I have got good prospects of getting a job according to my 
training and get a decent salary/wages 
15 12.5 
My chances are quite good 55 46.3 
My chances are quite bad 40 33.7 
I have almost no chance of getting a job according to my 
training and get a decent salary/wages 
7 5.9 
No answer/Undecided 2 1.6 





Who do you think needs mandatory job assignments upon graduation
(from university, technical college)?
 Number of respondents % of students 
The state more than anyone else 42 35.4 
Graduates (students) themselves 17 14.0 
The state and graduates (students) equally 45 38.0 
Neither the state nor graduates (students)  11 9.1 
No answer/Undecided 4 3.6 
Total  120 100.0 
 
Table 38
Which of the following would you like to achieve (have) in 10 years’ time?
(% of students)
 Definitely Possibly Unlikely I do not aspire 
to this 
1. Job according to training 51.6 39.3 6.1 3.0 
2. Advancement, climbing the career ladder 69.5 21.8 4.8 3.9 
3. High salary/wage 84.1 13.0 1.4 1.5 
4. Own business 24.1 37.8 27.2 11.0 
5. Own house/apartment  76.0 19.0 5.0 – 
6. Country/summer house 35.4 27.4 22.9 14.3 
7. Own car 66.1 25.5 3.1 5.2 
8. Executive position  26.5 41.3 22.8 9.4 
9. Complete self-fulfillment 55.3 37.2 6.7 0.8 
10. Active public and political position (in the 
parliament, local authorities, parties, public 
organizations, etc.)  
6.0 14.6 40.4 39.0 
11. Fame and high status of a professional in certain 
area  
38.1 41.1 11.7 9.1 
12. Fame and high authority as a public figure or 
politician 
4.8 7.7 45.0 42.5 
13. Family, children 73.1 23.9 0.9 – 
14. To live in a large city 42.3 41.9 7.8 8.0 
15. To live in the countryside or small town  3.5 9.1 38.0 49.3 
16. Live abroad 11.0 37.8 24.1 27.1 
 
Table 39
In your opinion, why do students become members of the Belarusian Republican
Youth Union? (% of students) (a few answers are possible)
 Number of respondents % of students 
I do not know such an organization 2 2.0 
To take part in concerts, public events 12 10.0 
To communicate , make friends 18 15.0 
Out of patriotism 11 9.0 
Because BRYU members are promised additional privileges, 
state support 
48 37.0 
Because they make everyone join the BRYU 44 42.0 
Other  2 2.0 
No answer/Undecided 12 10.0 
 
ATTENTION! QUESTIONS 40–43 WERE FOR THE UNEMPLOYED AND
NONWORKERS ONLY!
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Table 40
Why are you out of job now?
 Number of respondents % of jobless persons and 
nonworkers 
No jobs for my qualification, training   14 12.4 
No job that I would like 8 7.1 
No wish to work 5 4.4 
Low wages 18 16.3 
For health reasons 5 4.1 
For family reasons 43 38.0 
Other 8 7.4 
No answer/Undecided 12 10.3 
Total  113 100.0 
 
Table 41
Have you been looking for job/trying to start you own business in the past month?
 Number of respondents % of jobless persons and 
nonworkers 
Yes 47 41.1 
No 66 58.2 
No answer/Undecided 1 0.7 
Total  113 100.0 
 
Table 42
If you found a job, would you be able to start working in the next two weeks?
(% of those who answered question 41 in the affirmative)
 Number of respondents % of those seeking jobs 
Yes 44 95.4 
No 1 2.6 
No answer/Undecided 1 2.0 
Total  47 100.0 
 
Table 43
Are you registered in your local job center as an unemployed person?
 Number of respondents % of jobless persons and 
nonworkers 
Yes 14 12.0 
No 99 87.3 
No answer/Undecided 1 0.7 
Total  113 100.0 
 
ATTENTION! THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WERE FOR ALL
RESPONDENTS!
Table 44
Is there a community activist – who files complaints, collects signatures,
communicates with the authorities – in your apartment house?
 Number of respondents %  
Yes, and this is me 21 1.3 
Yes, and I know him/her 271 17.2 
There is someone, but I do not know him/her 222 14.1 
No, I am not aware of this person 1,063 67.4 





Are you a member of any public organization or political party?
 Number of respondents %  
Yes, I am a member of a political party 15 1.0 
Yes, I am a member of a public organization 134 8.5 
No 1,428 90.5 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 46
Have you ever helped a complete stranger, or taken part in any charity actions?
 Number of respondents %  
Yes 562 35.6 
No 939 59.6 
No answer/Undecided 76 4.8 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 47
How often do you communicate with your friends, people you know
(not family members or colleagues)?
 Number of respondents %  
A few times a week and more frequently 778 49.3 
Once a week 320 20.3 
A few times a month 275 17.4 
Once a month and less frequently 132 8.3 
Almost never 73 4.6 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
BLOCK III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
Table 48
Which of the following are the most serious problems for Belarus?
(Choose not more than five answers)
 % 
Consumer price inflation 81.8 
Alcoholism 47.9 
Low income level 32.4 
Instability of the ruble 17.9 
High housing prices 29.0 
High taxes 11.1 
High utility fees 32.9 
Poverty of a considerable part of population 28.5 
Corruption, bribery 15.7 
Unemployment 25.5 
Harassment of entrepreneurs 7.6 
Rising oil and natural gas prices 12.6 
Absence of democracy and freedom of speech 8.0 
Foreign debt growth 9.0 
Lack of culture; aggressive people 9.7 
Low quality of medical services 14.0 
State interference in business 4.4 
Excessive red tape 9.1 
Environment contamination 6.6 
Bad relations with other countries/international community 4.5 
High crime rate 5.7 
Population loss 8.5 
Poor quality of education 1.8 
Infringement of national culture, language 2.2 
These problems are not relevant in Belarus  0.3 
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Table 49
How would you assess your material wellMbeing?
 Number of respondents %  
High 2 0.1 
Above average 59 3.7 
Average 930 58.9 
Below average 407 25.8 
Low 165 10.5 
No answer/Undecided 14 0.9 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 50
How has your material wellMbeing
changed in the past year?
 Number of respondents %  
Decreased dramatically 173 11.0 
Decreased slightly 487 30.9 
Has not changed 763 48.4 
Increased slightly 115 7.3 
Increased seriously 6 0.4 
No answer/Undecided 33 2.1 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Table 51
If your material wellMbeing has improved in the past year,
what are the main reasons for this?
 Number of respondents % of those whose 
material well-being has 
improved 
My employer’s action 35 29.3 
Policy of the state 9 7.8 
My own actions 59 48.5 
Changes in the global economy 2 1.6 
Change in age, in the family 10 8.0 
No answer/Undecided 6 4.9 
Total  121 100.0 
 
Table 52
How do you think your material wellMbeing
will change in the next 12 months?
 Number of respondents %  
Decrease dramatically 179 11.3 
Decrease slightly 382 24.1 
Will not change 528 33.5 
Increase slightly 141 9.0 
Increase significantly 10 0.6 
No answer/Undecided 340 21.5 





If you believe your material wealth will decrease in the next 12 months,
what will be the main reasons for this?
 Number of respondents % of those who believe 
their material wealth will 
decrease 
My employer’s action 34 6.1 
Policy of the state 168 29.9 
My own actions 11 1.9 
Changes in the global economy 292 52.0 
Change in age, in the family 20 3.5 
No answer/Undecided 38 6.7 
Total  561 100.0 
 
Table 54










1. Army 11.6 47.5 15.8 25.2 
2. Police, security ministries 8.1 37.1 32.2 22.6 
3. Pensions, education allowances, benefits 68.3 11.2 0.8 19.7 
4. Healthcare  69.8 10.3 0.7 19.2 
5. Education, science 53.8 25.0 1.2 20.0 
6. Housing maintenance and utilities 34.4 35.9 7.3 22.3 
7. Public authorities 3.3 23.4 52.1 21.2 
8. Development and introduction of high 
technologies 
40.3 30.6 4.8 24.3 
9. Environmental protection 40.4 35.2 2.3 22.2 
10. Agriculture 47.5 28.5 2.7 21.4 
11. Construction of sports facilities 12.4 32.9 32.6 22.2 
12. Tourism 20.9 39.6 14.9 24.6 
13. Construction of roads, infrastructure 44.3 29.0 4.9 21.8 
14. Industry  44.7 29.2 3.1 22.9 
 
Table 55
Please, indicate to which extend you agree with the following statements
1 Sale and purchase of small enterprises must be 
authorized by the state; some small enterprises must 
remain state-controlled   
Small enterprises must be privately-owned 
and sold and purchased without limitations  
 Number of respondents %  
Fully agree with the former 346 22.0 
Rather agree with the former 411 26.1 
Disagree with both 281 17.8 
Rather agree with the latter 355 22.5 
Fully agree with the latter 184 11.7 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
2 Most prices must be set and controlled by the state  Most prices must be set on the basis of demand and supply without state interference  
 
 Number of respondents %  
Fully agree with the former 449 28.5 
Rather agree with the former 471 29.9 
Disagree with both 288 18.3 
Rather agree with the latter 250 15.8 
Fully agree with the latter 119 7.5 
Total  1,577 100.0 
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3 Most of the largest enterprises must remain state-
controlled  
Most of the largest enterprises must be 
privately-owned 
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 592 37.5 
Rather agree with the former 513 32.5 
Disagree with both 274 17.3 
Rather agree with the latter 141 8.9 
Fully agree with the latter 58 3.7 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
4 Largest banks must be state-owned and perform state programs  
Bank regulations must be based on 
international standards  
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 551 34.9 
Rather agree with the former 434 27.5 
Disagree with both 267 16.9 
Rather agree with the latter 227 14.4 
Fully agree with the latter 99 6.3 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
5 Loss-making and uncompetitive enterprises must be 
subsidized by the state  
Viability of enterprises must depend on their 
possibility to produce competitive products  
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 214 13.6 
Rather agree with the former 278 17.6 
Disagree with both 370 23.5 
Rather agree with the latter 432 27.4 
Fully agree with the latter 282 17.9 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
6 Export, import and foreign exchange trade must be 
controlled by the state  
Minimum regulation of export, import and 
foreign exchange trade that meet international 
requirements  
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 398 25.3 
Rather agree with the former 430 27.3 
Disagree with both 374 23.7 
Rather agree with the latter 262 16.6 
Fully agree with the latter 113 7.1 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
7 State must offer special conditions to selected 
enterprises and support domestic producers  
All enterprises, including foreign ones, must 
enjoy equal transparent rules of the game  
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 320 20.3 
Rather agree with the former 433 27.4 
Disagree with both 356 22.6 
Rather agree with the latter 303 19.2 
Fully agree with the latter 165 10.4 




8 State must determine which shareholdings can be sold, 
and which cannot be sold   
Free sale and purchase of securities, 
regulations being based on international 
standards  
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 350 22.2 
Rather agree with the former 470 29.8 
Disagree with both 361 22.9 
Rather agree with the latter 266 16.9 
Fully agree with the latter 131 8.3 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
9 Power engineering, telecoms, utilities and road 
maintenance must be state-owned  
Private business must be allowed into power 
engineering, telecoms, utilities and road 
maintenance 
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 595 37.7 
Rather agree with the former 485 30.7 
Disagree with both 238 15.1 
Rather agree with the latter 172 10.9 
Fully agree with the latter 87 5.5 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
10 Employment and wages must be regulated by the state 
even at privately-owned enterprises  
Employment and wages must be regulated by 
labor contracts between the worker, employer 
and the trade union  
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 341 21.6 
Rather agree with the former 360 22.8 
Disagree with both 260 16.5 
Rather agree with the latter 405 25.7 
Fully agree with the latter 210 13.3 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
11 Land must be state-owned, except for sale and purchase of small land plots, which must be restricted  
With minor exceptions, land must be sold and 
purchased without restrictions, including by 
foreign citizens  
 
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree with the former 553 35.1 
Rather agree with the former 466 29.6 
Disagree with both 330 20.9 
Rather agree with the latter 146 9.3 
Fully agree with the latter 82 5.2 
Total  1,577 100.0 
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Table 56
Please, compare the situation in the countries below and Belarus:
1. Living standards: Russia
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  329 20.9 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  552 35.0 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 486 30.8 
No answer/Undecided 210 13.3 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Living standards: Ukraine
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  887 56.2 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  379 24.0 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 107 6.8 
No answer/Undecided 204 12.9 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Living standards: Lithuania
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  186 11.8 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  358 22.7 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 497 31.5 
No answer/Undecided 535 33.9 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Living standards: Poland
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  60 3.8 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  252 16.0 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 802 50.8 
No answer/Undecided 463 29.4 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Living standards: Germany
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  21 1.4 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  73 4.6 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 1,123 71.2 
No answer/Undecided 360 22.8 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Living standards: Sweden
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  21 1.3 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  62 3.9 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 1,058 67.1 
No answer/Undecided 436 27.6 




Living standards: the United States
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  45 2.8 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  85 5.4 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 1,009 64.0 
No answer/Undecided 438 27.8 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
2. Stability: Russia
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  357 22.6 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  701 44.5 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 260 16.5 
No answer/Undecided 259 16.4 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Stability: Ukraine
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  969 61.4 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  318 20.1 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 49 3.1 
No answer/Undecided 242 15.3 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Stability: Lithuania
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  269 17.1 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  444 28.2 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 290 18.4 
No answer/Undecided 573 36.4 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Stability: Poland
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  98 6.2 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  373 23.7 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 580 36.8 
No answer/Undecided 525 33.3 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Stability: Germany
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  26 1.6 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  185 11.8 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 928 58.9 
No answer/Undecided 438 27.7 
Total 1,577 100.0 
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Stability: Sweden
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  19 1.2 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  156 9.9 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 908 57.6 
No answer/Undecided 494 31.3 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Stability: the United States
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  128 8.1 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  205 13.0 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 704 44.6 
No answer/Undecided 540 34.2 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
3. Possibility to make money: Russia
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  121 7.7 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  352 22.3 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 919 58.2 
No answer/Undecided 185 11.8 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Possibility to make money: Ukraine
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  717 45.4 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  358 22.7 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 216 13.7 
No answer/Undecided 287 18.2 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Possibility to make money: Lithuania
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  170 10.8 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  373 23.6 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 477 30.2 
No answer/Undecided 558 35.4 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Possibility to make money: Poland
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  49 3.1 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  263 16.7 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 797 50.5 
No answer/Undecided 468 29.7 




Possibility to make money: Germany
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  16 1.0 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  101 6.4 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 1,085 68.8 
No answer/Undecided 376 23.8 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Possibility to make money: Sweden
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  14 0.9 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  96 6.1 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 989 62.7 
No answer/Undecided 479 30.3 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Possibility to make money: the United States
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  29 1.9 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  100 6.3 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 994 63.0 
No answer/Undecided 454 28.8 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
4. Corruption: Russia
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  550 34.9 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  501 31.8 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 131 8.3 
No answer/Undecided 395 25.1 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Corruption: Ukraine
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  735 46.6 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  344 21.8 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 84 5.3 
No answer/Undecided 415 26.3 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Corruption: Lithuania
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  183 11.6 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  451 28.6 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 167 10.6 
No answer/Undecided 776 49.2 
Total 1,577 100.0 
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Corruption: Poland
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  100 6.4 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  392 24.9 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 307 19.4 
No answer/Undecided 778 49.3 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Corruption: Germany
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  59 3.7 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  236 15.0 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 577 36.6 
No answer/Undecided 705 44.7 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Corruption: Sweden
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  58 3.7 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  212 13.4 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 559 35.4 
No answer/Undecided 749 47.5 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Corruption: the United States
 Number of respondents % 
In that country the situation is worse than in Belarus  143 9.1 
In that country the situation is the same as in Belarus  237 15.1 
In that country the situation is better than in Belarus 433 27.5 
No answer/Undecided 763 48.4 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Table 57
If Belarusian stateMrun enterprises were to be privatized, where would you prefer to
have investors come from? (three answers are possible)
 Number of respondents % 
Belarus 1,215 77.0 
Israel 13 2.5 
Iran, Venezuela 4 0.3 
China 28 2.8 
Russia 85 26.0 
EU 89 10.5 
the United States 4 3.9 




BLOCK IV. POLITICAL SITUATION
Table 58
There is an opinion: «The state ensures civil peace and political stability and this
justifies certain restrictions on democracy and freedom of speech».
To what extent do you agree?
 Number of respondents % 
Fully agree 178 11.3 
Rather agree 539 34.2 
Rather disagree 409 25.9 
Fully disagree 144 9.1 
No answer/Undecided 308 19.5 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Table 59
Do you agree with the following statements?
Belarus must become an EU member
 Number of respondents % 
No 649 41.2 
Yes 529 33.5 
No answer/Undecided 399 25.3 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Belarus must become a part of Russia
 Number of respondents % 
No 1,043 66.1 
Yes 226 14.4 
No answer/Undecided 306 19.4 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Belarus must remain an independent state
 Number of respondents % 
No 216 13.7 
Yes 1,169 74.1 
No answer/Undecided 192 12.2 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Belarus and Russia must build a single state with a common currency, president and
parliament
  Number of respondents % 
No 865 54.8 
Yes 322 20.4 
No answer/Undecided 390 24.7 
Total  1,577 100.0 
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Block V. GENERAL INFORMATION
Place of residence
  Number of respondents % 
Minsk 300 19.0 
Minsk Region 238 15.1 
Brest Region 212 13.4 
Vitebsk Region 185 11.7 
Gomel Region 238 15.1 
Grodno Region 227 14.4 
Moghilev Region 178 11.3 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Size of settlement
  Number of respondents % 
> 1,000,000 (Minsk) 300 19.0 
100,000 – 500,000  496 31.5 
50,000 – 100,000  94 6.0 
10,000 – 50,000  258 16.4 
5,000 – 10,000  31 2.0 
< 5,000  398 25.2 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Sex
 Number of respondents % 
Male 734 46.5 
Female 844 53.5 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Age
 Number of respondents % 
 18–24 234 14.8 
 25–34 287 18.2 
 35–44 284 18.0 
 45–54 304 19.2 
 55–64 184 11.7 
65 + 285 18.1 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Nationality
 Number of respondents % 
Belarusian 1,353 85.8 
Russian 111 7.0 
Ukrainian 17 1.1 
Pole 84 5.3 
Other 13 0.8 





 Number of respondents % 
Single  303 19.2 
Married 920 58.3 
Live together without civil registration 35 2.2 
Divorced 139 8.8 
Widow/widower 177 11.2 
Refusal 4 0.2 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Monthly income
 Number of respondents % 
Sufficient, and we can put money aside on a monthly basis 121 7.7 
We manage to put money aside, but not regularly  689 43.7 
We only manage to make both ends meet 572 36.3 
Not enough money, we deny ourselves almost everything 119 7.6 
No answer/Undecided 76 4.8 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
Total monthly income, Belarusian rubles
 Number of respondents % 
Less than 200,000 9 0.6 
200,001–400,000 156 9.9 
400,001–600,000 160 10.1 
600,001–800,000 243 15.4 
800,001–1,000,000 281 17.8 
1,000,001–1,250,000 192 12.2 
1,250,001–1,500,000 132 8.3 
1,500,001–1,750,000 66 4.2 
1,750,001–2,000,000 58 3.7 
2,000,001–2,500,000 53 3.4 
Over 2,500,000 24 1.5 
No answer/Undecided 205 13.0 
Total  1,577 100.0 
 
How large is your family/how many people live in the same household and keep house
with you?
 Number of respondents % 
1 200 12.7 
2 474 30.0 
3 488 31.0 
4 308 19.5 
5 74 4.7 
6 26 1.6 
7 5 0.3 
8 1 0.1 
9 3 0.2 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Do you have children under 18 years of age (that live together with you)?
 Number of respondents % 
Yes 571 36.2 
No 1,001 63.5 
No answer 5 0.3 
Total 1,577 100.0 
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Do you personally use the Internet and if yes, how often?
 Number of respondents % 
Yes, every day 135 8.6 
Yes, a few times a week 174 11.1 
Yes, a few times a month 124 7.9 
Yes, once a month and less frequently 67 4.3 
No, I don’t 892 56.6 
I do not know what Internet is 184 11.7 
Total 1,577 100.0 
 
Which of the following countries have you visited in the past three years? A few answers
are possible
  Number of respondents % 
Russia 375 23.8 
Ukraine 203 12.9 
Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) 8 0.5 
Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, etc.) 21 1.3 
Western Europe (Germany, France, etc.) 8 0.5 
Scandinavia (Finland, Sweden, Norway) 1 0.1 
Other 20 1.3 





The Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies (BISS) is registered in Vilnius,
Lithuania. BISS was founded by leading Belarusian experts, journalists and public
figures as a platform for dialogue between the expert and academic community and
civil society, and form a bridge between analysts, Belarusian society and
international community. By developing this dialogue, BISS seeks to generate a
new vision of Belarus through constructive alternative proposals concerning
political, economic and social transformation of the country; studies ways to enhance
Belarus’ competitiveness and improve living standards for Belarusians.
BISS’ key spheres of interest are:
• engagement between the Belarusian state and society;
• transformation of political elites in Belarus;
• quality of human capital and migration issues;
• energy preparedness;
• relationship between Belarus and the European Union;
• Belarusian%Russian relations;
• national identity and development of the Belarusian nation.
BISS focuses on five key initiatives.
1. Economic, political and social research:
• awareness of the nature of «social contracts» in Belarusian society;
• genesis and transformation of political elites in Belarus;
• national identity in modern Belarus;
• global financial crisis and its impact on the Belarusian economy and society.
2. Publication of regular economic liberalization, privatization and investment
surveys, and monitoring of Belarus–EU relations.
3. Expert roundtables and conferences with representatives of think tanks, civil
society, political elite, interest groups and international experts addressing political,
economic and social development of Belarus. The key events include:
• annual BISS conference (two conferences have been held as of today);
• monthly BISS expert roundtables;
• Energy Club, a joint initiative of BISS and the Office for Democratic Belarus
(Brussels) establishing a platform to discuss urgent issues of the Belarusian
energy sector development, energy security and energy efficiency.
4. Advising Belarus Public Policy Fund (BPPF).
5. Publication of the Belarusian Yearbook, a comprehensive review of political,
economic and social trends in Belarus.
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